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This qualitative, inductive dissertation explores a social enterprise’s management of for-profit and 
not-for-profit missions administered through different programmes. Ineffective balancing 
negatively impacted the design, development, and implementation strategy of an education 
technology (EDTech) trial in no-fee government schools in Mpumalanga, South Africa intended to 
fund a non-profit music academy. 
 
This study builds upon existing literature in information technology management; the implications 
of managing multiple missions in social enterprises; as well as technology design and development 
theory. These are used to offer a descriptive account of limited/non-use of education technology in 
areas facing deep rooted inequalities. 
 
Through adopting a qualitative methodology using semi-structured interviews, observation, and 
document analysis; rich data was gathered to construct three case studies of individual schools. 
These case studies are compared to the expectations and reflections of the social enterprise’s board 
and management in light of limited/non use of EDTech. 
 
The research finds high degrees of nuance between schools; even within 5 Kilometres of each other. 
Such nuance is reflected in uneven provision of devices, educational resources, and infrastructure; 
varying technology integration strategies between schools; in addition to the individualistic sense-
making of education technology by teachers. 
 
This research provides a rich example of the difficulty for social enterprises in balancing 
disintegrated social and commercial value chains. This increases the risk of such organisations 
ineffectively allocating resources by prioritising speculative financial gain over social impact; 
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This qualitative and inductive study focuses on the development and introduction of technology in 
three resource constrained schools (RCSs) within Mpumalanga, administered through a social-
enterprise organization. The social-enterprise is made up of two constituent organisations based in 
White River, Mpumalanga, South Africa. 
 
The first organisation is a for profit education technology company called EDTech Pty. Ltd. who 
designed and developed a digital library and Virtual Learning Environment (VLE) called EDTech 
which delivers multimedia learning content through a local server. This feature does not require 
internet access. Additionally, it offers online assessments and class analytics aimed at teachers to 
provide more directed revision of topics. This function requires internet access. The second 
constituent organisation within the social enterprise is a Non-Profit Organisation (NPO) called 
Independent Music Academy (IMA, henceforth) who deliver music education across various after-
school drop-in centres within the province, mainly in townships around Mbombela, Mpumalanga. 
 
The three RCSs involved within this study are within 5Km drive of each other and are situated 
within Bushbuckridge Municipality, about 2 hours’ drive from White River where EDTech/IMA 
share an office. After reading a funders report, the researcher viewed EDTech/IMA as an 
interesting case to conduct research in education technology. In a trial of the EDTech technology 
within Mpumalanga province; the social-enterprise termed it a ‘failure’. Failure is the conclusion 
of EDTech/IMA due to extremely limited use of the technology provided within 11 schools within 
Mpumalanga Province, three of which were involved within this study. 
 
In practical terms, one of the schools involved within this study was the most successful in 
implementing the EDTech technology into regular teaching and learning, but in the eyes of the 
CEO of EDTech Pty. Ltd.  only “half functions” (Interview 2 with E-CEO). Every other school 
involved within the trial either had no reported use of EDTech, or reported usage for a few weeks, 
after which, no usage was reported. Success for EDTech would be recognised through regular 
online assessments conducted through EDTech; and corroborated through an improvement in the 
overall attainment of learners using the system based on previous years at the individual school and 
subject level. 
 
Through reading critical studies of technology in education; Selwyn (2010, p. 66) calls researchers 
to explore “the social, political, economic, cultural and historical contexts within which educational 





The research report explores the context of three spheres of contemporary life in South Africa, and 
now explains the basic elements of the legacy of Apartheid on spatial development in the areas of 
this study; South African education; and the current state of (internet) technology in South African 
communities. 
 
1.1.1 Context of Former Homelands in South Africa 
This research took place within three no-fee, government schools. These three schools operate 
within what used to be a former ‘self-governing territory’ during Apartheid time, also known as 
homelands or Bantustans. The policy of creating homelands was initiated in 1950 and is reflected 
in Apartheid era legislation such as the Group Areas Act and the political ideology of separate 
development of races within South Africa (Benwell, 2009). 
 
The former homeland, Gazankulu, was the home of the xiTsonga speaking people group and is 
where each of the three RCSs involved within this study are situated. Former homelands in South 
Africa still experienced the practical legacy of Apartheid. Water and electricity supply is not steady. 
Additionally, former homelands have underdeveloped transport and economic infrastructure. They 
are plagued with an inheritance of poorly resourced and maintained healthcare and educational 
institutions (King & McCusker, 2007). 
 
1.1.2 Context of South African Education 
In the wake of South Africa’s transition to a constitutional democracy; central and provincial 
governments sought to democratise education through several policies such as prioritising 
government funding in the poorest schools in the country and prohibiting such schools from levying 
fees on parents (Mestry & Ndhlovu, 2014); ensuring parents and local communities have direct 
participation in individual school development through mandatory School Governing Bodies 
(SGBs) (Karlsson, 2002); and attempts to deracialise school enrolment policies (Mestry, 2014; 
Spaull, 2012). 
 
Schools are classified as poor based upon their built infrastructure available and the socio-economic 
status of the population within the schools’ catchment areas and based upon a formula set by 
national government declares what funding is provided to individual schools based upon their 
relative resource availability (Mestry, 2014). Such resource constraints experienced by no-fee 
schools manifests itself through many symptoms, but for the purposes of this study, characterised 
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by infrastructure available within schools; the number of classrooms available; and variable access 
to technology. Schools with significant fee-based income can afford to invest in, for example, 
computer labs and due to geographic location, access to effective internet connections. Therefore, 
in areas privileged by Apartheid spatial policies, education technology interventions have access 
to more tacit resources such as educated and (relatively) economically stable parents (Yamauchi, 
2011); teachers educated to higher standards; and, in the case of generally white and coloured (an 
accepted term for mixed race individuals in South Africa) learners, the privilege of being able to 
learn in home languages (English and Afrikaans): the latter being an issue explored in the context 
of higher education by (Jaffer, Ng’ambi, & Czerniewicz, 2007). 
 
With this in mind, it is therefore reasonable to assert that fee-paying schools operate in significantly 
different operational conditions than no-fee schools resulting in development interventions 
requiring a local focus. In more specific terms, an appreciation of the nuanced context of operating 
in former ‘self-governing territory’s’ schools; and the implications of these historical process on 
the human resources, skills, and socio-political governance structures within schools is required. 
With the rise of new digital technologies, developing solutions with users to ensure such contextual 
appreciation is engrained within development processes resulting in relevant, useful, and 
potentially profitable products. 
 
1.1.3 The Context of (Internet) Technology in South Africa 
Internationally, the idea of a digital divide has characterised the gap between those who have access 
to technology and those who don’t (Donner, 2015). However, when access is considered to live 
within proximity to wireless telephone masts, regardless of access to devices, digital literacies, and 
meaningful content, this access can be referred to as theoretical access (Donner, 2015; Selwyn, 
2004). Therefore, the dichotomous view of access and digital divide becomes problematic. 
 
South Africa has the second highest inequality rating in the world, measured by the Gini Index 
(Central Inteligence Agency, 2018). Additionally, there is a broad legacy of Apartheid era-separate 
development policies in terms of infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, in this regard) 
(Kreutzer, 2009). Therefore, South Africans who live in non-urban areas are more likely to find 
themselves without access to the Internet as comparable to metropolitan areas such as Mbombela’s 
suburbs. This is manifested in the availability of broadband internet access which is not available 
typically within less economically developed areas of the province such as where the three schools 




Donner (2015) discusses the implications of the high-cost of mobile data (generally on pay-per-bit 
model) relative to disposable income as the ‘Metered Mindset’. The pay-per-bit model can be 
explained as devices owners paying for typically low amounts of mobile data. I.e. buying 20 Mbs 
for a day browsing. This a serious blockage in developing a fuller utilization of the Internet, 
particularly in low income communities. It is safe to assume that most mobile Internet user 
experiences this by thinking twice about what content they access; for how long; and when they 
access it (peak or off peak). 
 
South Africa is 28th in Africa for the cost of 1Gb of mobile data ($7.67) (2017 Q2), which is 
astonishing compared to the 2017 Q2 figure for Egypt at ($1.25) (Africa Research ICT, 2018). 
However, South Africa was 21st in Africa for 2017 Q1 ($7.49) and in 2016 Q1, South Africa was 
17th cheapest in Africa ($6.26) (ibid). This discouraging trend, of increasing prices is concerning. 
One potential contributing factor for this is the mobile network operators (MNOs) keen interest in 
ensuring the fastest possible speeds. MNOs have recently announced their readiness to bid for 5G 
spectrum access (Businesstech.co.za, 2018). As internet access remains unaffordable to those who 
experience the extremes of inequality; living under a 5G tower is meaningless as the cost of data 
increases. 
 
Without a means to gain experience with digital, internet technology residents in these areas will 
lack the suitable digital literacies in order to engage with technology as it takes time to develop 
skills in using software, devices like keyboards and mice. Therefore, in operating in communities 
who disproportionately experience structural oppression such as in former homelands, there must 
be an appreciation of the complex, non-linear, and divergent processes through which people make 
sense of, find value in, and use technology (Donner, Gitau, & Marsden, 2011). Given the varying 
digital literacies required between a low-end smart phone and a high performance desktop PC; it is 
necessary to remember there are distinct differences in what is possible or worthwhile for a 
particular kind of device: “The Internet is different when it is 2.5 inches wide.” (Donner et al., 
2011, p. 591). 
 
 
Schools involved in the trial of EDTech enacted it to varying degrees if at all, but none to the level 
EDTech/IMA had hoped to realise its believed transformative potential. Given the significant 
private and governmental investment in the platform, this research seeks to identify experiences of 
‘failure’ as learning opportunities specific to EDTech and education technology actors in South 




The principal research question of this study asks: what factors contributed to limited/non-use of 
EDTech in a trial in no-fee schools in Bushbuckridge Municipality, Mpumalanga? 
 
This question aims to provide detailed user based accounts to develop an evidence based strategy 
for EDTech/IMA to develop a relevant, implementable, and meaningful education technology 
product. Early rationalisations of failure provided through initial conversations, emails, and reports 
provided to the researcher primarily highlighted issues with external stakeholders such as the 
Mpumalanga Department of Education (MDoE) through inadequate training and class level 
integration support. However, this question acknowledges the potential for other factors to have 
contributed to the failure. 
 
At no point in the initial reports or conversations with the CEO of EDTech Pty. Ltd. were the views 
of teachers, learners, principals, or support staff’ used to explain such limited/non-use of EDTech. 
The users’ voices remained unaccounted for and have the potential to reveal rich details of their 
decision making process to avoid EDTech. Thusly, there is an opportunity to gain a broader 
perspective on what EDTech/IMA management came to term a failed trial. 
 
From the primary research question, a secondary research question asks: given the contributing 
factors to limited/non-use of EDTech, what can be learned from the approach of EDTech/IMA to 
integrating technology in schools facing resource constraints? 
 
1.2.1 Scope of the Dissertation 
This dissertation studies a specific digital library and VLE called EDTech, developed by the social-
enterprise, EDTech/IMA based in White River, Mpumalanga. A trial of the technology within 11 
schools within Mpumalanga Province took place in 2016, of which, three schools located within 
Bushbuckridge Municipality, Mpumalanga were identified to participate in this research in 
partnership with the social enterprise management. 
 
The organisation EDTech/IMA was selected as this represented an interesting case of limited/non-
use of technology in education settings. Subsequently, the three schools were purposively sampled 





Semi-structured interviews (individual and group based); participant observation; 
reports/documents were used as data collection methods in order to gain rich insight into multiple 
perspectives of limited/non-use of EDTech. A breakdown of the data gathered for this study is 
shown in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 – Field Site Data Collection 
Data Collection 
Method 
EDTech/IMA RCSs Total 




Learners: 3 groups 




Hours: 100 Hours: 90-105 Hours: 190-205 
Reports/Documents Number: 12 Number: 2 Number: 14 
 
 
This study assumed that schools operating in Bushbuckridge Municipality, Mpumalanga faced 
resource constraints which schools in and around towns and cities do not face. This was in most 
respects true and is reflected in low proximity to larger commercial and transport hubs; and access 
to reliable broadband internet connectivity. 
 
While each school had varying degrees of internet access and devices for teachers and learners to 
use; all principals discussed the complexity of managing no-fee schools in rural areas and the 
impact of smaller student bodies and faculty. Additionally, the relative socio-economic position of 
learners in the area of the schools, based upon the history of the area and the classification of no-
fee status, as a proxy measure, highlights distinct challenges which schools in peri-urban or urban 
areas may not face such as teacher recruitment and retention, infrastructure development, and local 
opportunities (for education and employment) for learners to be motivated to pursue and aspire to. 
 
While these schools are considered resource constrained in part due to their remote location and 
no-fee status; they cannot be considered as representative of all remote nor no fee schools. There 
have been investments made within these schools in technology resources which do not necessarily 





At no point during the research encounter were lessons; exam preparation or school operations 
interrupted. Interviews and conversations only took place with learners in an after school setting 
and only with the participant information sheet explained comprehensively. 
 
In line with both the UCT and GSB ethical conduct, no questions asking for intimate personal 
details and accounts were asked. Where personal accounts were organically offered through open 
questions, these were treated with respect, no probing questions, and participants were reminded 
that at any point now or in the future they could request any data collected to be destroyed and not 
used. 
 
All participants in interviews signed an informed consent form and consent was obtained from 
EDTech/IMA management and the management of RCSs, and the Mpumalanga Department of 
Education to conduct research within places under their jurisdiction (letter of approval in appendix 
I). Additionally, coming from overseas and being white required the researcher to continually 
introduce himself as a researcher, overcoming any uncertainty of the reason for his presence. 
 
All organisations have been awarded codes, apart from EDTech/IMA which have been given 
pseudonyms. Coding for individuals is used and efforts to remove, where possible, references to 
gender, while the coding of schools and avoiding naming specific villages helps to engrain 
anonymity so that no principal, teacher, learner or other individual can be immediately identified. 
This was made clear to participants at the beginning of interactions. 
 
2 Literature Review 
“An idea does not by itself solve a problem, but needs to be combined with time to develop it, 
skilled work to provide evidence for it, rhetorical work to make it plausible to others, and the 
support to put all of those in place” (Sismondo, 2004, p. 70). 
 
The literature review considers three academic streams relating to perspectives of technology 
within organisations and education; social enterprises and hybrid organisations to sustainably 
impact social change; as well as technology design and development methodologies. 
 
The subject of technology within organisations is addressed within a broad range of literatures, but 
for clarity, this study considers primarily sociomateriality and the practice lens literature.  This 
literature which has developed over recent decades to address the view that technology acts as an 
“independent variable” (Leonardi, 2012, p. 26) – where technology is applied it effects specific 
 
 15 
outcomes, pre-defined, and predicable. However, this perspective fails to account for the breadth 
other factors and underplays the role of both social structures and humans on technology (Oliver, 
2011; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Selwyn, 2010). 
 
There has been an increasing interest in the practice lens beyond technology in organisations, with 
an increasing interest in sociomaterial analyses in the intersection of education and technology 
research (Halperin, 2017; Halperin & Backhouse, 2007; Johri, 2011; Selwyn, 2010; Somekh, 
2004). These researchers have similar critical perspectives on determinism and thusly recognise 
what will be explained along the lines of technology and humans as co-constituents, acting upon 
one another (re)creating social structures they operate within. They challenge the typical education 
technologist perspective of assumed nascent impacts of technology on driving up education 
standards. Some, such as Selwyn, explicitly critique and call for research which problematizes 
assumptions around the transformative potential of technology in education by presenting cases of 
limited and non-use to counterpoint the perspectives of ever-the-optimist developmentalists. 
Selwyn (2010, p. 72) describes this research as developing research based on “reality” as opposed 
to “rhetoric” often espoused by learning technology theorists. 
 
In the context of this study, this literature and theoretical underpinning is appropriate given the 
context of lower than expected utilisation of the EDTech platform in Resource Constrained Schools 
(RCSs). This positions EDTech/IMA (the social enterprise) and EDTech (the technology) as a case 
of limited/non-use of an education technology. The practice lens equips the researcher with a 
vocabulary and backdrop of related studies with which to explore particular antecedents of non-
use (Halperin, 2017; Halperin & Backhouse, 2007) within the EDTech trial. The disposition of the 
practice lens to root analyses in observable action and practice aids in the provision of insight 
towards the development of both the EDTech product and the EDTech/IMA social enterprise 
structure. 
 
The second principal literature stream this study considers relates to the management of hybrid 
organisations (including social enterprises). These are organisations who seek to make 
profit/achieve financial sustainability while achieving a social mission. In social enterprises like 
EDTech/IMA, relationship management, between internal role-players (EDTech Pty. and IMA) 
and in the broader eco-system of stakeholders, is important. External stakeholders include the 
Mpumalanga Department of Education (MDoE); a 3rd party, UK based NGO; the RCSs; and the 
for-profit technology developers. Clearly, managing multiple stakeholders’ perspectives, ideas, and 
visions becomes important in ensuring that the EDTech’s efforts are not subject to mission drift – 
 
 16 
where social purpose organisations, for varying reasons, change their direction, seek more lucrative 
and potentially less socially impactful goals and fail to realise their initial mission. In some cases 
differing perspectives and visions of stakeholders are prioritised due to funding opportunities which 
can be classified as mission drift (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). 
 
The third literature stream explored is in design of technology and contemporary start-up theory. 
This section explores the importance of involving users and potential customers throughout an 
iterative design methodology. The emphasis here is to ensure that solutions are built to address 
problems which exist; are sufficiently scoped; and that designer and developer assumptions are 
tested for representativeness. Design thinking is gaining credence within development circles to 
develop realistic social missions and developing solutions which respond to user contexts (T. 
Brown & Wyatt, 2010). Additionally, using lean startup theory compliments this is terms of 
challenging and developing assumptions which a solution is built with and a highly iterative 
approach to development of a technology (Ries, 2011). 
 
The literature review now turns to exploring the development of the practice lens through a 
discussion of both deterministic and purely social-constructivist accounts of technologies. 
 
 
The development of sociomateriality literature in recent decades has drawn on perspectives from a 
wide range of academic areas, both established and emergent (such as Science & Technology 
Studies[S&TS]). The literature review now presents the development and theoretical background 
of Sociomateriality and the Practice Lens. 
 
2.1.1 From Technological Determinism 
Traditionally, there has been a view of technology being stable, regardless of its spatial and 
temporal application (Orlikowski, 1992, 2006, 2009; Orlikowski & Scott, 2014). In this view 
technology will produce, almost certainly, a particular socio-environmental change, a view which 
Pinch and Bijker (1984) reject. Woolgar and Grint (1991, p370, in (Orlikowski, 2000)) comment 
that once a technology has reached “a point of stability”; it becomes fairly clear what a technology 
can do. This is problematic. Orlikowski (2000) suggests the assumption that an artefact is rigid and 
temporally and culturally transcendent is blown over when empirical research shows diverse 




Technological determinism holds that because a technology is, in one given social and temporal 
context; that it will be across the board, enduring through time and space (M. R. Smith & Marx, 
1994). 
 
In order for us to build the fullest picture of technology’s influence in projects of modernity – it is 
important to understand the whole host of narratives of both human and non-human agency. 
However, viewing ‘modernity’, a concept with which Brey (2003) considers alongside technology, 
as a process or goal, is in itself a problematic term with little analytic purchase (Cooper, 2005). 
Assumptions of a linear path towards development, emerged through 20th century discourse, where 
“‘modern’ was equated with ‘western’ and ‘progress’” (Christie 2008, p75). Rodiriguez and Wilson 
(2000, p3) posit that these assumptions can be “dangerously wrong”. 
 
Williams and Edge (1996, p880) highlight “the very structure and architecture of contemporary 
information technology is itself a product of historical processes of social and economic shaping.” 
With this point in mind, can it be possible to simply retrofit a technology (such as One Laptop Per 
Child [OLPC] technology) ideated, designed and built the colonial era buildings of MIT, Oxford 
and Berkley to an emerging market, postcolonial context? Without the deep contextual 
understanding of the users, these well intentioned endeavours may fall below what was hoped 
(Warschauer & Ames, 2010). 
 
When developers are far removed from the socio-economic, political, technological context of 
those whom an intervention is developed, these complex negotiations can often be made without 
considering the person behind the screen, as a unique, dependant variable – affected by and 
operating within the context of historical processes (Kraemer, Dedrick, & Sharma, 2009). While 
EDTech was designed and developed in South Africa with relative proximity to the spaces intended 
for use; the extent to which this translated into actual observation and consideration of the contexts 
of users may present similar outcomes of geographical distance. Practically, limited observation  
of user contexts reduces visibility and involvement of users throughout the design, development, 
and implementation process, as experienced by programmes such as OLPC (Warschauer & Ames, 
2010). 
 
Fraught with political undercurrents; the tendency to view “technology as an independent entity, a 
virtually autonomous agent of change” (Smith & Marx, 1994, pxi) or an “independent variable” 
(Leonardi, 2012, p26; Orlikowski & Scott, 2014, p872); technological determinism represents just 




Therefore, to view a technological artefact as stable, to black box it, and assume it as an independent 
variable is problematic. Returning to this studies concern with young people, in rural South Africa, 
and their experience of technology (the Internet and mobile devices): Chigona, Chigona, Kayongo, 
and Kausa (2010) find that technology alone, cannot effect positive change in education. With this 
in mind, we return to Warschauer and Ames (2010) and their work on the One Laptop Per Child 
(OLPC) program who find that access to technologies is not enough to make positive contributions 
to Education; and argue it needs to happen alongside more systemic “integrated education 
improvement efforts” (p. 34). Thus, dispelling the “utopianism” (Warschauer & Ames, 2010, p. 
40) of previous black boxed, technologically deterministic projects becomes of increasing 
pertinence. 
 
2.1.2  A Pendulum from Determinism to Constructivism 
Pinch & Bijker (1984, p406) argue a “sociological theory of technology… should be the 
explanandum not the explanans” amounting for the fact that technology should seek to be 
explained, and not be taken as the explanation. In pointing out the flaws of technological 
determinism, we uncover some of the benefits of the social shaping of technology (SST) (Williams 
& Edge, 1996) or the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) (Pinch & Bijker, 1984). 
 
Pinch and Bijker (1984, p. 411) notably outlined the elementary stage of SCOT; but is concerned 
with “the developmental process of a technological artefact… described as an alternation of 
variation and selection.”. Their systematic historical analysis of the development of the modern 
day bicycle highlights the various material alternatives in construction; wheel and suspension 
engineering; the users, designers and manufacturers (as heterogeneous groups with equally 
heterogeneous objectives); and various solutions for various interpretations of the problem to be 
solved. Ultimately, ‘market forces’ combined with sufficient rhetorical work on social factors (such 
as perceptions of style and safety) consolidated the design of what we would consider the 
predecessor of the modern day bicycle (Pinch & Bijker, 1984). 
 
The social constructivist approach to S&TS places overt, if not complete, focus on human agency 
and the roles of human actors in technology studies. However, Pickering (1993, p. 564) discusses 
the ways in which “the contours of materiality” act as a kind of agency meaning that materiality 
shapes what action is possible. Similarly, Orlikowski (2006, p. 460) writes “human action is highly 




This acceptance of agency which is beyond the human realm, or alternatively, the rejection of a 
purely human centred understanding of technology pushes us to consider technology (and scientific 
fact) with a “posthumanist turn” (Pickering, 1993, p561). There is in fact a third path; one which 
recognizes the partial truths found in both perspectives – of the material agency (known to 
technological determinists) and of human agency (argued by social constructivists), and 
importantly, separating the institutional context (etiquette, norms and protocol) from human agency 
(Orlikowski, 1992); building on the theory of structuration by Giddens (1984). 
 
2.1.3   Sociomateriality Leading to the Practice Lens 
The duality of technology reflects both the human agency enacting technology and technology in 
its artefactual characteristics. Additionally however, through the structurational model of 
technology is also “institutional in structure” (Orlikowski, 1992). Through an example of a 
technology consultancy firm who developed, used and licensed their own proprietary interface 
design software; we are shown how the rigid institutional properties of the in-house software enact 
a form of agency over how employees work should be done; perhaps more realistically how not to 
perform their jobs. The management within this consultancy firm, designed the technology in a 
specific way so as to engrain ‘best practice’ into the daily work routines of staff. However, over 
time the specific interactions between staff and technology were occasionally modified based on 
the experience of staff within their consulting projects. 
 
Adding this extra layer of complexity (through consideration of the institutional properties), would 
have forced the founders, managers, and designers of OLPC to consider the wildly varying contexts 
their technology sought to have impact. Through a less technologically deterministic approach their 
intervention could have been better incorporated into the daily routines and give dignity to the 
current structures and practices within which learners learn. 
 
More recent work to this effect by Orlikowski, is termed ‘the practice lens’ (2000). One key 
takeaway is the separation of technology between its artefactual characteristics such as hard and 
soft components – its materiality – and the artefact in use (ibid). The practice lens develops some 
key features of Giddens’ theory of structuration (1984) that social structures (technology) are 
‘enacted in situ’; that they are (re)produced over space and time; and through this repeated series 
of engagements, particular routines emerge. 
 
Depending on the specific materialities enacted, structures informing use, and the sense making 
capacities of users – various and innumerable versions of a ‘technology-in-practice’ may be 
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observed. A Technology-in-Practice may be (re)produced over time; though it never attains an 
enduring ‘stabilised’ perspective as with the possibility to do otherwise lies the potential for 
innovation, learning, and change.” (Orlikowski, 2000, p. 412). 
 
The Practice Lens, drawing on the idea of structurational modalities, is developed by Orilowski 
(2000). The ontological nature of the practice lens (in separating a technology from its users and 
institutional context) is carried over and the author uses intra-connectedness to refer to each 
component’s co-constitutive nature. This stema from the work of Barad in intra-action (2003) 
which has been applied in Information Systems research to progress from thinking about two 
discreet entities acting upon one another: “when boundaries dissolve and things pass through each 
other” (Scott & Orlikowski, 2009, p. 6). 
 
These modalities, as depicted by Orlikowski are ‘facilities’, ‘norms’, and ‘interpretive schemes’ 
(2000). Facilities refers to the technologies at hand and that are implicated in practice, though an 
important aspect of this is that specific materiality that isn’t implicated in practice is not considered 
to be relevant in a Technology-in-Practice account. Norms, or normative conditions refers to 
institutional forces. This can be thought of elements of organisational culture, accepted work 
practices, and expectations of how people ought to enact technology to achieve organisational ends. 
Interpretive schemes are the knowledges and assumptions held by individuals who provoke 
technology in particular ways. Each of these structurational modalities affect and are affected by 
each other and sit within broader structures which shape and form what practice could and should 




Figure 1 - Technology-in-Practice framework (Orlikowski, 2000) 
The practice lens focuses research on actions with technology, and allows researchers to observe 
diverse interpretations, understandings and norms associated with technology. This provides the 
basis to observe and account for differences in application of the same technology, particularly 
within different organizations. 
 
Within the confines of this study and given the field sites to be explored, this lens allows researchers 
and practitioners to understand the rationales that people approach technology with resulting in 
various degrees of use, potentially looking rather different to one another. Additionally, it uncovers 
the unforeseen impacts such uses have across various institutions, places, times, given a multitude 
of factors external to the technology itself (ibid). 
 
2.1.4   Existing studies of Sociomateriality in Education Technology Research  
Studies such as Johri (2011) and Selwyn (2010) have outlined the tendency of education technology 
practitioners to focus on assumed impacts of technology on education, and both seek to move 
towards practice based accounts. Education scholars have for decades proposed the 
 
 22 
transformational impacts of technology on education and development more generally. However, 
as Mercer (2005, p. 243) writes “development interventions which turn the symptoms of poverty 
into technical problems to be solved with technological responses are inherently flawed”. 
 
Studies of Technology Mediated Learning (TML) have considered the transformation of space and 
time occurring through internetworked learning technologies. On the issue of space it has been 
rationalised that learners engaging in TML are simultaneously alone by a computer but co-present 
in a community of learners in digital space (Loureiro-Koechlin & Allan, 2009). The implications 
of TML on the temporality of learning have been discussed in relation to consumption of learning 
multimedia independently and at will (Perrotta, Czerniewicz, & Beetham, 2016) and in terms of 
the implications on the “freedom” of recipients of electronic communications to the benefit of 
senders (Loureiro-Koechlin & Allan, 2009, p. 4). 
 
The aim of EDTech in RCSs is to effect a hybrid learning environment which allows students to 
be physically co-present during school hours, yet allow those with access to personal devices to 
study from home through the EDTech App. This hybridity of spatio-temporal co-presence and the 
decentring of teacher from the learning process is socio-politically contentious. As found in other 
contexts, such redefinition of ‘the teacher’ does not foster effective education technology 
implementation and practice development (Hodas, 1993). Additionally, viewing them simply as 
banks of specific units of knowledge to be transferred to receptacles (learners) degrades the 
importance of teachers – a profession built on centuries of practice. Subsequently, teachers’ refusal 
to use such ‘transformational’ technologies, from the deterministic, knowledge transfer perspective 
often results in blame due to the “stubborn backwardness of teachers or inflexibility or insularity 
of school culture” (Hodas, 1993, p. 9). 
 
Rich accounts of practice within education technology are needed, particularly in cases which do 
not represent the dominant stream of ‘models of technology’s transformational potential’. This 
highlights issues in “compromised and constrained social realities of technology use ‘on the 
ground’ in educational settings” (Selwyn, 2010, p. 66). 
 
The practice lens, with its focus on lived realities and tendency towards observation of action 
provides a useful theoretical lens with which to critique education technology. With a critical gaze, 
the researcher can “move beyond asking whether a technology ‘works’ in a technical or pedagogic 
sense” (Selwyn, 2010, p. 72). Such a move beyond functionality and more explicit focus on critique 
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can reveal pre-existing conflicts between the powerful and powerless taking into consideration 
previous historical processes (ibid, p. 70). 
 
The practice lens provides a focus on use and technology in practice. The use of the structurational 
modalities offered through the practice lens, in the context of education technology research 
“facilitate the inter-linkage between agency and structure which are viewed not as independent and 
conflicting elements but as a mutually interacting duality” (Halperin & Backhouse, 2007, p. 5). 
 
As opposed to seeing the OLPC intervention as applicable “in spite of [the learners’] schools and 
teachers” (Warschauer & Ames, 2010, p. 34), a structurational view would have forced the 
developers and founders to consider the users and their specific needs (of literacy, language, 
specific content needs, etc.); not to mention the apparent disregard of the value teachers could add. 
On the issue of the displacement of teachers’ role and power relations with the class; Bass (2009, 
p. 9) writes about the potentially dramatic difference in success of the OLPC programme if it were 
“conceived as ‘One Laptop Per Teacher’”. 
 
OLPC’s technologically deterministic perspective ignored the more neutral perspective that “ICT 
is more of a sociotechnical network than a tool” (Warschauer & Ames, 2010, p. 37). The ‘tool 
view’ is explained extensively by Orlikowski and Iacono (2001, p. 123) and highlights that a tool 
can be “passed from hand to hand and used as is, by anyone, anytime, and anywhere”. This may 
be somewhat an acceptable claim for a hammer (taking inspiration from Leonardi (2012)). 
However, with its negligible material complexity when compared to a laptop, we begin to see the 
problematic nature of such a view. This would assume that all laptops, operating systems, input 
and output devices share a common standard and critically, that users actually possess the skills to 
engage and make meaning with these tools. In countries such as South Africa where consumer 
technology tends to be mobile with touch interfaces, desktop/laptop computer literacies tend to be 
less prevalent. This is evident through Donner’s (2015) idea of theoretical access where access has 
typically been thought of purely from living within range of mobile phone networks. 
 
The context of EDTech and IMA operating as a social enterprise, blending both for profit and non-
profit initiatives requires additional organizational and management theory to provide academic 





There are several names given to organizations which combine profit making activities and the 
achievement of a particular social mission such as Social Enterprises (Bull, 2008; Donner, 2015); 
Corporations with Social Responsibility Programmes (Banerjee, 2008; Copestake, 2007); Public-
Private Partnerships (Miraftab, 2004); corporate-NGO collaborations (Dahan, Doh, Oetzel, & 
Yaziji, 2010) and the list is almost inexhaustible. 
 
Suffice to say that, regardless of academic and practitioner nomenclature, there is a significant 
increase in organizations who seek to fulfil social ends with income generation activities. These 
organisations and activities “lie in a netherworld between economic and political action” (Unger, 
2015, p. 234) as both global market capitalism and the nation state have failed to serve adequately 
(Curtis, 2008; Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015, p. 52). 
 
With varying degrees of a profit/social motives, significant interest has been taken in several market 
based approaches to social development with equally varying degrees of profitability and impact. 
Examples in Prahalad (2006, 2014) including ‘Jaipur Foot’, ‘Aravind Eye Care’ within his book 
show that by innovating (sometimes completely redesigning) traditional business processes such 
as patient flows in hospitals and clinics; organisations seeking financially self-sustainable 
operations can radically reduce inefficiencies. This can decrease costs while increasing quality of 
service delivery and patient throughput, simultaneously. 
 
Both of these sustainable social development organizations (Jaipur Foot and Aravind Eye Care) 
combine radically reduced manufacturing and supply chain costs, as well as the development of 
cost recovery focussed business models. These see the minority pay while the majority (90% in 
some cases) would receive a full package of treatment for free (Prahalad, 2014). 
 
2.2.1 Hybridity Expressed Through Competing Institutional Logics 
Hybrid organisations find themselves balancing potentially competing ‘logics’ (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010) where logics refer to organizational schemas of how to achieve specific goals; be 
that profit or social impact. As Smith, Gonin, and Besharov (2013, p. 409) explain; competing 
organisational objectives “juxtapose divergent identities, goals, logics, and practices, which creates 
tensions for leaders and their organizations”. This poses a difficult challenge for the leaders of 
hybrid organisations as they must manage these tensions effectively. However, these tensions 





However, interpersonal conflicts between different employees within the same organisation are 
possible. Some have a role clearly aligned with one or other logic (a production manager vs. an 
employee support councillor) (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015). As such, tension between 
competing institutional logics not only takes places within a negotiation between financial and 
social performance; but also in employees’ identification with one or other logic. Clear 
organisational leadership and creating mutual appreciation of the role of each logic-identity in 
achieving “superordinate goal” (Battilana et al., 2015, p. 1678) is important in hybrids. 
 
While organisations seeking to achieve multiple objectives including profitable commercial logics 
and multiple social impact logics; Garrette and Karnani (2010, p. 42) introduces the idea of 
“multiple objectives trap”. Wach (2012, p. 12) explores this in relation a Danone project which 
sought to create a yogurt product delivering a dual social objective and an additional profit making 
imperative. One social objective was to fortify the yoghurt product with health improving vitamins 
and minerals and the other was to ensure the packaging and waste management was 
environmentally friendly. 
 
With the triple objectives; Danone realised it wasn’t possible to reconcile these three logics and 
instead removed the focus on environmental impact to ensure profitability of the fortified yoghurt 
products specifically designed for those on low incomes (ibid). Evidently, the managing of many 
social objectives while remaining profitable was not possible for Danone to justify it as a profitable 
business venture. 
 
Managing tensions between institutional logics has implications on resource allocation; how 
management focus is prioritised; and how employees and volunteers see their roles within the 
organisations. Considering the role of human resources as assets to organisations; Battilana and 
Dorado (2010) discuss the implications of hybrid organisations in the Micro-Finance sector 
prioritising employees with a dominant background in finance or social development. They 
highlight the importance of creating a shared organisational identity to avoid tension between the 
two groups. 
 
However, such tension between logics also impacts members of staff who are responsible for 
delivering financial and social value simultaneously. As is the case with many micro-finance 
organisations; staff members experience this tension through rationalising their “nurturing role” 
with clients and ensuring acceptable repayment rates as set by management (Dixon, Ritchie, & 




The notion of strategically employing people who may not fit conventional logic of, in the case of 
finance, emphasises the imperative for organisations adopting such an approach to ensure adequate 
training; skills development; and socialisation with the organisational values, vision, and mission 
to achieve “operational excellence” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 1435). 
 
2.2.2 Target Group Inclusivity in Staff and Board Membership 
Scholars of hybrid organisation theory build on the theme of human resources discuss the value 
excluded societal groups could bring to hybrid organisations seeking profitable social business 
models as “antagonistic assets” (Hockerts, 2015). Hockerts (2015, pp. 85–86) argues the imperative 
to view “marginalised people… as inherently valuable in their own right”. By doing so, Hockerts 
(2015) gives vivid examples of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) adding value 
within the software development process. This is built on the assumption that some individuals 
with ASD have a preference for repetitive work with attention to detail. While this is just one 
example of how individuals excluded from traditional organisations can add value; strategically 
selecting employees from marginalised groups presents potential competitive advantages given 
their unique life experiences and skill sets (ibid).  
 
Viewing people from marginalised groups as value adding assets to organisations may be a social 
purpose in its own right. However, the inclusion of target service users or end consumers within 
operations processes or strategy development present opportunities to engrain the voices, 
experiences, and opinions of beneficiaries within the organisation itself. Furthermore, Mair, Mayer, 
and Lutz (2015, p. 717) highlight that traditional non-profit boards would tend to reflect “target 
group,  community members, and volunteers”. Such a view would reflect the principle of ensuring 
such marginalised voices or “antagonistic assets” should be incorporated into hybrid organisations 
where one institutional logic seeks to achieve a social social mission. Therefore, the extent to which 
boards have some representation of target groups in decision making processes, may foster more 
or less balance towards competing institutional logics of commercial viability and social mission. 
 
2.2.3 Perspectives on the Marketisation and Financialisation of Compassion 
Within the various literature streams on hybrid organizations and social enterprises more generally, 
financial sustainability is often mentioned as the main motivation for seeking self-generated 
revenue streams (Baumann, 2004; Haigh, Walker, Bacq, & Kickul, 2015; Santos et al., 2015). 
However, there are particular perspectives on sustainability which differentiate between 
operational sustainability (income cover operational costs) and total financial sustainability 
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(income covers operational costs plus growth capital) which could otherwise be thought of as 
complete self-sufficiency (Bogan, 2012). 
 
“Investing in a social business is different from philanthropy in several ways – the social business 
is self-sustaining and investors get their money back: people who donate to charity do not.” (Yunus, 
Moingeon, & Lehmann-Ortega, 2010, p. 311). This is the ideal set-up many social enterprises strive 
for and draws on a core tenet of sustainability which generally underpins the Social Enterprise 
movement. 
 
While such investments in what Yunus, et al (2010) call ‘social businesses’ may take the lead from 
Islamic loan philosophy of 0% interest; it allows investors, presumably, to continue to recycle their 
capital through vehicles akin to venture capital. However, the extent to which this includes a profit 
margin, and/or how this margin is calculated, remains unclear. 
 
Beyond direct financial remuneration to investors, Dahan, et al. (2010) deal with the collaboration 
between One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) and Microsoft where Microsoft developed a limited version 
of the windows operating system which ran on the devices made by OLPC. While there may not 
have been direct financial remuneration for MS – using their historically dominant market position 
as the computer (as opposed to alternatives like Linux) means for many first time users of 
computers, Microsoft could very quickly get the Windows brand domesticated in these new 
markets for long term gain (Kraemer et al., 2009). Likewise, in the short term, Microsoft can reap 
the ethical rewards for providing for those less fortunate. 
 
Equally troubling, is the assumption that users in resource constrained economies should settle for 
low-cost/low-performance technology (ibid). The power relations in such collaborations are cause 
for concern due to the assumptions of trusteeship and pervading post-colonial imagination felt 
towards the African continent (Mercer, Mohan, & Power, 2003). Such trusteeship and viewing 
service users as beneficiaries presents a potentially imbalanced power dynamic between 
organisations and those who consume the product or service they produce. It may be tempting for 
organisations to prescribe solutions from the perspective of their world view based upon 
assumptions as opposed to the lived realities of beneficiaries. 
 
Regarding public and third sector collaborations; the contractualisation of social welfare, for 
example, through the tendering of services from governments to third-sector organisations is 
arguably “radically restructuring these institutions along market-friendly, not client-friendly, paths 
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of development.” (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005, p. 93); potentially a kind of pseudo-
privatisation (McHugh, Sinclair, Roy, Huckfield, & Donaldson, 2013). 
 
Examples within social care in South Africa have recently caused dramatic concern such as the 
Life Esidimeni case where the outsourcing of psychiatric care contracts coupled with poor patient 
management practices and the prioritisation of cost-cutting had fatal consequences for more than 
100 patients (Dhai, 2017b, 2017a). Whether through poor tendering processes and due diligence; 
lack of oversight; a risk that comes with the model; or more realistically a mix of some of these 
factors, it is clear there are issues in the implementation of public-private-partnerships; and the 
contracting of social welfare programmes regardless of country (Miraftab, 2004). 
 
2.2.4   Balancing Profitability and Impact 
Beyond a few examples of sustainable social enterprises (Aravind Eye Care, Jaipur Foot, etc.); is 
it possible for all hybrid organizations to achieve the appropriate mix? Creating revenue streams 
sufficient to support operations and maintaining a strong social objective can be realised in different 
ways. 
 
Alter (2007) explains the ways in which revenue streams can be aligned (or not) with the social 
programmes offered  (figure 2, below). 
 
 
Figure 2 - 'level of integration between social programmes and business activities' Alter (2007) 
There are evidently ways in which the specific configuration of both activities can be completely 
aligned such as traditional Microfinance where the social programme is inseparable from the 
enterprise activity (on the left of figure 2). This represents an alignment of business performance 
and social mission where service users/beneficiaries are customers. These have been termed 
“integrated hybrids” (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012, p. 52; Ebrahim et al., 2014, p. 83). 
 
While it may be rhetorically possible that microfinance serves Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) 
consumers effectively; treating ‘poor’ as a complete categorical rather than accepting nuance and 
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varying levels of poverty; MFIs themselves may engage in ‘poverty market skimming’ activities 
serving the least poor of the poor (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2008; R. L. Meyer, 2002). 
 
However, in the region between integrated and separated social/enterprise activities lies the area in 
which many social enterprise organisations, such as EDTech, operate in. While the categorisation 
offered by Alter in figure 2 (2007) appears as more of a continuum, there is significant scope in all 
sides to loose focus on one or both fundamental aspects of the hybrid organization. 
 
Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair (2014, p. 83) stipulate, organisational governance is important in the 
“proper alignment and prioritization of diverse and sometimes conflicting interests” which involves 
balancing financial objectives with social outreach. However, Ebrahim, et al. (2014) go on to 
classify social enterprises based upon the degree integration of financial objectives and social 
objectives where differentiated hybrids reflect organisations like EDTech where clients (schools 
and provincial education departments) and beneficiaries (learners at IMA drop-in hubs) are 
different. 
 
Through the addition of an extra axis, Santos, et al. (2015, p. 36) provide a more comprehensive 
matrix describing the categorisations of “aligning business models and organizational design”. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Aligning Business Models and Organizational Design - from Santos, et al,. (2015, p.45) 
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Figure 3 provides a richer account of aspects of hybrid organisations’ convergence between 
revenue streams and where social value is created. The principal risks as outlined by Santos, et al,. 
(2015) are difficulty in achieving financial sustainability and critically, a high risk of mission drift. 
 
For organisations where the consumption of a product or service does not directly or 
‘automatically’ deliver social value; the realisation of social value emerges from a specific set of 
behaviours or actions. For example, in Microfinance the purported social value creation is 
contingent on service users/consumers utilising extra income to benefit the family through 
improved nutrition through more/better quality food, investment in better assets (e.g. a more energy 
efficient stove), etc. (ibid). In comparison, the example of Danone’s fortified yoghurt, social value 
is created through consumption of the product and therefore, the value spillovers can be said to be 
automatic. 
 
This is a critical issue when considering the potential to scale social innovations, particularly in the 
Microfinance example. Not only does the access to credit need to be scaled to reach more 
individuals; the cost of educating, encouraging, and ensuring clients utilise this extra income in 
effective ways to realise the transformative potential. Such training, monitoring, and evaluation 
require significant hidden costs in ensuring the most social value possible can be created. 
 
2.2.5 Scaling Social Impact 
As social welfare and social development are increasingly being contracted from the public sector 
to the private and third sectors; social enterprises (who naturally straddle these lines) are 
experiencing increasing concern to scale up positive impact (André & Pache, 2016; Moore, Riddell, 
& Vocisano, 2015). As a result; funders, donor agencies, and philanthropists are increasingly 
auditing organisations they invest in to ensure they are getting the most out of their money (Ebrahim 
& Rangan, 2014). 
 
For organisations whose customers are their beneficiaries and where social value is derived through 
consumption of a product or service; scaling can be relatively straightforward in principal 
(Battilana et al., 2012) – particularly where a product (such as fortified foods) or utility (including 
clean, safe, or renewable energy) is provided (Santos et al., 2015). 
 
Social enterprises are being compelled to scale and grow their impact in the face of success (Dees, 
Anderson, & Wei-skillern, 2004). However, such calls for an expectation of growth and scale 
neglect to recognise the importance of social ties, relationships, and local contexts within hybrid 
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organisations which are threatened as organisations grow (W. K. Smith et al., 2013). On this note, 
André and Pache (2016, p. 660) ask: “can they [caring entrepreneurs] still care while going to 
scale?”. Additionally, scale brings increasing complexity to organisational governance; under 
developed and researched vehicles and strategies for achieving it; and a broader picture of how best 
to achieve large scale, societal change (Moore et al., 2015). 
 
As success is realised in core activities and impact of a given programme, intervention, or product; 
organisations – particularly with sustainable income – may seek to expand to positively impact 
wider communities. While, in a technology focussed organisation such as EDTech/IMA, this may 
be possible through considering the core elements of diffusion of innovation theory (Rogers, 1983) 
or through employing more contemporary technology start-up theory such as the lean startup (Ries, 
2011); for social enterprises or hybrid organisations more generally with a dual objective of social 
impact beyond profitability – growth and scaling impact become more difficult (Dees et al., 2004). 
 
As such, recent scholarly work has been done to understand differing approaches to achieving an 
increase in an organisation’s track record of social impact (Dees et al., 2004; Hockerts & 
Wüstenhagen, 2010; Moore et al., 2015). However, few organisations will find the process of 
growing impact as relatively straightforward as private sector companies, particularly in social 
franchising models of scaling social impact (Doherty, Haugh, & Lyon, 2014; Mulgan, 2012). 
 
Various approaches to and strategies for achieving scale are outlined by different authors. Moore, 
et al., (2015) describe scaling out (reaching greater numbers through replicating programmes, 
increasing the number of beneficiaries, etc.); scaling up (using experience of a social innovation to 
influence law and policy); and scaling deep (developing, strengthening sense of community and 
culture). Others such as Dees, et al., (2004) describe three strategies for achieving an increase in 
numbers reached such as dissemination (the sharing of ideas, values, programmes, etc. with other 
organisations and supporting implementation); affiliation (e.g. creating umbrella organisations for 
organisations with similar visions, missions, and values to share best-practices); and branching 
(where replication of the intervention takes place in new areas under centralised 
control/management). 
 
Scaling social impact comes at a time after there is evidence of social impact as an outcome of 
administering a particular programme, system, product, etc. (André & Pache, 2016). Part of the 
complexity comes from the change in monitoring impact depending on the specific growth strategy 




Depending on the strategy or mechanism for growth selected, management becomes a pertinent 
issue given the inherent complexities of monitoring impact – even at simply a local scale. “How, 
for instance, can an underprivileged student’s increased self-confidence be measured?” (André & 
Pache, 2016, p. 667). Additionally, at what point can the impact of this social impact be seen to 
have tangible benefits on such an individual? The latter could conceivably be years after the service 
user left the education system and entered employment. 
 
However, there seems to be very little concern within the literature for alternatives to increasing an 
organisations footprint within existing communities by diversifying programmes, increasing 
engagement with communities already involved, and problematising the seemingly natural 
expectation that organisations amplify their social impact. Scholars such as Westley and Antandze 
(2010) wouldn’t consider such organisations to be innovating and rather lower their profile to social 
inventions. 
 
However, as is common with start up businesses, growth and the entrepreneurs drive for scaling up 
a business is not always a priority, nor a goal in itself given that many businesses operate on smaller 
scales such as ‘arm chair enterprises’; ‘lifestyle businesses’. Not every entrepreneur seeks to build 
a formidable business empire. As such, perhaps social entrepreneurs can be content with a 
manageable project; with a niche geographical focus; and clear missions. 
 
In avoiding such tensions associated with growth and mission drift (André & Pache, 2016; Battilana 
et al., 2012); there is an argument, under developed within the literature for niche organisations to 
focus on their core beneficiaries and rather than seeking growth through serving greater numbers 
of service-users; or local growth through working in partnership with other organisations; there is 
potential for growth to be realised by ‘scaling in’; by deepening relationships, complimentary 
services/programmes, and ultimately scaling the impact of one organisation but with existing 
beneficiaries and within successful networks. 
 
2.2.6   Missions and Mission Drift in Social Purpose Organisations 
“The mission is what inspires the founders to create the organization… Yet even as non-profits are 
stuck to their mission, they are also pulled by market forces.” (Rangan, 2004, p. 114). Even in the 
case of non-profit organisations, “market forces”, experienced for example through donor funding 




Social enterprises often find themselves in a position where rationalising competing, traditional 
institutional logics progresses towards a more or less financially focussed aim (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Mair et al., 2015); thus either compromising the resources available to deliver particular 
social outcomes or undermining the sustainability of the organization – potentially liquidating the 
organisation and having no resources to achieve the social purpose (Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
 
Given the narrow line upon which social enterprises operate, the literature tends to warn against 
mission drift caused by focussing on financial sustainability, rather than criticising unsustainable 
social programmes. 
 
Much of the contention between achieving social impact and self-generated revenue comes from 
misaligned or conflicting objectives and outcomes. MFIs who express themselves as ‘Integrated 
Hybrids’ may operate within a pro-poor space (Battilana et al., 2012); but are criticised for not 
reaching the poorest of the poor on account of the higher relative costs of serving bottom of the 
pyramid markets (Copestake, 2007). 
 
Additionally, along the lines of using the social enterprise as a marketing gimmick, some social 
service providers engaging in Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) may be argued as ‘Trojan 
horses’; where what appears to be civic society, government, and business working in partnership; 
results rather in more typical privatisation such as the case of post-apartheid housing policy 
(Miraftab, 2004). Such an outcome shows there is real potential for PPPs to experience mission 
drift as in the face of poor performance and underrepresentation of civil society results in fully 
privatised service delivery (ibid). One possible implications of such PPP or pseudo-privatisation is 
a drain on public funds and that service delivery is dependant on private contractors’ financial 
health. 
 
Conversely, organisations espousing dedication to serve ‘poorest of the poor’ sectors may struggle 
for financial sustainability and depending on management responses could abruptly cease to exist 
(Santos et al., 2015, p. 38) or potentially worse, cause harm. Dixon, Ritchie, and Siwale (2007, p. 
47) found that loan officers developed “inappropriate methods to compel further repayments” from 
clients at risk of defaulting. Therefore, being ethically incompatible with the mission of enhancing 
the economic opportunities of the poor, in these cases, Microfinance could in fact deepen the plight 




Social enterprises therefore run the risk of perpetuating inequalities. This may also be observed in 
cases of prioritising loan repayments over the well-being of clients whose loan application may not 
have been suitable for disbursement or by encouraging loans to be disbursed in specific informal 
sectors already saturated by micro-enterprises (Hulme, 2000). Alternatively, by uplifting those 
almost at the bottom, while allowing those at the bottom to remain unserved – deepens their relative 
experience of poverty, potentially entrenching deeper social inequity. 
 
Warschauer and Ames (2010, p. 44) suggest in the case of OLPC in Paraguay, the provision of the 
laptops through the programme “might exacerbate divides rather than overcome them” because 
evidence suggested mostly learners from higher socio-economic backgrounds used the OLPC’s 
XO computers for creative ends.  The old adage holds – good intentions are not enough. 
 
 
It is important, in the context of this dissertation, to consider how hybrid organisations (and their 
services/products) can be systematically designed and managed with a view to achieving (in full 
or in part) financial sustainability alongside achievement of the social mission(s). In general 
entrepreneurship theory and practice, seeing and realising market success is difficult (Blank, 2013). 
However, to realise the dual objectives of hybrid organisations, what might contemporary start-up 
and design theory reveal for organisations seeking two or more, competing institutional logics? 
The lean start-up provides a rich language and set of tools and methodologies to increase 
the likelihood of a start-up succeeding (Blank, 2013; Ries, 2011). In ‘The Lean Startup’, Ries 
(2011), proposes several key processes (such as ‘build, measure, learn’; to iterate quickly and often 
between development, measuring outcomes, and learning from the results) and philosophies (such 
as avoiding a ‘build and they will come’ mentality). One key takeaway The Lean Startup provides 
is to ensure a more efficient use of resources; in the right area, at the right time, and knowing when 
to reallocate them. 
The imperative is to avoid developing a product which solves a problem or satisfies a market 
need/want which doesn’t really exist or is too small to become financially sustainable. Rather, 
expect that assumptions made in the early phases of a (technology) startup may need significant 
development or may simply be wrong. Solving for problem definitions that aren’t accurate or 
nuanced enough may be met with rejection by end users (Markus & Keil, 1994). Rejection of 
technology is also discussed in terms of the practice lens (Orlikowski, 2000) and as can be seen by 
technologists ‘over-selling’ the benefits of education technologies (Russell, Bebell, O’Dwyer, & 
O’Connor, 2003). It is therefore important to develop cooperative design practices that feed ideas, 
 
 35 
user feedback, designs, and prototypes between designers, developers, and users. While this shares 
similar attributes to the testing of assumptions in ‘Theory of Change’ (Kail & Lumley, 2012; RSA 
& Univeristy of Cape Town, 2014); the Lean Startup principals go into significant detail of the 
design and development of activities and specific products. 
One of the attributes of hybrid organisations is their ability to innovate within the context of limited 
resources (Doherty et al., 2014; Mair & Martí, 2006). This forces these organisations to 
fundamentally rethink how they go about achieving a social mission, such as radical cost reduction 
in products/processes where service users on extremely low incomes e.g. Jaipur Foot or Aravind 
Eye Care (Mair & Martí, 2006; Prahalad, 2014). 
Successful hybrid organisation innovators may operate in what is termed by Prahalad (2006) as a 
‘sand box’ where rigid boundaries can be set for innovators to play with the shifting sands they 
contain. Inviting playful creativity lends itself to towards breaking down or augmenting 
assumptions; something which design thinking’s “overlapping spaces” (differentiated from a linear 
process) strives to communicate (T. Brown & Wyatt, 2010, p. 33). 
Design thinking emphasises key characteristics of those involved within product/service 
development. Such characteristics are empathy in hearing multiple alternative perspectives; asking 
deeper questions about why assumptions are assumed to be; fostering human experience and 
emotion throughout the project through story telling; being creative with ‘boundaries’ and 
‘requirements’; though this is not exhaustive (Beckman & Barry, 2007; T. Brown, 2008; T. Brown 
& Wyatt, 2010). When blended with the rapid, highly iterative prototyping approach of the Lean 
Startup principals; there is some evidence that social enterprises can target resources on projects, 
services, products and experiences where there is ever increasing evidence of success (T. Brown 
& Wyatt, 2010). 
A key philosophy is to expect and embrace failure, even seeking failure, fast and often, shared with 
Lean Startup principals (Blank, 2013). Failure is a departure point for learning and challenging 
assumptions of developers. In the context of working in emerging economies and resource 
constrained settings far removed from end-users; it should be expected. Where 
products/services/experiences are designed based upon untested assumptions, as is presented 
through EDTech’s case; failure should point towards untested assumptions (Liedtka, 2015, p. 936). 
When a well designed user experiment or test is carried out, learning should be a systematic and 
planned endeavour (Blank, 2013; Ries, 2011). 
Alternative processes, philosophies, and methodologies such as the Lean Startup and design 
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thinking provide a strong evidence base to subvert the traditional ‘consult the client; design and 
build in a lab for the client; deliver solution to client’ approach. Lean thinking can help mitigate 
the worst case scenario of developing a solution for the wrong problem (or based on the wrong 
assumptions); while wasting resources for an issue that pervades. This is the major issue with the 
‘build and they will come’ mentality (Ries, 2011). 
 
Sociomateriality and the practice lens provides a theoretical underpinning to oppose determinist 
accounts of technology. This can be shown more generally in information systems research, but 
also in the more specific context of education technology to account for and explain limited/non-
use of technologies (Halperin, 2017; Halperin & Backhouse, 2007; Orlikowski, 2000). 
 
Given that education, as a social institution, is so important to society; the importance of ‘getting 
it right’ is a contentious issue imbued in politics and dependant on individuals’ worldviews (Hodas, 
1993). 
 
Recognising the historical processes within South African communities, the continent and the 
global south more generally, ensuring sufficient ‘hearing’ and collaboration is important so as to 
avoid deterministic, homogenising views of communities with a post-colonial imagination 
(Mercer, 2005; Mercer et al., 2003). 
 
Technology is not apolitical; and in the case of education technology; it’s usually always political 
(Hodas, 1993). In rejecting hard and soft definitions of technology, particularly in education, a 
more fluid appreciation for the role technology could play within schools can be rooted in practice 
and experience, rather than an intrinsic determinism and false belief in technology to achieve 
particular, desirable transformations (Selwyn, 2010). 
 
The practice lens differentiates the artefact from what happens when artefacts are placed in the 
hands of users in different contexts (Orlikowski, 2000); and such contextualisation of ‘technology-
in-practice’ allows more substantial appreciation of the individual, social and institutional factors 
which affect technologies’ use; what such use actually looks like; and thusly their potential and 
actual impact. 
 
Technology-in-practice, while operating within existing structures, tends to recreate such 
structures, therefore users are recursive in their implementation of technologies and the 
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establishments of routines is expected (Giddens, 1984; Halperin & Backhouse, 2007; Leonardi, 
2011; Orlikowski, 2000). Therefore, human agency can be said to reproduce the structures which 
enable action (Giddens, 1984, p. 2). 
 
By rooting analysis of the uses and implications of technology in practice, it engrains a sense of 
what is actually happening as opposed to the politics laden, deterministic ‘this is what should 
happen’ perspective. Additionally, in the context of this study (in light of the generalizable failure 
of EDTech in RCSs) eliciting experiences of the technology and uncovering what reasons there 
were for limited/non-use of the technology may reveal valuable insights for EDTech/IMA. When 
compared with the ‘whats’, ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of other technology uses in school settings, this can 
provide EDTech with a more impartial, practice based account of what is actually happening within 
the schools observed. 
 
In managing the relationship EDTech/IMA has with the MDoE, mission drift is arguably one key 
area where failure can be imagined as the project was aligned more towards the mission of the 
MDoE than EDTech, but rationalised through the promise of funding (Rangan, 2004). A kind of 
lucrative, utopian rabbit hole emerged where the promise of funding and the simplicity with which 
EDTech/IMA viewed the transformation of the South African education landscape for funding an 
arts programme, is revealed. 
 
Such a myopic view of achieving a revenue stream for an arts programme can be highlighted 
through assumptions made by EDTech in how RCSs should use technology. These assumptions 
were made in a vacuum of end-users; those with a contextual appreciation for RCSs; overestimating 
the access of schools to the internet; and RCSs having staff with both the skills and motivation to 
implement their vision and a lack of integration support and training. 
 
In the context of this study, a political differentiation between ‘Westerners’ and ‘Africans’ (as 
portrayed by Mercer, et al., (2003)) is potentially problematic as designers, developers, and 
managers were all South African. However, it is still important to recognise distance between 
development and use beyond pins on maps to account for the diverse cultures of South African 
society accounting for distance based upon socio-economic, political, racial, lived experiences, and 
the impact of historical processes as opposed to distance literally measured by kilometres. 
 
This kind of projection of the problem and building based on inaccurate assumptions highlights the 
validity of a more inclusive design process such as design thinking which places empathy at the 
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heart of the whole design process from problem definition, through ideation, design, development, 
testing, and implementation. 
 
Resource utilisation is an important consideration of both third sector organisations and start-ups 
in the eyes of the lean methodology. Hybrid organisations are often heralded for the frugality from 
which innovation emerges (Hockerts, 2015); lean thinking emphasises the importance of frugality 
and the strategic employment of resources, and critically, the importance of identifying sunk costs, 
and the need to pivot early (Blank, 2013). This is one such benefit from adopting a lean start-up 
approach to organisational development and its predisposition towards seeking failure and 
intentionally learning from it (Blank, 2013; Ries, 2011). 
 
From the literature review, a conceptual model connecting these various literature streams to this 
study have been created. Firstly, a conceptual model is created. This highlights the 
interconnectedness of of hybrid organisation theory with the value of rooting technology design 
and development in practice lens analysis. This is presented in figure 4 below. This presents a series 
of tensions arising from the management of competing organisational logics. Secondly, a literature 
consistency matrix has been developed which shows various publications; their methodological 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 - Literature Consistency Matrix 
Thematic 
Area 
Study Methods Theoretical 
Underpinning/ 
Research Findings 












materials data from 
previous studies. 
Structures are enacted by 
users, not inherent strictly 
within technologies or 
institutions 
Seeking practice based 








practice lens use 
Practice creates 
organisational realties 
useful in exploring and 
effecting change in 
organising 
Developing understandings 
of current practice to 
inform how technology in 





Analysis of 2027 
articles in leading 




Advancing the views of 
inseparability between 
technology and social 
dimensions 
Research seeking to 
develop social and 
contextual understandings 













Application of the 
practice lens in education 
technology studies for 
holistic conceptualisation 
of education technologies 
Application of a practice 
lens in education 
technology to develop rich 
accounts of broad context 
Johiri 
(2011) 
Case Study: Re-use 




The importance of 
balancing technological 




Providing contextual and 
technical aspects of 
Learning Technology to 











critical studies in 
education 
technology research 
Critical studies of 
education technology 
allow a deeper probing of 
power, control, and 
broader social justice 
issues 
recognising the locus of 
design and development 
carries assumptions, socio-
economic and political 
power and the ability 
relinquish responsibility 
for ‘failure’ – how can 
such assumptions be 




using ANT to 
examine MOOCs, a 
relatively new 
phenomena 
Sociological enquiries of 
global digital education 
platforms provide insight 
into uneven participation 
across socioeconomic 
and privilege boundaries 
and potential reasons for 
this 
Implications of socio-
economic variability and 
inequalities among users 






highlighting value in 
ANT, SCOT, 
Activity Theory, and 
Communities of 




output) in ‘learning and 
technology’ research// 
critical approaches to 
Challenging deterministic 
assumptions of the contexts 
of use and the cause-effect 
results excepted through 







give descriptive accounts 










Study on 2 MFIs in 
Bolivia over 3 
fieldwork periods 
using interviews and 
observation. 
Contextual data was 
gathered through 
smaller interactions 
with loan officers of 
other companies 
Institutional Logics in 




employees appears to be 
an important factor to 
manage when developing 
HO operations, identity 
and impact 
Highlights some strategies 
to manage a dual profit and 
social outreach motive in 
HOs and identifies the 
importance of HRs and 
processes to develop 





Using survey data 
from 70 Social 
Enterprises to 
conduct comparative 
analysis and using 
secondary sources to 
build richer pictures 
of what they find 
Some SEs thrive in 
balancing dual logics 
where they can see 
innovation opportunities 
and act quicker than 
traditional/single logic 
organisations// there is 
great heterogeneity 
between cases in how 
duality is managed 
Provides alternative 
organisational structures 
and approaches to 
managing dual logics by 
interrogating how different 
organisations react and 






claims within MFI 
literature and 
practice and that 
commercial banking 
best practice leads to 
the best performing 
pro-poor MFIs 
There is a nuanced 
approach to 
understanding drivers of 
inclusiveness, achieving 
missions, and funding 
mixes and anecdote based 
evidence doesn’t account 
for the complexity of 
serving poor clients nor 
serve as a platform for 
innovation 
Highlights hybrid 
organisations (in the 
context of Microfinance) 
need to have systematic 
approaches to assessing 
impact and effectiveness – 
rhetoric and a few positive 













literature // leads to 
a discussion on how 
HOs can avoid 
mission drift by 
seeking to overlap 
their outreach and 
income generating 
activities and the 
role of the board 
HOs face distinct 
challenges in accounting 
to many different 
stakeholders within and 
outside the organisation. 
This includes boards, 
clients, funders, etc. 
 
Critical to success is 
being able to prioritise 
and balance these 
perspectives and HO 
dualities 
The paper raises important 
aspects about HO 
governance how multiple 
perspectives must be 
balanced// relevant to 
EDTech in light of little 
representation of service 
users and the specific 
organisational structure of 









and collates findings 




Developed a matrix of 4 
social hybrid organisation 
models based upon the 
degree of convergence 
between clients and 
beneficiaries (x axis) and 
whether value is 
automatically created or 
EDTech/IMA operate 
multiple programmes 
where beneficiaries and 
clients are mixed in a 
complicated fashion. This 
typology matrix provides 
key management and 




upon the kinds of 
integration and 
value spillovers 
within each category 
contingent on other 
success factors (y axis) 
organisations within each 
category and the difficulty 












framework to assess 
strategies to achieve 
a social mission 
Mission drift is loosely 
defined and suggests 
where goals, performance 
assessment, and 
management processes 
are weak; mission drift is 
a likely possibility – 
managers can be reactive 
to trends and with weak 
importance placed on 
specific social outcomes, 
drifting is more likely 
Given the questions 
orientation to impact and 
less than expected use 
(leading to poor results); 
the paper suggests more 
clearly defined 
performance indicators and 
goals can help avoid 
changes in organisational 
rationalisation of 




Case study of South 
African housing 
policy and the public 
private partnerships 





Highlights the risks of 
PPPs becoming a route to 
privatisation and not fully 
serving the contractual 
requirements outlined in 
the partnership in neo-
liberal economies, such 
as South Africa. 
Given the contract between 
EDTech/IMA and the 
MDoE; the significant 
investment (multi-million 
rand grants and tenders) as 
well as informal 
contractual redefinitions 












the importance of 
“care” during the 
social enterprise 




Social enterprise scaling 
follows broadly similar 
processes/stages as for 
profit enterprises though 
the importance of 
embedding ethics of care 
into organisational 
governance policies and 
ensuring that the 
founding principles of the 
organisation are steadfast 
throughout the scale 
process is important.  
The rapid growth expected 
by EDTech to develop a 
sustainable revenue stream, 
led to a lost sense of the 
founding mission and 
principles of care. 
 
Prior to scaling social 
impact, 1. social impact 
must be evident and 2. The 
values and contexts which 
make this successful must 
be translated into 
organisational governance 
processes to allow the 
caring principles of 
education development not 












focus groups and 
surveys 
Scaling strategies for 
social enterprises require 





with for example working 
with government or civil 
society organisations to 
This paper provides 
rhetorical work to 
challenge the traditional 
view of scaling from a 
business-orientated 
replication/diffusion 
perspective. It offers 
alternative avenues for 
social enterprises to scale 
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influence policy and 
systemic change; or 
deepening emphasis on 
changing values, cultural 
practices, or relationships 
to achieve the change they 
want to see. 
 
This is valuable for 
EDTech to problematize 
their chosen scale strategy 
and whether it was too 
early for EDTech to scale 








article in the 
Stanford Social 
Innovation Review 




Highlights the experience 
of different scaling 
strategies from varying 
organisations. It provides 
different language from 
Moore, et al., (2015) and 
presents a 5R framework 




Provides description of 
how social enterprises and 
their management teams 
strategized their scaling 
practices and the factors 




should approach scaling 
impact in different ways. 
Scaling is not uniform and 
there are a range of options 
which EDTech could have 









in HBR to give 








Provides a brief overview 
of the cogent arguments 
in favour of the 
methodology for start-up 
companies. 
As EDTech is a tech start-
up; this explanation of the 
methodology provides a 
broad overview of the 
benefits of its application 
within this space. 
 
It highlights the iterative 
nature of successful start-
ups product development 
and blends with ideas of 
Product-Market Fit 
Ries (2011) Book which 
introduces the 
practice based 
accounts of Eric 
Ries using examples 
of tech start-ups he 
has led and 
consulted with. 
This book builds upon 
the body of theory on 
just-in-time inventory 




The emphasis is on 
iteration in design, 
development and product 
launches and planned 
product testing where 
learning is a priority. 
This is a salient philosophy 
within modern technology 
companies and start-ups. 
The methodology places an 
emphasis on delivering 
value early on with 
customers through. 
 
This relates to EDTech as 
they adopted an opposite 
methodology referred to in 
the book as ‘build and they 
will come’ where products 
are designed in a vacuum 
and launched as large, 
standalone products as 
opposed to incremental 




failing fast and often as 
vectors of organisational 








value of design 






referring to existing 
case studies 
Design thinking forces a 
new way to think about 
product design. 
 
It is a user-centred design 
methodology where key 




users are not always 
aware of what they want 
(of they have 
preconceived ideas of 
what a solution should 
be); good design should 
understand the problem 
and the context through 
which the problems are 
experienced to address 
root causes. 
EDTech followed a design 
methodology where the 
context of government 
schools was not considered 
and deterministically 
believed their solution 
would translate to any 
learning context from 
IMA. 
 
This theory (and the body 
of work this article aligns 
with) is relevant to 
EDTech to develop 
empathy for the context 
rather than building 
products based on untested 
assumptions and 
rationalising failure as 
coming from outwith their 
control. This is not strictly 
true, based upon a reading 







theories with design 
thinking to use 
design thinking to 
overcome such 
biases 
Design thinking provides 
much hope for 
developing useful 
solutions which match 
the needs of users, 
service users and 
customers. This paper 
advances this by 
highlighting particular 
cognitive biases which 
may be reduced by a 
design thinking approach 
to product/service 
development 
EDTech have shown 
through multiple annual 
and funder reports to 
overestimate the value of 
their product with a limited 
empirical base to justify it. 
 
This paper highlights how 
alternative approaches to 
design, development, and 
importantly the empathetic 
involvement of users can 
reduce these biases to 
develop more realistic, 






3 Research Methodology 
The objective of this research report is to describe and compare various enactments of the same 
technology within different spaces. The goal is to explore antecedents of ‘less than expected’ utility 
of a digital education platform (EDTech) in three RCSs as compared to an ‘ideal-use case’. Through 
employing qualitative methods (semi-structured interviews; active and passive observation; and 
use of organisational reports); this inductive study builds on multiple cases study; one for each field 
site juxtaposed by perspectives of EDTech/IMA as a hybrid organisation. 
 
 
The construction of case studies based upon multi-site fieldwork was chosen due to its inherent 
strengths in allowing the comparison and contrast of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). This strategy 
allowed me to address the research questions, which are structured towards generating rich 
descriptions of non/limited use and a comparison with the ‘ideal case’. In keeping with the studies 
adoption of a practice lens; observing the technology in situ provides rich accounts of limited/non-
use and gave me the opportunity to observe potential alternatives to EDTech which teachers would 
employ in their teaching. 
 
The decision to conduct research within IMA was pursued when the CEO/Principal of 
EDTech/IMA invited the researcher to do so in 2016.  Research was scoped and observation and 
interviews carried out with EDTech/IMA staff and learners. Research was conducted in schools in 
July. Within the 3 schools studied, a period of between 4-7 days was spent in each site and this was 
dependant on factors such as school holidays and breaks as well as the availability of transport 
between Bushbuckridge Municipality and White River. Follow-up research happened within the 
IMA drop-in music school in July and the first week of August 2017. 
 
Research can therefore be considered to have taken place over 3 main stages: initial observations 
and interviews in EDTech/IMA offices; school based observations (a total of 3 weeks); lastly 
follow-up interviews and observations in EDTech/IMA office and the drop-in music school in 
Mpumalanga. There is a time break between data collection times as the researcher had to return 
to the UK to save for the remainder of the data collection. For summaries of the field sites and the 





Table 3 - Classifying and Detailing Field Sites 
 Purpose of Research in Each Case 
 Organisational 
Context 
Ideal Use-Case Limited/Non Use-Cases 
Field site 
Code 





(time divided between considering 
EDTech/IMA as an organisation 
and IMA as a place of education 
technology use and allow the 
researcher time to acclimatise to 







service day with no 
learners) 
6 days 
(including one day of 
researcher led in-
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None of the informants were known to the researcher prior to research commencing other than the 
CEO/Principal of EDTech/IMA whom the researcher had known since the early inception of the 
EDTech platform. This had implications on gaining the trust of informants which is highlighted as 
a concern in relatively short exposures in the field (Wilson, 1977). Additionally, as Cricco-Lizza 
(2007) explains the power elements involved in research involving researchers of different races. 
However, this was remedied through a rapport building strategy drawing on for example: sharing 
personal life experiences; showing an interest and actively learning seemingly small greetings in 
xiTsonga; and explaining that the researcher lived within the communities. 
 
Furthermore, as indicative within building theory from qualitative data as developed by Gioia, et 
al., informants are viewed as knowledgeable agents (2012, p. 17). This recognition engrained 
within the mind of the researcher that the best people to explain limited/non-use of technology 
within educational settings are those who choose (not) to utilise a given technology. 
 
Simply, showing a desire to learn from informants as opposed to ‘studying them’ was adopted and 
having an empathetic, relationship building approach with informants aided in the development of 
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trust in similar ways to Cricco-Lizza (2007). As many of the teachers and staff members had access 
to smart phones, the researcher provided his personal cell number to communicate with informants 
though WhatsApp, Facebook, and Messenger, though not for the purposes of data collection. 
Furthermore, having the buy-in and endorsement of the research by each principal and their existing 
relationships with one another facilitated ease of data collection. 
 
 
After face-to-face meetings and emails with the CEO/Principal of EDTech/IMA respectively, the 
research encounter had been broadly scoped together and commenced the following week. 
 
Prior to the development of EDTech as a technology and an organization, IMA, its predecessor, 
developed a model of music tuition which seeks to provide a comprehensive music education in 
resource constrained communities. Starting in 2011, 3 ‘hubs’ were created using grant funding 
from Department of Culture, Sports and Recreation (DCSR) and private donor funding. 
Comprehensive music education takes the form of music theory classes; introductory instrumental 
lessons; band formation and performance; and other industry relevant skills such as band 
management. 
 
EDTech as a technology (not a formal organization) was developed in 2012 as a project to enable 
consistency in the delivery of music theory and instrumental lessons. This was developed in part 
through funding from a private software development company in Johannesburg. EDTech was 
chosen for this study as the context of a ‘failed trial’ interested the researcher and fitted within 
broader discussions of non-use of technology within education (Selwyn, 2010). While the CEO 
was known to the researcher prior to research commencing; this was limited to roughly 3 informal 
conversations dating back to 2013 around the early inception of the EDTech product range. 
 
3.2.1 Sampling Strategy of RCSs 
RCS field sites, were selected based on discussion between the researcher, the CEO/Principal, and 
the lead platform administrator/trainer of EDTech/IMA. These were chosen based upon varying 
degrees of use, visible to EDTech/IMA via reporting features built within EDTech. RCS-B was 
highlighted as the ‘most functioning’ school (interestingly the only school visited by the CEO), 
while RCS-A and RCS-C represented schools where data was initially visible, but after a matter of 
weeks after training and implementation, no usage was detected. Therefore, a theoretical sampling 





While the CEO of EDTech had visited one of the RCSs identified within the sample; the researcher 
was the first individual to spend more than one or two days at each school. The researcher in this 
scenario very quickly became a key vector of user level feedback to EDTech/IMA from the RCSs 
and additionally, being an ‘outsider’ to EDTech allowed for some degree of impartiality as issues 
users raised about EDTech were not taken personally – as staff of EDTech may be inclined to. 
Therefore, the field sites which formed the cases were purposively selected so as to represent 
different aspects of the same phenomena, while facing many similar issues (C. B. Meyer, 2001). 
 
Key informants were identified based on those whom, in the first 2 days of each encounter, 
relationships with the researcher had developed rapport and presented ‘interesting cases’ based on 
a number of factors. In the case of teachers factors identified were expressed interest and varying 
degrees of experience in utilising technology within the classroom and/or identification as ‘the best 
teachers’. Therefore, additional to the theoretical sampling approach used to identify filed sites and 
cases, individuals were also selected for the qualities they possess and the routines they enact. 
 
Learners in RCS-A were selected for participation in group interviews based upon those who were 
available after school; were willing to participate; and generally if some level of rapport and trust 
developed. In RCS-B, learners were selected with the technology facilitator due to the limited time 
available within the school. These learners didn’t appear to be particularly representative of their 
peer group. However, given their higher relative socio-economic position at home, this builds 
aspects of accounting for heterogeneous lived experiences of participants and ensuring a broad 
representation of backgrounds are accounted for in such diverse research settings. 
 
3.2.2 Population and Data 
The numbers of informants and the kinds of data obtained within each field site is shown in table 
3. The principal in RCS-A was not available for formal interview during the time spent at RCS-A 
school due to external responsibilities and commitments. However, as the researcher stayed next 
door to RCS-A’s Principal, with their sister during the fieldwork in RCSs, there were many 
informal conversations and other opportunities to engage with RCS-A’s Principal. 
 
 
Research was designed in partnership with EDTech/IMA CEO/Principal to develop research that 
was useful to EDTech/IMA and relevant within the academic literature of the study. Research 
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methods chosen were qualitative to build a rich picture of users’ decisions to (not) use EDTech and 
technology more generally.  
 
3.3.1 Data Collection Methods 
Due to the need for EDTech/IMA to understand the factors surrounding limited/non-use of EDTech 
within RCSs, qualitative methods were selected. These were semi-structured interviews; 
observations; reviewing EDTech/IMA reports. This approach has been used in various 
combinations by other similar studies in technology within organisation studies (Orlikowski, 2000; 
Orlikowski & Gash, 1994); applying a ‘practice lens’ in education technology research (Halperin, 
2017; Halperin & Backhouse, 2007); sociological research in education technology (Johri, 2011); 
and research into hybrid organisations management of dual objectives (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
 
3.3.1.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were selected as a viable method for data collection within this research 
as they provide a certain flexibility allowing the probing of factors which had previously not been 
considered (Barbour & Schostak, 2005). Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton (2012, p19) write that semi-
structured interviews provide ways to access “retrospective and real-time accounts by those people 
experiencing the phenomenon of theoretical interest”. The flexibility offered by semi-structured 
vs. structured interviews allowed the researcher to explore issues that emerged organically 
throughout the interview, particularly when teachers were discussing negative aspects of EDTech.  
 
Because the research question seeks to explore limited/non-use of technology; employing this 
research method allows the researcher opportunities to engage directly with potential/intended 
users of the platform. 
 
RCS-C was the first RCS involved within the study. Due to issues such as time and the extra classes 
being provided in order to finish the curriculum prior to exams, it wasn’t possible to find learners 
to individually engage in research. While the majority of interviews were conducted on a one-to-
one basis; in the case of RCS-A and RCS-B learners were generally interviewed in groups. This 
was due to issues in time available vs. a desire to maximise the number of learner voices captured. 
The group based learner interviews provided additional advantages such as learners being able to 





The issue of using group based interviews, it should be noted, is not the same as focus groups – 
particularly as this particular data collection method did not consider group interaction as part of 
the methodology (Kitzinger, 1995). The researcher used this simply as a method to gather multiple 
perspectives, therefore, these are considered group interviews, not focus groups. Here, research 
flexibility is mentioned by Eisenhardt and is viewed as “controlled opportunism” (1989, p. 539). 
 
All semi-structured interviews were recorded with prior informed consent and subsequently 
transcribed once the researcher had returned from field sites after the research period. 
 
3.3.1.2 Observations and Research Diaries 
Observation data is held within diaries kept by the researcher to “provide first person accounts of 
social situations… they provide insight into situations and activities” (Burgess, 1981, p81). Field 
notes were organised through both handwritten notebooks and through the cloud based notes 
management software ‘Evernote’. The latter was used to allow the researcher to keep research data 
safely stored on the internet in a private form. The main reason for cloud based organisation is the 
synchronisation between multiple devices. 
 
In line with Singleton and Straits (2005; cited in Sangasubana, 2011); observations were recorded 
in a diary each dealing with a particular kind of observation and insight. These are: Running 
Description; Forgotten Episodes; Ideas and Notes for Further Information Use; Personal 
Impressions and Feelings; and Methodological Notes. Labelling the diary under different headings 
allows the researcher to organise findings for later retrieval. Observations held in Evernote were 
mostly recorded in the evenings when the researcher had left the field while handwritten diaries 
allowed the researcher to observe and take notes without having to worry about battery power of 
the laptop or tablet. 
 
Observation data includes pictures, videos, printed documents provided to the researcher and 
lengths of written prose, which recall informal conversations, and occurrences/thoughts that seem 
potentially useful. Some have used field notes extensively, such as Burrell (2012), while other have 
used it as part of their research instrument arsenal (Donner et al., 2011). 
 
In order to enhance the richness of data collected and arm the author with a broad range of data 
sources; photographs were taken during research. These are presented periodically throughout the 
results to show readers, particular screenshots and interface designs, and the configurations of 
technology within classrooms and ICT centres. Recent work on education technology employing a 
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qualitative, ethnographic, multi-case study approach included the use of photographs in order to 
develop “a substantial corpus of empirical data” (Selwyn, Nemorin, Bulfin, & Johnson, 2017, p. 
290) 
 
3.3.1.3 Reviewing Annual Reports, Funders Reports, and Other Documents 
Annual Reports of IMA (publicly held) and some private reports by EDTech/IMA to funders 
(provided by EDTech/IMA management) were used to build a picture of the design and 
development process over time of each constituent organisation of EDTech/IMA and the 
development of the EDTech platform over time. These were mainly used to gain a holistic 
understanding and to compliment information provided by EDTech/IMA management and staff. 
These reports were analysed in combination with interviews conducted with CEO/Principal of 
EDTech/IMA and informal conversations with board members. Such an approach was used by 
Haplerin, and aided in the generation of thick description (2017). 
 
3.3.2 Research Instruments 
The semi-structured research instruments were developed initially prior to entering the field and 
trailed with one participant; then revised; and rolled out as similarly carried out by Appleton (1995). 
An extract from the interview guideline is presented in Figure 5 (below) where a broad topic with 





Figure 5 - Extract From Principal Interview Guideline 
In each interview, the researcher showed the interviewee the schedule or explained the main 
question and their intentions and then the first question was always rapport building, to ‘ease the 
participant in’, and generally, interviews were concluded on positive points  (Heights, 2008). 
Additionally, the researcher always asked participants if they had any questions or points to add. 
When the offer was taken up, some participants said they found the interview insightful for 
unpacking their thoughts and often would then turn to asking more about the researcher’s personal 
life, background, or their perception of the experience. 
 
 
Data was analysed inductively through the use of NVIVO software and drew on the work of (Gioia 
et al., 2012). Each interview, once transcribed, was re-listened to (to hear as espoused); re-read and 
coded. 
 
These initial codes were specific given the context of each interview and field site however, through 
following the process of developing 1st order themes using, as much as possible, references to the 
language used by informants. This converted roughly over 200 ‘raw’ codes into 1st order themes 
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where each initial code was considered in relation to others. The author experienced a sense of 
being “lost” as outlined by Gioia, et al. (2012, p. 20) – an important aspect of the process. 
 
Many of the early, raw codes were over 4 or 5 words and thusly were not as succinct. In generating 
1st order themes, the researcher read through the list of nodes/ ‘raw codes’ and began to re-label 
them. There were cases throughout this process where nodes with longer codes were clearly linked 
such as issues identified with EDTech App. In this example, these were aggregated under newly 
created themes and sub-themes recognising that issues with the EDTech App all impacted teaching 
and learning but in different ways. Thus, ‘raw’ nodes were generally consolidated into 1st order 
themes iteratively; but in some cases the initial labels were retained to cater for nuanced 
appreciation at later stages of interrogating the codes. 
 
From here, a level of theoretical abstraction was pursued by using the contextual and broad insights, 
impressions, and reflections of the researcher from the field to begin to draw first order concepts 
into broader, more encompassing 2nd order concepts. Moving a step away from the interview 
transcripts and diaries to consider the relationships between ideas discussed with informants, the 
researcher began to use their detailed appreciation for the broader encounters within the field sites. 
 
From considering these abstracted 2nd order themes, connections and common threads running 
through the 2nd order themes, distinct categories were developed – these are termed ‘aggregated 
dimensions’ (ibid). At this level of abstraction, the researcher began to theorise, draw comparisons 
with the literature in a more systematic manner and at this stage, tended to depart from the grounded 
theory model. The researcher’s aim here was to capitalise on the academic rigour, but allow for 
data to add to existing theories of the practice lens in education technology and education 
technology non-use more generally. 
 
The resulting data structure after following this process are found in figure 6, below. The data 
structure was used in the construction of the three main subsections of section two of the results 
chapter. The analyses of structurational modalities are presented in the sequential manner starting 
with facility, named technological conditions; followed by the norms, named institutional 
conditions/factors; and lastly, the interpretive schemes, named ‘individual factors’. 
 
The presentation of no-fee school data is presented in this way to capitalise on the work developed 
in applying the structurational practice lens (Orlikowski, 2000) in the context of education 
technology (Halperin, 2017; Halperin & Backhouse, 2007). Given the large volume of observation 
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based data, ‘technology in practice’ was observed and typically the interactions between individual 
users and their chosen technology are represented through the second category of ‘experiencing 
technology in education’. 
 
















































































“Triangulation is a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple 
and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell & Miller, 
2000, p. 126). This study used three different qualitative sources: interviews with multiple 
stakeholders; passive observation across field sites; and documents including reports, memos and 
contracts. In order to minimise researcher bias, particularly in the interpretation of results, 
corroborating each of these sources with each other provided an advantage rather than relying on 
one method or form of data (Creswell & Miller, 2000). 
 
However, scholars such as Denzin (2012, p. 82) write critically about the conflation of 
triangulation, mixed methods, and the dilution of the term from when “triangulation referred only 
to the use of multiple forms of qualitative research methods, not the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods”. It is specifically in this way that triangulation is referred to– as a vehicle 
to add “rigour, breadth complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry” (Denzin, 2012, p. 82). 
 
In triangulating these three sources of data; three mini case studies of resource constrained schools 
were compiled and compared these with the organisational context of EDTech/IMA; an aspiring 
education innovator and sought thicker description from broad data sources. In accounting for for 
multiple perspectives from multiple sources, the researcher expected that differences of opinion 
and perspectives. In the context of understanding why the technology EDTech was not utilised 
nearly as much as was hoped, triangulating data sources allowed the researcher to uncover 
“disconfirming evidence” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 127). This is reflected throughout the 
results, discussion and conclusion chapters where varying perspectives on EDTech’s strategy and 
product are presented. Antecedents of limited/non-use in the eyes of informants are compared and 
contrasted with each other and EDTech management. Such disconfirmation conveys different 
perspectives of the positives and negatives of EDTech in practice and limited/non-use. 
 
 
Results are presented in the next chapter and deal with both contexts of IMA and the RCSs 
separately, then compare and contrast the findings of both. Results are presented ethnographically 
and discussed in terms of the data structure emergent through the data analysis conducted. In 
viewing informants as knowledgeable agents with their own interpretations of the context in which 
they operate (either teaching or learning) provides the researcher with user based accounts and 




As a point of uncovering assumptions engrained within EDTech/IMA management; highlighting 
contextual differences is important as this seeks to provide clarity and key contradictions present 
in the EDTech/IMA rationalisation of exogenous-only factors affecting the failed trial of EDTech. 
Additionally, drawing on the practice lens stipulation that ‘structures are instantiated in practice’ 
(Orlikowski, 2000); by viewing limited/non-use (practice) through this lens alternative conceptions 
of potential avoidance or limited use can be uncovered. 
  
3.6.1 Structure of Results 
Results are structured in two main sections. The first introduces the data from EDTech/IMA office 
where the researcher spent time observing management dealing with issues with EDTech and  
managing the IMA space where EDTech was the principal medium of theoretical content delivery. 
However, given the large volume of data collected over this research experience; a relatively small 
number of salient quotes are extracted for illustrative purposes in the dissertation. 
 
Data for this section comes primarily from annual reports of IMA (which also detail EDTech’s 
development over time); interviews with senior and long term members of staff; observation data; 
and informal conversations with board members and other stakeholders. 
 
The results from RCSs are presented through the structurational modalities, following the structure 
outlined by Halperin and Backhouse (2007) to explain limited use of technology within educational 
settings. These structurational modalities were evident at many stages throughout the research 
process and within each modality; specific issues emerged which led to the development of an 
empirical model presented in figure 15. In this model, structurational modalities are broken down 
into different categories and sub-categories, which are then explained sequentially to build up a 
clear picture of practices observed within the field sites. 
 
In cases where no use of EDTech was present, the researcher took the opportunity to observe other 
uses of technology within schools and consider the ways teachers explained their non-use of 
EDTech through discussing why they chose other technologies to implement in class. In the second 
section of the results chapter; photographs are used more frequently to assist readers unfamiliar 





The presentation of results in two principal sections allows the author to convey two alternative 
accounts of poor utilisation of EDTech which can be compared, contrasted and subsequently 
insight drawn from divergence of perceptions. 
 
3.6.2 Coding Strategy of Informants 
No individual is referenced by name and all informants are referred to by codes. The coding 
structure is explained in table 4 (below). 
 




EDTech/IMA Informant Coding Scheme 
 
1st character Suffix 
 
‘E’ ‘CEO’ or ‘DBA’ or ‘BM’ 
E Refers to someone within EDTech/IMA 
organisation 
Refers to the informants’ role within EDTech/IMA 
 
CEO = Chief Executive Officer (of EDTech) 
DBA = Database Administrator/trainer 
BM = Board Member (of IMA) 
 
RCS Informant Coding Scheme 
 
1st character 2nd character 3rd character 4th character 
(as required) 
‘R’ ‘A’ or ‘B’ or ‘C’ ‘P’ or ‘T’ or ‘L’ or ‘F’ Informant Number (for 
n>1) 
R refers to an individual 
within a Resource 
Constrained School 
This letter refers to the 
specific RCS an 
individual was aligned to 
 
 
This refers to the role of 
the individual within the 
RCS. 
 
P = principal 
T = teacher 
L = learner 
F = facilitator 
The 4th character 
distinguishes between 
two or more informants 
with the same role in the 
same school. 
 
These numbers are 
assigned randomly and 
do not necessarily reflect 
seniority 
Examples: 
E-CEO refers to the CEO of EDTech 
E-DBA refers to the database administrator of EDTech/IMA 
E-BM refers to a board member of IMA 
 
RAT1 refers to the first teacher within RCS-A 
RBF refers to the facilitator in RCS-B (there was only one facilitator in RCS-B and none in other RCSs) 
RCP refers to the principal in RCS-C 




This chapter of the dissertation outlines the empirical data and is structured in two main parts. The 
first section outlines the organisational context of EDTech/IMA as a hybrid organisation/social 
enterprise. This is followed by a brief on the development process of the EDTech technologies. 
Lastly, it shows the perspectives of EDTech/IMA management on the failure of EDTech to be 
integrated into teaching and learning within schools as expected. 
 
The second section of this chapter provides accounts from RCSs on their use of technology in 
general and probes the varying degrees of EDTech utilisation. As none of the schools observed 
used the technology as EDTech/IMA had expected (RCS-C didn’t use it at all). There are 
significant differences in opinion of the EDTech platform between the organisation and its users. 
This mismatch in interpretations of EDTech reveal broader issues relating to teachers use of ICT 
in teaching and learning; the context of education technology within RCSs; and the importance of 
designing with users and not for beneficiaries. 
 
 
EDTech was designed to be owned by a for profit entity (a Pty. Ltd. registered company) who could 
monetise the technology to provide an additional revenue stream for IMA (combined, they are a 
social enterprise). Monetisation would come through a variety of possible avenues. These include 
tenders to implement and maintain the platform; generic donations to IMA from individuals, 
business, or other agencies; other organizations donating ‘digital learning centres’ to resource 
constrained communities; or alternatively funding development of particular ‘digital learning 
content’ such as maths or physical science. Private companies can do so as fulfilment of Corporate 
Social Investment/Responsibility [CSI and CSR] obligations or for tax relief. 
 
Implementation of each of these options would be subcontracted to EDTech Pty. Ltd. from IMA 
with a profit margin added. This is one of the benefits to social enterprises of South Africa’s liberal 
approach to the third sector. 
 
As EDTech (the technology) became more substantial in terms of content and learning developed 
by and for IMA – EDTech Pty. was established. This allowed for a social enterprise structure to 
emerge through the close links between IMA (a registered NPO) and EDTech Pty. Ltd. shown in 
figure 7 (below). This shows the various external and internal actors/stakeholders and flows of 





Figure 7 - Social Enterprise Structure with value flows (Author’s Own Diagram) 
The social enterprise structure (linking a non-profit entity to a for-profit entity) allowed the 
organization to seek private capital investment and private loans to supplement donations/grants 
(with the expectation of repayment plus interest). Additionally, EDTech (at the time of writing) is 
in the process of gaining a government tender to implement the system and training across 
Mpumalanga schools (reflected in a tender authorised, but not yet released, by the Department of 
Education). 
 
“The reason we went into the educational programme [in resource constrained schools] was to 
offer free maths and science [resources] to the kids in the rural spaces we were [working with] 
… and by doing this [we thought] we will probably get more [governmental, private sector, and 
third sector] funding” 
Interview 2 with E-CEO 
 
This is to say, the development of the EDTech system was initially started with a view to positively 
impact on the learning opportunities for learners who attended their drop-in music hubs. This is an 
important consideration to bear in mind as this enables a more grounded understanding of any 


























































































EDTech Pty. Ltd. and IMA operate as a hybrid organisation with the aim of facilitating digital 
education in Mpumalanga. The aim is to deliver digital education in two broad reaching, 
substantially different programmes. One is a drop-in creative arts programme where young people 
can attend free music tuition training partially delivered through the EDTech platform. Secondly, 
they aim to increase funding for the creative arts programme through a for profit venture to deliver 
digital, multimedia learning content in government schools where the EDTech product is sold to 
schools via the MDoE. Both are seen as socially valuable projects by EDTech/IMA; but are 
differentiated in part through the dual organisational structure (a for profit company part owned by 
a non-profit organisation). 
 
Depending on the perspective taken on EDTech/IMA as a hybrid organisation; if EDTech is 
considered a for-profit social enterprise in its own right: clients of EDTech are also beneficiaries. 
They could be considered individual schools who invest in EDTech’s products and would therefore 
be considered a blending hybrid. 
 
‘Value spillovers’ from utilisation of the EDTech platform would therefore be contingent on the 
ability of individual teachers within a facilitating school environment to enhance education through 
digital education. Such dependence on teachers’ willingness to change practices and ensuring 
schools are facilitating environments for such change may prove costly in terms of training and 
support. Furthermore, ensuring sufficient rhetorical work to ensure such a vision for change is 
internalised by all stakeholders external to EDTech may prove difficult. This is in keeping with 
practice based accounts of technology where determinisms are rejected to prioritise the intricate 
roles individuals play in enacting technology within the context of organisations (Orlikowski, 
2000). Were value spillovers automatic in education technology; research into education 
technology would not be marred by the disparity between rhetoric from technologists and failure 
often experienced in education technology projects. 
 
However, EDTech should be considered alongside the additional creative arts and music tuition 
programmes of IMA. 
 
For IMA to achieve its social objectives; focus, and financial and human resources must also be 
dedicated to ensuring the successful implementation of these programmes. This would result in 
EDTech being classified as a coupling hybrid where the clients are the individual government 
schools integrating EDTech into their teaching and learning; whereas beneficiaries are learners 
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attending the after school music programmes. Importantly, clients and beneficiaries completely 
separate resulting in two independent value streams (Santos et al., 2015). 
 
As such, the complexity of the organisational structure and its various projects is heightened. This 
is explored in the context of the conceptual model presented in figure 4, balancing financial and 
social objectives has implications on mission drift and the trio of objectives increases the risks of 
the multiple objectives trap. 
 
After multiple, multi-million rand grants and service delivery contracts from the MDoE and private 
capital investment in EDTech Pty.; there is real potential for the technology to become imbued in 
the tensions highlighted in figure 4. These tensions could be expressed through a conflict between 
funding their creative arts programmes; adequately resourcing the development and 
implementation of the EDTech platform within schools; and ensuring that the EDTech platform 
achieves improved education results which reflect the social and financial investments made in it. 
 
It is important recognise the multiple, competing institutional logics of EDTech/IMA and the 
complex relationship management required for success; given the increased complexity in 
managing a hybrid organisation with two independent value streams (Santos et al., 2015). This 
requires perspectives from within both fields in order to strive for such dualistic organisational 
objectives. 
 
Given the intention for EDTech to become a sustainable source of income for IMA; and the 
competing objectives of delivering effective digital education in government schools (and doing so 
profitably) while using this funding to deliver drop-in after school music education; as a hybrid 
organisation; EDTech/IMA run the serious risks associated with such complexity. 
 
Now faced with almost wholesale avoidance at worst and limited use at best, EDTech/IMA 
arguably is struggling to reconcile such complexity and are waiting for both a financial and social 
return on the investments made into the digital learning platform. The risk of mission drift away 
from the original founders’ mission to provide effective, free music education towards a complex 
mix of social and financial objectives, accountabilities, funders, and stakeholders is potentially only 
being realised now. Such a mission drift is a result of being overambitious with the organisational 





4.1.1 Moving from Informal Music Education to Government School Education 
To understand the transition from a focus on informal music education to developing a multi-
million rand blended learning platform; it is important to view such a journey through time as 
captured in annual reports from IMA. 
 
The original mission of EDTech from its inception “was intended to deliver music content to our 
members in our Hubs. The initial focus was to develop Music Theory, Guitar and Recorder.” (IMA 
Annual Report of 2013). IMA music hubs are informal music education programmes that were 
situated in existing organisations, mainly within townships and acted as spaces to provide access 
to music education in an after school youth club setting. Over time, however, the mission developed 
“to enable IMA to provide a better service to its members including the delivery of educational 
content which is lacking within their schools, such as mathematics and science.” (IMA Annual 
Report of 2012). This is rooted in the perspective that “music supports education outcomes and is 
good for the spirit” (IMA Annual Report of 2014) and a recognition that learners may not have 
access to learning resources in the communities where IMA operates hubs when compared with 
fee-paying schools. 
 
When this is read in conjunction with the previous interview extract of E-CEO, the IMA annual 
report of 2013 explains: 
 
“We are confident… that [EDTech] has the potential to raise significant funding for IMA 
through sponsorship (marketing budgets) and social investment budgets from organisations who 
are keen to improve education standards in South Africa.” 
(IMA Annual Report of 2013) 
 
In facing this market pull (where the market is conceived as revenue streams for IMA) at the 
expense of mission stick (Rangan, 2004); IMA subsequently focussed significant resources in the 
development of EDTech, with evidence of this at the expense of valuable resources available – 
both in terms of demands staff (management and operations employees) but additionally financial 
resources. 
 
“In 2014, IMA continued to deliver its music program through its existing hub structures [drop-
in music centres within township communities]. EDTech, our management and training program, 
consumed many of our resources in 2014.” 




As the ideas of lucrative funding became increasingly real; IMA signed a contract with the 
Mpumalanga Department of Education (MDoE) to develop content for 10 of the most taught 
subjects within the province. A combination of governmental grants; national lottery funding; 
private sector tax deductible donations; and private investor loans were gained in order that IMA 
may develop a solution for schools to address shortfalls in South Africa’s government school 
system. 
 
This, another example of both market pull (funding opportunities) and further redefinition of the 
organisational mission can be thought of as the point at which EDTech as a project of IMA, started 
to become a semi-independent organisation on its own. This is an early indication of potential 
mission drift as IMA’s desire to become a self-sustaining NPO saw them embark on a long and 
tumultuous journey; combining the technology start-up institutional logic with a music education 
logic; and an education development logic. 
 
As part of the social enterprise set-up, IMA is a majority shareholder (60%+) of EDTech. In return 
for IMA’s ownership, profits gained through successful growth and development of EDTech would 
be invested into the music education programme because “the arts are incredibly difficult to fund. 
This is an opportunity for us to gain alternative income streams” (Informal conversation with E-
CEO). 
 
In signing the contract with the MDoE to deliver such a massive project, EDTech/IMA 
management envisaged the platform becoming “an important educational tool in the province of 
Mpumalanga… we plan to expand the reach of EDTech to the whole country.” (IMA Annual 
Report of 2014). The mission of EDTech Pty. Ltd. (although a private company) became imbued 
in a political project to “become leaders in blended learning and developing a pathway to flipping 
the African classroom” (IMA Annual Report of 2014). 
 
While hybrid learning or blended learning is generally regarded internationally by protagonists of 
education technology and its innate, deterministic outcomes; such assertions are generally based 
upon rhetoric as opposed to reality (Selwyn, 2010, p. 66). There are many dangers in assuming that 
“the African classroom” is in need of flipping. This includes, but is not limited to: the view that all 
African schools are the same; that centuries of oppression and colonisation, and decades of 
Apartheid can be addressed by digital technology (Mercer et al., 2003); and that “improving teacher 
productivity” (IMA Annual Report of 2014) is necessarily fulfilled through technology subverting 
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the role of teachers from “professionals” to “day labourers” (Hodas, 1993, p. 5). The latter, of 
viewing teachers solely as vectors of measurable units of knowledge, creates the inevitable 
outcome that economic views of efficiency posit teachers as “the weakest link in the chain” (Hodas, 
1993, p. 8). This partly explains why videos, as the main mediums of instruction through EDTech’s 
ideal enactment, were so emphasised as a headline feature and benefit of the platform. 
 
4.1.2 Design and Development of the EDTech Platform 
Initially, the content and functions provided by EDTech (the technology) were focussed on 
managing hubs – IMAs after school music education programs situated in peri-urban townships 
and one in a boutique shopping centre just outside White River. The management of hubs relates 
to tracking attendance; delivering learning content and assessments (initially for music only); and 
managing events – the latter being a previously sought after source of self-generated income for 
IMA (indicated in many of the IMA annual reports). 
 
4.1.2.1 Developing and Curating Non-Music Content for EDTech 
Development of the platform (mainly in terms of broadening available content), helped push the 
project towards the project of a free, ‘cloud-based classroom’ for all South Africans. This took 
place between 2013 and 2015 in two phases: 
1. Providing content for Mathematics, English (First Additional Language), and Physical 
Science (2013) 
a. Using twelve employed teachers to curate existing content and where necessary 
develop in-house content 
2. Providing content for thirteen ‘Major Enrolment Subjects’ such as Accounting, Economics, 
Mathematical Literacy, Life Sciences, etc. (2014/15) 
a. Using fifteen employed teachers to curate existing content and where necessary 
develop in-house content 
 
In conversations with a board member of IMA, it emerged that the specific financial remuneration 
structure for employed teachers did not foster a comprehensive approach to the curation of content. 
 
“[The curators] would pick the ‘low-hanging fruit’ tasks and avoid the more time consuming 
tasks. There were issues with quality assurance [QA] of the resources. Because of how they were 
getting paid, some modules for a specific grade and subject lacked the quality, depth and 
appropriacy for use within [the schools we operate in]. They [the curators], were paid before QA 
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issues emerged. So they had no motivation to revise content issues as they had already been 
paid.” 
(Informal conversation with E-BM1, 2017) 
 
As teachers were employed on a module by module basis, payments were made for the completion 
of modules, rather than whole grades or subjects. In each subject and grade there may be four or 
five modules, separated into weeks, as indicated in the relevant Curriculum Assessment Policy 
Statements (CAPS)1 documents. While E-BM1 hadn’t visited the schools involved within this 
study; they were acutely aware of some of the content deficiencies identified. However, the 
implications of inadequately developed content provided by EDTech are only truly appreciated 
when considered in relation to the experience of EDTech within RCSs. 
 
4.1.2.2 Re-Designing the EDTech Interface 
After the initial development of the EDTech platform, and the incremental addition of CAPS 
aligned subject material for Grades 7-12, focus began to shift to usability and interface design. 
 
“It looked boring. [EDTech] was too complicated by then. It didn’t have the face that you’re 
seeing now... Then we could see that kids were struggling to log-in, find what they were looking 
for… So then we decided to have a management side and a learners’ side, then things became 
easy.” 
(Interview 1 with E-DBA, 2017) 
 
E-DBA explained that there were fundamental changes made in terms of interface design based 
upon user feedback and experience from the IMA music hubs. Examples of the early interface is 
shown in figures 8 and 9, below. 
 
It is clear from speaking with E-DBA, who has worked for IMA and EDTech as a dual function 
employee for over 5 years, that there were concerns that utilisation was hampered by the relatively 
poor usability of the earlier versions of the platform interface. 
 
                                                   
1 CAPS is the current South African Curriculum structure and CAPS documents/statements outline 
all examinable learning outcomes. For resources to be curriculum aligned they must account for 




Figure 8 - Old Interface view (image 1) – Researcher’s Photograph 
 
Figure 9 - Old Interface view (Image 2) - Researcher's Photograph 
As figures 8 and 9 show, there wasn’t engaging or intuitive. Furthermore, the ‘database feel’ of 
EDTech’s early iteration shown more clearly in figure 9, provides many options within the one 
screen such as multiple windows, options, and access to different tables within the complex 
database structure. Therefore, for users commanding low digital literacies, such as learners and 




From this point, a new interface was designed, which mimicked the ‘tile’ interface typical of the 
previous Windows Mobile and recent Windows PC Operating Systems (OSs). This can be seen in 




Figure 10 - New User View of ‘Dashboard’ - Researcher's Photograph 
It is important to note that this design iteration requires an internet connection and must be operated 
through a web browser in order to access resources, videos, instructional documents, assessments, 
etc. This, currently operational, version of the online software is referred to as ‘EDTech Enterprise’. 
 
This version was developed specifically for IMA hubs in order to realise a hybrid learning 
environment for music tuition within the context of the series of centrally managed, but 
geographically spread hubs. Software modules, including online assessments and real-time user 
analytics, were designed to ensure consistency of tuition and identify areas where learners in 
                                                   
2 Black boxes have been used to cover information which could reveal the logo and name of 
EDTech and the informant who was logged in at the time. 
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specific hubs may lack the necessary support to effectively learn and pass assessments. This has 
resulted in a relatively complex virtual learning environment (VLE) being developed for a specific 
use case – IMA drop-in music hubs. 
 
4.1.2.3 Involvement of (Some) User Experience Feedback in EDTech Re-Design 
Due to the connectedness of the drop-in music hubs using EDTech (they all fell under the 
management and authority of IMA), there was regular feedback and observation throughout the 
early development stages of the platform. This meant that as development took place, the context 
specific requirements of IMA music hubs were taken into account and ‘on the spot’ feedback could 
be gained. It is vital to recognise that teaching methods between the RCSs and IMA hubs are 
inherently different and the implications of retrofitting such rigid teaching practices from IMA into 
resource constrained may not be easy. 
 
This feeds into other streams within existing literature as EDTech/IMA responses to failure (the 
limited/non-use of EDTech in RCSs) and the technologically deterministic view of technology on 
behalf of EDTech managers. This view of technology is exacerbated through little interest in 
understanding the existing nuances, routines and structures that make up the education context. 
This privileges the rationalisation that technology (EDTech, in this instance) can achieve certain 
outcomes “if used in a correct manner” (Selwyn, 2010, p. 68). 
 
IMA was developing proprietary software in a new and growing organization; without a complex, 
hierarchical management structure or established/institutionalised work practices. The EDTech 
platform was developed alongside IMA’s practice/culture.  By having the two so tightly 
intertwined; EDTech products and IMA’s pedagogy and learning culture were conceptualised, 
designed and developed with relative freedom and flexibility. This specific design context for IMA 
hubs did not translate to formally assessed, academically accredited, fiscally frugal, and 
systematically underinvested in no-fee schools typical of townships and particularly in former 
Bantustans. Such structural differences are partly as a result of the legacy of separate development 
policies during Apartheid and the issue of the fiscal inequality due to the dualistic no-fee/fee paying 
schools where governmental subsidies to no-fee schools fail to resemble fee income from fee-
paying schools. 
 
There was a higher degree of flexibility in terms of technical design and organization work patterns 
during initial development. This echoes the co-constitutive nature of technology within 
organizations. Although, this is more acute due to the infancy of both IMA and EDTech 
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technologies and how integral the technology had to be in teaching and learning within the IMA 
music hubs. E-CEO explains his motivation to deliver music theory education through wholly 
digital means: 
 
“I don’t have enough resources even with the funding I’ve been given. I’ve got to employ a full-
time teacher to lecture students as you do in a classroom setting? So I’ve had to make the 
conscious decision that we are using a digital platform to deliver education and that’s where it 
begins.” 
(Interview 1 with E-CEO) 
 
There are many spin off implications of this approach to ‘going digital’, which were revealed 
through the broader engagements with E-CEO during the research process. The simplicity with 
which he views the integration of technology in teaching and learning as a “decision at management 
level” (Interview 1 with E-CEO) may be acceptable when the technology is developed in-house, in 
a new and growing organisation. However, as the software was developed for very specific 
applications, in specific education contexts with non-accredited curricula; the extent to which this 
‘top-down’ approach to implementation can be administered in a government school is uncertain. 
 
This is one critical oversight made by EDTech/IMA: The direct transferability of the platform 
intricately designed for (mainly peri-urban) drop-in, after school music programmes to no-fee, 
government schools in former Bantustans. 
 
E-CEO has a background in satellite communications and worked for years overseas, partly in the 
UK before returning to South Africa. As such, E-CEO is technically astute and intricately 
understands satellite connectivity and its practical applications. However, the remaining board 
members are either professional musicians who play more of an ambassador role within IMA; local 
business owners; one former education professional; and an accountant. 
 
E-CEO considers all of the areas where EDTech/IMA operated to be ‘rural’; apart from the office 
(with a hub attached) in a boutique shopping centre. The hubs are actually operating in peri-urban 
townships (on the outskirts of towns and cities) within 35Km by road of the office. The RCSs are 
based in the rural countryside roughly 80-90Km by road from the office. This is an important 
differentiation to make as the infrastructure of towns and cities is more proximate to peri-urban 
areas than in rural areas and the proximity of the music hubs, relative to the schools studied in this 
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research means EDTech management and staff must travel twice the distance to observe 
limited/non-use. 
 
The implications of this are broad, but are felt by EDTech/IMA in terms of the increased costs 
(travel time, fuel, etc.) of visiting schools involved within the trial. Additionally, E-CEO’s and 
EDTech/IMA’s homogenising view of townships through many examples in interviews, informal 
conversations, and in annual reports can be questioned. This is not only because of the significantly 
different contextual factors between peri-urban townships and former self-governing territories; 
but additionally, the limited experience, knowledge, and appreciation for the context of rurality and 
education in resource constrained settings were lacking both on the board of IMA. 
 
As the White Paper on Local Government outlines: “the definition of “urban” and “rural” is hotly 
debated” (Department of Constitutional Development, 1998, p. 19) and elsewhere in the white 
paper it explains the importance of understanding the impact of historical processes in the wide 
variety of areas classified as ‘rural’ and their distinct, highly variable context. ‘Rural’ formed such 
a broad generalisation of areas perceived to be a mixture of non-urban, poor, townships, inhabited 
primarily by black people but was also particularly problematic in relation to E-CEO’s labelling of 
black learners at IMA as ‘rural’. 
 
The conflation of rurality with township, poverty, social deprivation, a lower socio-economic status 
naming individuals as ‘rural’ is problematic, and insensitive to the nuance of black lived 
experiences. In one of the researcher’s first interactions at IMA; E-CEO randomly selected a male, 
black learner as we were discussing the work IMA does with individuals from disadvantaged 
backgrounds and from what he described as rural areas. “As we were leaving the stage to go back 
to the office, someone walks past and E-CEO asks: ‘Hey, are both your parents dead?’” (extract 
from researcher’s diary). The learner was shocked, said no, and continued to walk past. But this 
quote emphasises the conflation E-CEO makes, primarily highlighting a lack of sensitivity for the 
circumstances learners within IMA come from and subsequently reducing the analytical purchase 
of rurality; and. 
 
As Figure 11 (below) (Statistics South Africa, 2003, p. 3) shows, there is great complexity in 
evaluating an area based upon proximity to urban centres. Based upon the evidence of conflation 
of rurality with a myriad of other socio-economic, spatial, and historic processes; rural very quickly 




Figure 11 - 2001 Census Area Classifications between Urban-Rural (Statistics South Africa, 2003, p.3) 
When discussing issues related to rurality, E-CEO highlighted “we were able to deliver a digital 
education solution into rural townships” (Interview 1 with E-CEO) and additionally the annual 
report of 2013 read “the application can be used by rural schools to deliver meaningful educational 
content to any user regardless of internet availability and regardless of the physical location of the 
school”. 
 
While there is most certainly a difference in the lived experience of those living townships and 
informal settlements (such as Langa around Cape Town) within cities and those in less urbanised 
areas (such as Pienaar around Mbombela, Mpumalanga) – township (one categorisation of formal 
settlement) is as variable a concept as rurality. Given the unique circumstances and historical 
processes through which each individual settlement was created or developed; differing access to 
services are available. Some rural townships on the periphery of commercial farms, forestry 
businesses, mines, etc. were created specifically to serve the needs of these white owned 
businesses; and were (and to some degree still are) inherently labour reserves. This is the 
importance of understanding the implications of historical processes on the spatial inequalities 
faced and a detractor of motivation for some learners’ future careers. 
 
This explicit assumption that peri-urban townships in Mbombela Municipality and resource 
constrained communities in Bushbuckridge Municipality face the same challenges is a source of 
under appreciation of the contexts of individual communities. As such, the difficulties schools face 
between these two different contexts and the implications of uneven development and spatial 
inequality between former self-governing territories and townships is stark in many cases. Such a 
view, combined with the difference in institutional function (hubs as drop-in music centres and 
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RCSs as government, schools following an accredited curriculum); goes some way in ‘setting the 
stage’ for non-use within RCSs. 
 
Because drop-in music centres in peri-urban townships were involved in EDTech’s technology 
design and development process; the potential for under-appreciation of the institutional context of 
RCSs and the centrality of the teacher in government school classrooms becomes evident. 
 
4.1.3 Developing Digital Libraries (hubs) 
EDTech, recognising the lack of internet connectivity in most resource constrained schools, 
developed what is called a Digital Library (also interchangeable within EDTech with the word 
hub). 
 
When digital libraries are distributed by EDTech, they are branded with the EDTech logo and are 
pre-loaded with the full curriculum of resources (or those which have been curated) from Grade 7- 
Grade 12. However, instead of accessing the learning resources using the Intel firmware; EDTech 
developed a series of mobile and PC apps with which users must use to interact with the digital 
library. This was a strategic decision made by EDTech developers and management based upon 
the role the digital library was envisaged playing within resource constrained schools and was 
intended to simplify the interface for ease of use. 
 
Due to the limited internet connectivity expected within resource constrained settings, the Digital 
Library operates only as a resource retrieval system. No assessments/tests are available without 
access to the Internet. Users can only navigate their way through learning resources structured by 
Subject, Grade, then Week to find the video and text based resources required (see figure 12 and 
13 below). Critically, without Internet connectivity: no usage data is collected and either stored or 
transmitted to EDTech’s servers. There is no data held by EDTech of whether or how a particular 
device is being used, unless it is connected to the internet and online assessments are carried out. 
 
When the Digital Library is connected to the Internet (either through an Ethernet or SIM card 
connection) this allows the hub to communicate with the EDTech ‘cloud servers’. If this networked 
set-up is opted for, the Digital Library works to minimise the bandwidth and data use by only 





It can therefore be summarised that, the Digital Library presents an opportunity for locations 
without internet connectivity to have access to all of the content curated by EDTech on the one 
device, but unless there is internet connectivity, all other features of EDTech (assessments, updates, 
class analytics, etc.) are not possible. However, even in the small number of cases where content 
is updated or fixed, in locations using the Digital Library without internet access; these updates 
will not happen as there is no connection to the servers where updates are held. 
 
4.1.4 Developing Mobile and PC Apps 
EDTech developed Mobile (Android, iOS, and Windows Mobile) and PC (Windows 8 and 10) 
Apps which offer users the opportunity to use EDTech on the devices of their choice. These were 
made public on the relevant App Stores in 2015. 
 
Both the Mobile and PC Apps share a similar interface which is different to the enterprise version 
(with tiles – figure 10) – see figure 12 (below) for the mobile interface and figure 13 (below) for 
the PC interface. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Mobile App Interface and Basic Navigation - (EDTech, 2016) 
HOW TO ACCESS CONTENT 
Select Subject Select Grade 
The Grade is arranged in WEEKLY steps.  Each 
step contains the resources that you need to 
cover in that week.  The resources are videos, 




Figure 13 - PC App Interface - (EDTech, 2016) 
In the App, at the top right corner there is a connection indicator and there are 4 possible “states of 






Figure 14 - States of Connectivity - (EDTech, 2016) 
If a user is connected to a digital library, they can browse and stream content from the hub or 
alternatively can download content to their device. This allows them to access learning content in 
places where they have no internet connection. If a user is connected to the internet (either via. a 
WiFi connection or a mobile data connection in the case of SIM card devices) they can stream or 
download content to their device like with the hub, but additionally, they will have access to online 
assessments. 
 
If a mobile connection is used, this depletes a user’s data bundle or airtime and because it is rich 
multi-media content, this has the potential to deplete the average South African learner’s mobile 
data within seconds – assuming she has any to begin with. 
 
There are settings which can be used to stop the use of mobile data, but these are within settings 
menus which might not be easily accessible of their location on the user interface. There are 
increased levels of complexity if the digital library is hosted within an existing W/LAN as certain 
network settings within the App need to be changed. The following example showcases the 
inappropriateness of EDTech’s products requiring internet access within resource constrained 
contexts. 
OFFLINE—NOT connected to the Internet or to a HUB.  Can only 
view content that has been downloaded to the device only. 
ONLINE & HUB —Connected to the Internet and  Connected to 
a HUB.  Can download content onto device (if on HUB). 
ONLINE —Connected to the Internet only.  Can view content on-
line from YouTube and other websites.  Uses DATA. 
HUB—Connected to a Hub only.  Can view content on the HUB.  
Uses NO data.  Can download content onto device.  Must have a 
WiFi connection and WiFi must be turned ON. 
STATES OF CONNECTIVITY 
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4.1.4.1 Other Experiences of EDTech as an Internet Requiring Solution 
In 2015 EDTech carried out a separate trial with live-streamed lessons through Skype Broadcast 
where viewers could watch a teacher give a lesson (in Maths, Physical Science, and Life Science 
grades 10-12) in real time and additionally communicate with the teacher through an instant 
message service. There was an expectation from EDTech management that there would be an 
average of 1,000 viewers per lesson. The average viewership was less than 2 per lesson. The private 
company who funded this project as a tax deductible donation from a Corporate Social 
Responsibility fund received a report where the analysis section began: 
 
“The premise for this project was that there is a demand for education; the country, the economy 
and business need a well-educated population, which translates in the minds of many to a 
“demand for education”. This premise is false. 
 
The number of online viewers is staggeringly low and the uptake so poor that it can simply be 
said that there is not a demand for education. [sic][emphasis in original]” 
EDTech Funders Report (2017) 
 
Co-authored by E-CEO, this report provides valuable insight into the ways in which EDTech, as 
an organisation, lack empathy for the lived experience of the average South African and particularly 
those who live in communities around former Bantustans and attend no-fee schools. The rationally 
behind such an unfounded assertion that there is “not a demand for education [in South Africa] 
[emphasis in original]” is that because Facebook marketing and engagement through likes was 
high; the only conceivable explanation for low viewership and click through rates was that all 
learners in South Africa lack any motivation for education. 
 
Additionally, the report and informal conversations with E-CEO projected the idea of apathy on 
behalf of teachers too; providing further conjecture that if teachers lack materials, hypothetically, 
they should jump at any opportunity to access resources. Apathy was projected onto teachers and 
principals by E-CEO in their assertion that every school in South Africa received a daily email with 
links to the broadcasts and a description of the lessons. 
 
This reveals ignorance on behalf of EDTech, its management, and the authors of the report and 
lack of appreciation for the complex context of EDTech’s target user market. Given the 
prohibitively high costs of mobile data (and internet enabled devices) in South Africa (Africa 
Research ICT, 2018) and across emerging economies (and the global south) (Chetty, Banks, Brush, 
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Donner, & Grinter, 2011; Donner, 2015; Donner & Gitau, 2009; Kreutzer, 2009); and the high 
inequality that South Africa faces in terms of socio-economic security, education (between no-fee 
and fee paying government schools), access to wired broadband internet access, etc.; it is 
unsurprising that viewership was so low. 
 
In the context of high social media engagement, users on many mobile networks in South Africa 
are given free access to Facebook and Twitter, explaining the high engagement on these platforms 
and the low click through rate, when required to pay for access outside these platforms. 
Furthermore, as learners generally are provided with after school lessons regularly and schools 
have uneven and metered (capped) access to the Internet. Such access is typically through satellite 
connections with a 10Gb per month usage cap – for a whole school. 
 
In informal conversations with E-CEO, the researcher found that in spite of being aware of the 
challenges in accessing the Internet in such contexts; E-CEO’s response was to assume that “if 
learners wanted to access it, they could do so at school” or “they could go somewhere that offered 
free WiFi” (informal conversations with E-CEO). Such a belief that learners can seek out 
connectivity is at odds with pragmatic reality as learners will either already be engaged in extra 
lessons after school conducted by teachers in schools (at the same time as live broadcasts). 
Additionally, schools frequently found their 10Gb data allowance depleted within a few weeks of 
each month. The issue of rurality means there is significant cost (financial and time costs) of 
transport and the number of individual taxis required to get to areas offering free WiFi; and not to 
mention the implications of travelling at evening on the safety of learners, particularly girls. 
 
This example, while dense in description, reveals several key misunderstandings, assumptions, and 
worldviews which are not in keeping with the reality experienced by learners targeted by EDTech, 
particularly within resource constrained settings, where additional study materials would 
supposedly be most impactful. 
 
4.1.5 EDTech/IMA Organisational Perspectives of a ‘Failed Trial’ 
Much of the conversation with E-CEO, when discussing the failure of the trial of EDTech in RCSs 
placed culpability squarely in the hands of an “incompetent” provincial Department of Education 
(interviews 1 and 2 with E-CEO). In fact, the term “incompetent” appeared 19 times over two 
interviews lasting a total of 2 and a half hours, referring specifically to the department as an 
organisation and its constituent employees and representatives. E-CEO rationalises the failure in 




“the failure of the project is not going to be due to [EDTech], it's going to be due to the fact that 
no training has been provided and part of the installation was that the schools had functional 
internet…  It's been an epic failure by the department to provide the training, and to follow-up on 
the training and to make sure the infrastructure needed is there and is being used [sic].” 
(Interview 1 with E-CEO) 
 
Here, E-CEO views the provision of training as a major downfall of the EDTech trial in RCSs 
coupled with the perceived lack of internet within RCSs involved within the schools. E-CEO 
explained the contract EDTech had with the Mpumalanga Department of Education (MDoE) 
(agreed and signed in 2014) that EDTech provided training to roughly 15 trainers who operate on 
a cascade model also referred to as ‘training the trainer’. However, in reading the contract, it is 
explicitly stated that EDTech/IMA was responsible for providing training to “Teachers, 
facilitators, and users to optimise their effective use of the platform” (EDTech/IMA service 
delivery agreement with MDoE, 2014). 
 
It turned out that after the contract was signed, E-CEO was requested to train MDoE staff to 
subsequently train teachers. This renegotiation of the contract was not necessarily formally agreed 
through a contractual amendment, leading to what could be understood as diffusion of 
responsibility, where the MDoE may not have fully appreciated the extent of training required for 
teachers to used EDTech effectively and lead to a fuller utility of the platform. 
 
“I’m sure they will view [EDTech] as a failure in the future. It’s not a failure because [EDTech] 
is a failure. We can demonstrate that it works in a functional space. It will be a failure because 
the people in the Department of Education are simply incompetent and should not be employed 
[sic].” 
(Interview 2 with E-CEO) 
 
In relinquishing responsibility for the failure, along with the perception that “it works in a 
functional space”, E-CEO implies that EDTech is perfectly positioned to realise the national 
Department of Basic Education’s directive for “e-Education” (Department of Education, 2004). 
The empirical base for E-CEO to assert EDTech as the ideal tool for realising such a directive, 
however, is based upon the experience of EDTech in IMA Hubs and with no substantial effort to 
explore areas of limited or wholesale avoidance of EDTech, beyond conjecture. Additionally, what 
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separates EDTech from other technological possibilities is questionable at best and the data from 
RCSs reveals divergence in routines developed by teachers with technology in the classroom. 
 
From a critical perspective, the vacuum of education professionals involved within the 
development of the platform; the lack of any black or coloured representation and but a few women 
on the board of IMA (and exclusively white males as directors in EDTech Pty.) could offer an 
alternative conception as to the antecedents of failure of the EDTech trial. As Doherty, Haugh, and 
Lyon (2014) outline while discussing the increased responsibility of social enterprise boards in 
accounting to a broader range of stakeholders than for-profit organisations; “[this] leads to tensions 
in securing the appropriate board representation of commercial and stakeholder engagement 
expertise” (ibid, p. 429). 
 
As there are no individuals representative of black lived experiences within the board of IMA; nor 
the experience of teachers with professional, practice based, expertise in RCSs; the extent to which 
decisions made are inclusive or representative of the interests of the schools involved within the 
trial is concerning. Understanding the potential for teachers and learners from resource constrained 
schools to be considered as “antagonistic assets” (Hockerts, 2015) and the transformative promise 
they have to become part of EDTech’s competitive advantage; it is worthwhile in acknowledging 
the limited input teachers and learners from such schools played in developing EDTech. 
 
Given the dual organisational structure of EDTech/IMA; the board of IMA seeks primarily to serve 
the interests of the drop-in music centres. This suggests there is little oversight of the social mission 
of EDTech. As EDTech Pty. Ltd. is a private company, even though it is part owned by IMA, the 
significant degrees of autonomy and lack of participation of “target groups” (Mair et al., 2015). 
 
This highlights a significant degree of complexity in the organisational structure of EDTech/IMA 
as a hybrid organisation. Furthermore, the balancing of two different social impact logics (of music 
education in resource constrained communities and education technology development in RCSs) 
with the commercial logic of the technology start-up is problematic. There is no board whose 
principal role is to ensure inclusiveness, relevance, and effectiveness of the EDTech platform. 
 
Mission drift is evident given the multiple (re)developments made to IMA’s mission with regards 
to EDTech. Such revisions to mission from initially providing after schools support holistic 
development of learners in their drop-in music centre; to developing an ambitious, ubiquitous 
solution to address teaching and learning resources in resource constrained schools highlights a 
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drift from the original mission. Language in the IMA annual reports is highlighted the EDTech 
project as a drain on resources and as E-CEO puts it: “Out of every 100 company ideas that start – 
one might work. So people burn a lot of money in trying to make things happen.” (Interview 2 with 
E-CEO). What was originally viewed, however optimistically or naïvely, as a cash cow – very 
quickly became a costly, time consuming, stressful, and resentful project detracting from E-CEO’s 
and the founding board member’s aim of developing the next generation of South African 
musicians. 
 
EDTech/IMA have separate clients (resource constrained schools and funders) and beneficiaries 
(IMA learners of music). In the Santos et al., (2015, p. 45) categorisation of hybrid organisation 
value chains: they live up to the dual assertion that the risk of mission drift is high and achieving 
financial sustainability is difficult. 
 
4.1.6  Summary of EDTech Pty., IMA, and EDTech Technologies 
IMA is the parent organization of EDTech in such that EDTech Pty. exists to, ideally, create 
significant revenue streams for IMA. Both IMA and EDTech Pty. are linked within the same Social 
Enterprise structure. 
 
Through a co-constitutive development process, both IMA and EDTech’s product offering were 
developed to suit the specific needs of IMA and its music hubs operating in resource constrained 
communities, while the technological capabilities of EDTech equally informed the way IMA would 
operate. As outlined through the classifications of hybrid organisations programmes and 
organisational design by Santos, et al., (2015); EDTech/IMA can be considered a coupling hybrid 
with significant risks of mission drift (prioritising one element of the organisational logics at the 
expense of another); and the significant difficulty in achieving financial self-sustainability. 
 
EDTech/IMA management classify IMA music hubs as “rural” (as outlined in reports, interviews 
and informal conversations); while the researcher disagrees with this assertion and considers the 
IMA hubs as peri-urban due to their relative proximity to urban centres. The extent to which 
EDTech’s Digital Library product is directly transferrable and usable within resource constrained, 
no-fee government schools situated in rural areas (or significantly ‘more rural’ than the IMA hubs) 
is explored in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Critically, however, the specific configuration of the EDTech/IMA social enterprise structure is 
problematic as what started as a project to provide maths and science education in IMA music hubs, 
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has run down a rabbit hole, drifted from the mission of delivering effective music and arts education 
in resource constrained communities. In turn, EDTech has arguably become too complex a project 
in it’s focus on schools across Mpumalanga and South Africa to be managed and administered 
within the context of a relatively small and locally focussed social enterprise. The result, from 
viewing the social enterprise data: a draining of resources from IMA through shared management 
and frontline staff, offices, and competing operational priorities; social missions; and complex 
multi-million rand grants, investments, and donations. As such, the limited/non-use of EDTech 
could be subject to aiming to tackle too much given this niche focus on music education and have 
been caught by the multiple objectives trap (Garrette & Karnani, 2010). 
 
 
The data from the resource constrained schools (RCSs) are presented following the structure of the 
model developed based upon the practice lens, and the structurational modalities it outlines. While 
analyses are presented as discreet categories and sub-categories; to read these as such, without 
regarding the ‘intra-connectedness’ of each component, misses the depth of nuance and 
idiosyncrasies involved in teachers deciding whether or not to use technology in general. Supposing 
they do; selecting which technologies and the ‘hows’, ‘whens’, and ‘whys’ of the integration of 
technology in the classroom are also subject to nuanced negotiations. 
 
Figure 15 (below) shows the model developed based upon the data collected throughout the 
research process, focussing on teachers’ negotiations with technology within RCSs. There is an 
emphasis on idiosyncrasy; heterogeneity; the individual; and their journey. Each constituent 
component outlined in the model is not mutually exclusive: they are presented as such for analytic 




Figure 15 - Negotiations of Education Technology in Context Model 
There is a significant level of iteration between concepts due to the co-constitutive nature of 
structurational modalities. This particular order is used to map the technological conditions teacher 
operate within to set the scope for discussing normative conditions and interpretive schemes 
(Halperin & Backhouse, 2007, p. 6). Overlaps between concepts are signposted in the text. The 
model aims to highlight the relative complexity beyond the deterministic, linear way which E-CEO 
sees the process of achieving digital education within RCSs in South Africa. 
 
4.2.1 Technological Conditions – The Modality of Facility 
The mere presence of technology in RCSs does not automatically encourage systemic integration 
of technology into classroom practice. Often times technologies remained locked within safes, 
cupboards and offices. While for some teachers a lack of available technology is a barrier; for 
others the outcome of deciding not to use technology is impacted by broader issues. In each of the 
RCS field sites, there were broadly similar technologies present. These were connected and stored 
in different ways and places. Subsequently, the degree to which they were implemented or even 
brought out of the safe/secure storage varied greatly between field sites. 
 
Figure 16 (below) shows a secure storage and charging unit for tablets which was not used. Instead 




















Individual Rationalisations in (limited/non) Enactments of Technology in Education 
Individual Factors 
ICT Self-Efficacy Experience with Tech 
Pragmatic Considerations 
Time Considerations Perceived Reliability 
Selecting Techs Resource Identification 
Technological Conditions 
Tech Eco-systems Available Resources 
Institutional Conditions/Perspectives 
DoBE Directives for ICT in 
Education 
Management Styles and 
Processes 
Tech Provided by Multiple, Independent Actors 
Complex Process to Decide: 
Will I use technology in my class? 
If yes, then: 
What benefits do I hope to gain? 
Which Technology do I use in my class? 
How do I go about integrating it? 
• Use is not a categorical 
o There are are many levels and strategies of integration 
• It is an individual negotiation of conditions, not limited to: 
o individual factors of confidence and support/safety net 
o using personal experience of ICTs to build integration strategies 
o perceptions of the technologies available 
§ Other teachers experience 
§ Previous personal experience 
o how positive motivation and personal development are viewed 
o how newcomers to technology are supported before, during, after use 
§ is anyone available to ‘team teach’? 
o how curious the individual is/willing to try new things/risk 
§ trying and not succeeding could create barriers to try again 
o institutional directives alone cannot drive usage 
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facility. This was due to security concerns. Figure 17 (below) shows storage solutions in RCS-B. 
A wooden cabinet (right) is used for storing things like speakers, old keyboards, etc. and two 
storage units similar to that shown in figure 16 house tablets and laptops. For additional security, 
these secure storage units are encased in a locking steel frame which is bolted to the cement floor. 
 
 




Figure 17 - Two Device Storage Options in RCS-B and Half Bricked Windows (for security) 
The following categories of technological conditions provide evidence primarily of heterogeneity 
in technology; its technical and perceived levels of interconnectedness; and sets the backdrop for 
understanding the levels of appropriacy of institutional and individual perspectives of technology-
in-practice. The rich ethnographic data presented, shows the pragmatic approaches of teachers to 
navigate new technologies, spaces, developing and modifying new routines. 
 
Heterogeneity is evident in individual use of technology within different classrooms and is 
practically rationalised by users depending on the technological conditions present within a school. 
However, prescriptions for technology use in the classroom are mandated at various institutional 
levels (nationally, provincially, municipally, by district, by circuit, by individual principals, and by 
non-governmental actors within the space). Therefore, the extent to which policy, protocols, and 
technologies are pragmatically realised in teaching and learning is broad. This is impacted by the 
specific assemblages of technology available. This includes the coalescence of these technologies 
within education spaces and the context specific concerns (e.g. security); infrastructure available 
(electricity supply and internet access), diverse supply and qualities of user devices; and the 
educational resources available to teachers and learners to exploit. 
 
4.2.1.1 Technology Ecosystems – a Category of Technological Conditions 
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Technology Eco-Systems relates to various technologies which are available within schools. Tech 
Eco-Systems can be broken down into various categories and based upon the field sites considered, 
the categories are Technology Capacity; Facilities; and Device Supply Chains. 
 
Technology Capacity – A subcategory of Technology Ecosystems 
In each school there were varying degrees of access to the Internet. RCS-A at one point had a 
connection to the Internet through VSAT (Very-Small-Aperture-Terminal [satellite based internet 
connectivity]). However, it was rendered unusable due to a lightening storm and was therefore not 
providing any connectivity. The only access to the Internet was provided through a sim card which 
was used purely for administrative purposes. This significantly limited the opportunities of staff to 
use online materials. 
 
Some teachers, however, through their own catalogue of resources stored on their personal devices 
were able to continue their use of technology in the classroom. RAT1 only occasionally used 
EDTech to browse the available content to find resources which he believed could be useful to 
supplement resources he curated over years of teaching. The full functionality of the EDTech hub 
(online assessments and class progress reporting/analytics) could not be realised. In RCS-A, only 
a small part of the platform was used meaning the majority of effort to code and develop EDTech 
Hub/App remained wasted in RCS-A. 
 
RCS-B was the most advanced user of EDTech, and in fact, the only regular user of EDTech. 
However, the quality of the internet connection presented significant issues in its effective use. In 
RCS-B, the EDTech hub uses a sim card to connect to the internet when using EDTech for online 
assessments. The researcher sat in the dedicated ICT centre were RBF, the technology facilitator, 
hosted cohorts of students to deliver digital education. 
 
“RBF connects to the "EDTechHubVodacom" Wi-Fi network; accesses the device system menu; 
allows internet access for connected devices; and borrows my cell phone to check the balance of 
the data on the SIM card inside the hub. 
 
RBF: Ok, we have 800Mb 
 
Researcher: Is that enough? 
 
RBF: I don't know, we can see. Maybe we'll only bring around 10 learners” 
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(Observations in Research Diary) 
 
Learners are brought into the ICT centre in groups of 15 (half of a class) due to its small size, but 
the mobile data available means that only 5 learners can complete online assessments out of a class 
of 30. There may have been intervening issues that depleted the school’s available mobile data such 
as the tablets learners were using conducting automatic updates – though other causes are also 
possible. This highlights significant issues in the intricacies of setting up internet connections 
though the EDTech hub and critically, how these are managed. 
 
To further problematize this scenario, online assessments when conducted through the app are 
designed to be streamlined. However, when using the EDTech app when connected to a hub there 
are two possible ways to enact online assessments (the data intensive in-app browser or through 
the streamlined assessment interface). The former was the default option presented to some users. 
This is another potential cause of depleted data, but the specific cause was not investigated by RBF 
– it appeared this was not unusual. 
 
While this specific case represents an enactment of EDTech; it highlights why, for the next two 
weeks, there was be no use of the EDTech online assessment facility and explains subsequent non-
use of the technology. Here, EDTech operates as part of an eco-system of technologies. This raises 
issues in terms of the distributed nature of role players within RCSs to be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter, particularly the ‘Technology Provided by Multiple, Independent Actors’ 
section. 
 
Facilities – A Subcategory of Technology Ecosystems 
Facilities comprise of the physical spaces present within RCSs. Facilities and strategies to manage 
them are different in each of the field sites. RCS-A had no dedicated space for the use of technology 
in teaching and learning. 
 
In RCS-A, there were two projectors. RAT1 explains how one of these is distributed within the 
school. 
 
“[F]ortunately last year, someone donated a laptop, a new projector and a new screen. So 
because I was using this… mainly it was only me. Then the principal said, these things that have 
come, I’m putting them in your hands. You are in charge.” 




While some other teachers implemented technology within the classrooms in RCS-A, this was very 
limited. Very few teachers in RCS-A, if any other than RAT1 used technology for presenting 
alternative multi-media, and the enactment of EDTech in particular was significantly limited. 
Observation data shows teachers in RCS-A tended to project PDF documents rather than rich multi-
media content. 
 
RCS-A had a smart board fixed within the science lab which dual functioned as RAT1’s classroom. 
This was never used as more than a projector screen during the research encounter, meaning that 
while RCS-A had access to interactive technology, it was never implicated in practice. 
Additionally, the presence of the smart board had implications on the ease with which he could 




Figure 18 - RCS-A Science Class: Smart and Chalk Board Positioning (Researcher’s Photograph) 
RCS-B had an ICT centre with an interactive white board rendered non-functional due to theft of 
an essential cable. When a whole class was present in the class, it was very crowded. The need to 
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divide classes in two increased the pressure on the ICT centre’s capacity and scheduling. As a 
result, use of the ICT centre was timetabled and restricted to certain subjects reducing the utilisation 
of the majority of the EDTech content. Only grades 9-11 used the ICT centre and only for two 
subjects. 
 
In RCS-C, there was a dedicated classroom with an interactive white board and enough seats to 
accommodate a whole class. Teachers could request the use of the ICT classroom and then use it 
as it suited them. Teachers using the ICT classroom were asked by RCP to sign a register when 
they used the ICT classroom and explain briefly how they used it; which technologies they used; 
and how they described the experience. 
 
For RCS-B and RCS-C; theft was a major problem. Both, in recent months, had experienced 
robberies, where expensive devices such as laptops, LCD TVs, and specialist cables were stolen. 
As a result, RCS-B had bricked up the majority of the windows in the class and now only use the 
secure storage unit for storing devices. However, after the research encounter, the researcher was 
informed of significant theft of devices from RCS-B (almost everything) in spite of the additional 
security measures present in RCS-B. 
 
Device Supply Chains – A Subcategory of Technology Eco-systems 
While devices are present within schools, there are many examples of where devices used in 
teaching and learning are the personal property of teachers and learners. The benefits of having 
individuals using their own devices are multiple such as the case of RAT1 having built up a 
personal bank of resources over their years of teaching in different schools, in different provinces 
(both government and private). This includes a science experiment simulator to circumvent the lack 
of fully equipped science labs. 
 
The benefits to EDTech of teachers and learners using personal devices with an EDTech Hub, is 
the option to download content to the device and take it home to prepare for classes with no internet 
connection or mobile data required. This is a theoretical benefit that was rarely enacted by learners 
but is discussed by E-CEO in saying that: 
 
“The students can’t make use of the resources as they’re not able to bring their devices to school. 
So that’s a non-starter. You would think the first thing is just open up the digital space and say, 
children bring whatever device you have, download it, and take it away.” 




E-CEO isn’t 100% accurate in this assertion. In both RCS-A and RCS-B; learners were permitted 
to bring their own devices under the conditions that they are stored in the school office during 
school time with prior written consent from a teacher. However, the limited learner access to 
EDTech on their own devices, is rather a more complex mix of issues to be explored in the 
discussion chapter drawing upon data presented throughout this chapter. 
 
While a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) approach may overcome some issues in the availability 
of devices or financial resources of institutions to procure them (Selwyn et al., 2017); there are a 
number of drawbacks in this approach. It is an ineffective strategy to increase use of EDTech in 
practice. In many cases, the devices that found themselves in the hands of teachers and learners 
were not fit for purpose beyond personal entertainment and communication. 
 
RAL1 expressed an interest in using EDTech as part of their revision, but within seconds it was 
apparent that the laptop wasn’t compatible with EDTech as the OS was Windows 7, and therefore 
incompatible with the EDTech Hub. The device was a ‘hand-me-down’ from RAL1’s older sister. 
Through a soft hack, RAL1 could circumnavigate the restrictive requirement of the App and 
transfer files through a proxy device – their friends android cell phone. However, this increased the 
workload for RAL1 to access the content before having the chance to decide whether it was useful 
or not. 
 
RAT2 explained that their son had recently got a new laptop and gave them this one. RAT2, had a 
laptop with Windows 8, but many of the keys on the keyboard were not working. This meant using 
the laptop in any meaningful way for teaching and learning was limited by the time-consuming 
task of using the on-screen-keyboard (OSK). While this provided a workaround, the cost of 
replacing the keyboard and even identifying where to get the keyboard replaced given the location 
of the school may prove an expensive, time consuming ordeal. Figure 19 (below) shows the impact 





Figure 19 - On-Screen Keyboard on RAT2's Laptop 
In the case of RAL2, even new devices purportedly compatible with EDTech highlighted further 
issues. RAT2 had a budget Android OS phablet (SIM enabled tablet) which was technically 
compatible with EDTech. However, when working with the learner, during the EDTech app 
installation process, the phablet crashed. It took about 45 minutes to remedy the issue as the App 
required the overwhelming majority of the processors capacity – so much so, that it was impossible 
to find enough processing power to turn the device off. 
 
The app itself eventually worked, but even once operational, the storage capacity was so low, very 
little could be downloaded. This highlights further issues of enacting EDTech on the devices which 
typically find themselves in the hands of users in RCSs and alludes to inadequate user market 
research on behalf of EDTech. Combined with the recommended screen size of 7 inches or higher 
(advice on the app store system requirements), it becomes problematic to assert that a BYOD policy 
is desirable when smartphones are the devices that are generally available to bring. Limited device 
access means learners must accept less as a result of the inequalities they face. 
 
4.2.1.2 Available Resources – a Category of Technological Conditions  
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The availability of resources is a major aspect of a user’s decision whether or not to use technology 
within their teaching and learning. This emerged as a critical factor specifically for EDTech in spite 
of the thousands of video resources available due to multifaceted issue of quality; subjects being 
omitted; videos not following the curriculum effectively enough; and the EDTech App’s sometimes 
disappointing user experience. 
 
Above and beyond the individual resources available with an education technology; issues along 
the lines of ease of set-up and use (dependant on users’ literacies and experience at an individual 
level); how they balance the perceived benefit over traditional pedagogies; and how perceptions of 
a technology are informed by previous experience also impact how available/accessible 
technologies are perceived to be. 
 
The issue of resource quality is consistently raised as a reason not to use EDTech (at all or more 
regularly) and this is related to the content curation process adopted by EDTech/IMA. This includes 
the original source of videos which are held within EDTech. As many of the videos come from an 
organisation called Khan Academy, the resources present on EDTech are often in an accent foreign 
to South Africa. These videos are designed for proficient (if not native) speakers of English and, 
mostly being developed in North America, the pace of speech can be fast. RBL1 explains “Some 
of them, they go too fast. We are still thinking, like calculating and then you end up not 
understanding it.” (Group Interview in RCS-B). Therefore, E-CEO’s vision of digital, independent, 
learner driven learning through EDTech is not likely to be realised. 
 
Almost every individual across all field sites who had used EDTech at least once identified content 
as a major barrier to use. However, upon further reflections on the data, other issues emerged 
throughout the research process and the issues with EDTech can be generally summarised in table 
5 (below). 
 
Table 5 - EDTech Issues as Available Resource 
Problem Area Symptom 
Content 
Aspect Ratio (black ‘boxes’ around video) 
Colour Contrast (black background and 
coloured text on videos) 
Accent/pace of speech of video narrator 
difficult to hear 
Some videos not made by school teachers or 
for school classrooms 





Time navigator on the in-App Multimedia 
Player not functional 
Full screen mode on iOS app doesn’t work 
effectively 
Limited App OS Compatibility 
Mobile Data/PPB Internet consumption of 
online features is significant in RCCs 
App installs and runs one day and doesn’t 
work the next day 
Hub Design Confusing Set-up Process 
Hub/App interoperability 
No files appear on first use (without internet) 
Inefficient system architecture for low-
cost/low-performance devices 
Mobile data/internet required to move 
between G7-9 and G10-12 resources 
Maintenance Process 
App is not maintainable as EDTech 
prioritising communicating ‘soft fixes’ not 
app fixes and couldn’t be adapted for RCS 
environments 
 
Each of these symptoms (or problem areas) have various cases, impacts, and potential remedies. 
Issues related to content generally stem from the content curation/development process employed 
by EDTech. This can be remedied going forward through the development of a content protocol or 
checklist. When coupled with the feelings of E-BM1, highlight the content curation process was 
poorly conceived. However, given that much (if not most) of the video content has been aggregated 
from external organisations (e.g. Khan Academy) issues relating to the colour contrast and aspect 
ratio are not easily addressed as 3rd party content is developed outside of the realm of EDTech 
controls. 
 
Even content developed in-house experienced issues with the aspect ratio of videos, but due to the 
way in which the content was recorded (screen capture from a live lesson); this would require the 
teacher who recorded the video to re-design the PowerPoint slides used and re-record a whole 50-
minute lesson – the funding for such an endeavour, already spent. 
 
Issues related to app and hub design and their interoperability will require redesign of these 
technologies. For example, issues in the in-built media player, presumably could be fixed by 
implementing a different pre-programmed media player module within the code design; while 
addressing the technical aspects of the efficiency of the App on low-cost/low-performance devices 
may require significant and fundamental re-design of the App and Hub environments. However, 




This is a problematic strategy in and of itself given the uneven access to variable quality devices 
within user groups in resource constrained communities. This holds serious potential to exacerbate 
existing inequalities and deepen the disadvantage faced by learners already in difficult domestic 
contexts as also found in the OLPC programme by Warschauer and Ames (2010). 
 
4.2.2 Institutional Conditions/Perspectives – The Modality of Norms 
At many institutional levels of education in South Africa; technology integration is promoted as a 
key driver of education development. Each individual school involved within this study operates 
in nuanced conditions with access to varying sources of technology; facilities and available 
technologies; degrees of dedicated integration expertise; and school management cultures. 
Therefore, each school creates a unique environment though which teachers are more or less 
empowered to integrate technology within teaching and learning. 
 
Such heterogeneity in the specific visions of technology in education across institutional remits 
may therefore require higher degrees of collaboration between actors including government 
departments of education; individual schools and their leaders; and the independent suppliers of 
technologies and training. EDTech, as one of many independent actors did not recognise this and 
arguably standardised their product offering too early and in a vacuum of empathy for such 
complexity. The results within this section showcase a need to develop cases of different practices 
and responses to technology to interpret and action policy through context specific means. 
 
4.2.2.1 DOBE Directives for ICT in Education 
The Department of Basic Education (national) have provided directives and plans to ensure that 
South African schools increasingly use technology within classrooms and for school 
administration. 
 
These directives take different forms such as the guidelines for ICT integration which presents a 
‘teacher development framework’ which positions differing levels of ICT use in the classroom as 
a pyramid, shown in figure 20 (below) (Department of Basic Education, 2007, p. 7). This 
framework is an important consideration in terms of institutional conditions/perspectives as it sets 
the agenda of national and provincial governments for assessing schools’ integration of ICT into 






Figure 20 - Teacher Development Framework (from DoBE, 2007, p. 7) 
This document (ibid) is an important marker in central government policy for directing positive 
change within digital education in government schools in South Africa and builds upon the ground 
work provided in the white paper for e-education (Department of Education, 2004). Above the 
entry level, teachers should be confident enough to implement ICTs in the classroom which also 
involves the confidence to teach learners how to use ICT. While for some teachers, like RAT1, this 
is straightforward; for others it becomes more complicated as it requires the will to implement 
technology in their classes. RBF explained they often faced difficulty in encouraging staff to turn 
up to training sessions. However, RBF also performs one of the core roles which teachers are 
expected to carry out above the entry level. RBF works with learners in semi-structured technology 
training with learners and teachers. This eases the burden on teachers. 
 
Within RCS-C, at least two teachers were engaged in courses with University of the Free State 
known as ‘Advanced Certificates of Education/Teaching’ (ACE/T). These appeared to be greatly 
appreciated by the teachers studying for these qualifications as RCT1 explained: 
 
“It’s a bursary from the government. They cover the cost of studying, maybe we have to take a 
week, they organise a place for us, they organise the catering, the accommodation. We only pay 
the transport. So it really helps you develop as a teacher… it’s difficult because some of the 
subjects they have introduced to us in the field. We are not quite skilled for these subjects. So this 
course; it is developing us so we can have enough knowledge and skills to assist learners in the 
classrooms.” 




RCT1 touches on a few issues pertinent to the institutional conditions teachers operate within such 
as: their individual professional development; opportunities to travel and stay in hotels (which can 
be a big deal for overworked and underpaid teachers); and ways for them to stay abreast of 
curriculum and teaching developments since they left teacher training colleges. Furthermore, these 
accredited courses also aid teachers in their career progression should they wish to seek promotion 
or move from practice to policy. 
 
RCT1 and RCT2 were in possession of laptops which were provided to them/the school as part of 
an initiative to encourage the broader use of technology within their practice. These two teachers 
were keen users of the ICT centre within RCS-C and regularly conducted extra classes within the 
ICT centre; enabled by the provision of devices to them. Additionally, the ACE/T provides teachers 
with assignments that require the use of technology, developing their experience with ICTs and 
subsequently their ICT self-efficacy. In the various interactions with RCT1 and RCT2, both 
approached the researcher at different times to ask for assistance in achieving some tasks. On one 
occasion, RCT1 asked for advice about creating tables which involved merging cells. After 20 
minutes of repeating the process to build the complex table structure in MS Word, RCT1 expressed 
some pride in the new skill. 
 
Other teachers such as RAT1 mentioned the value of these courses for teachers and in their opinion, 
the disappointingly low uptake among colleagues. This can be perceived as a negative factor 
relating to teacher motivation. However, it can also be conceived as a way to encourage passionate 
teachers to continually develop their professional practice. This prioritises resources to teachers 
with a vocational approach to their work; a life-long learning perspective; and desires for career 
progression. 
 
4.2.2.2 Management Styles and Processes 
In the schools studied, each management style was slightly different. This related to various 
approaches to delegation of responsibility of technology (i.e. a science teacher in RCS-A); 
monitoring performance (RCS-C had a register used indirectly in performance appraisals); and 
strategies to develop use (RCS-B had a technology facilitator to provide training and support; RCP 
would sometimes take the lead in coordinating training; and in RCS-A, individual teachers are 
informally providing assistance and support). 
 
However, operationally, leadership within schools generally took the form of leading by example 
and engraining a culture of ‘teamwork’ or ‘unity’ within Senior Management Teams (SMTs) and 
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the school as a whole. The emphasis of positive motivation techniques, prioritising the motivation 
of teachers based on guest speakers; occasionally holding meetings in a hotel in a nearby town; and 
principals assisting teachers in the delivery of digital education all work together to form unity 
within the school. 
 
RBP was very clear throughout the interview in terms of their positive, constructive approach to 
delivering great results with teachers who might be underperforming. 
 
“[I]t should be positive and constructive at all times. It’s not a talk that will be negative. 
Negativity will never bring good results. You have to be positive to the situation. Try to 
understand what makes them not to perform and talk to them in a positive way and in a 
supporting way, so that they come back on board and they start working hard.” 
(Interview with RBP) 
 
Beyond leadership, to manage the facility and ensure that access to the ICT centre was equitable, 
RCS-B developed a policy to only use the ICT centre and EDTech for English First Additional 
Language (FAL) and Maths. These were the classes where there were teachers keen to use 
technology as part of their teaching. This had the benefit of allowing specific teachers to develop 
routines in implementing technology, and based upon the school timetable, greatly reduced the 
possibility of clashing. The ICT centre in RCS-B was managed through a timetable of which days 
and periods the ICT centre was used. 
 
RCS-C differed in that the ICT centre was open to any teacher willing to use it. Here, there was a 
register which teachers were expected to sign every time they brought a class into the ICT centre. 
The register, as part of RCP’s own ICT in teaching strategy, is explained it as such: 
 
“So now I’m starting to give more pressure. Now I’m monitoring, indirectly… When I want them 
to sign, and when we have a meeting I can say that ‘[this and that teacher] are the only teachers 
who are using the ICT, what about you? What about the others?’ … [then they realise] ‘the 
principal is reading there who is going to the ICT centre… next time it’s me.’ I’m winning them 
like that. I’m not fighting them; I just thank them…” 
(Interview with RCP) 
 
RCS-B and RCS-C, with their dedicated ICT facilities, were able to develop their own strategies 
to manage the utility of the ICT centre in ways which suited them. Conversely, in RCS-A with the 
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space limitations (all rooms primarily functioning as classrooms); rather than the learners being 
mobile throughout spaces; the technology itself was mobile throughout spaces. Further 
compounded by the lack of internet connectivity at the time of the research; this reduced the ability 
of teachers to leverage more substantial benefits of networked technologies within their school. 
RCS-A and RCS-B appeared to have less emphasis placed on as many teachers as possible using 
technology and rather focussed on maximising specific teachers’ enactments of technology: those 
who had the skills, experience, and passion. 
 
On the issue of vocational passion and the context of school management driving use, RCT3 felt 
that the principal of RCS-C was authoritarian as RCP wasn’t listening to the teachers or taking their 
perspectives into account in decision making. Therefore, in RCT3’s opinion, the lack of 
institutional support in terms of job security affected their buy-in to management’s vision and 
directions. Arguably, this impacted on RCT3’s motivation to invest personal time into their role 
and limited RCT3’s feelings of being an integral part of RCS-C as an organisation and a team. 
 
Therefore, aside from the management of technology, resources, and school vision; the specific 
issue of employment contracts, contributed to an experience of flux as they may be ‘re-deployed’ 
and have to re-adapt to a new working environment. Evidently some, like RCT3 react to this 
scenario by limiting their use of technology, while others like RAT1, in previous temporary roles 
in other provinces, used this opportunity to collect a broad range of resources from various 
individuals. Approaches to management and institutional directives may be undermined by more 
conventional employment politics. This highlights the heterogeneous responses to education and 
technology use in light of transient deployments in conjunction with their personal rationalisations 
of work, working, and going above and beyond. 
 
4.2.2.3 Technology Provided by Multiple, Independent Actors 
There are various sources of technology within the RCSs studied. Generally, these providers 
operate relatively independently and little after installation support is given. For example, only 3 
months of post-install support is required of MNOs legal obligations under ICASA regulations in 
school connection programmes (documentation received from MDoE). For EDTech, however, 
there is no formal follow-up policy and a serious bone of contention held by EDTech/IMA 
management is the lack of training implementation through the DoE in Mpumalanga. 
 
The implications of having multiple disaggregated actors within the area of education technology 
in schools is directly related to the subcategory ‘Technology Eco-Systems’ as the limited/non-use 
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of EDTech can be attributed to a variety of factors. As a core theme in the research question of this 
study is providing alternative accounts of the perceived failure of the EDTech trial; divergent 
viewpoints of the antecedents of the failure now gradually emerge. 
 
As non-school-based actors within the education technology space operate more or less in 
distributed pockets of activity; the unsystematic, superficial integration of technology into teaching 
and learning is a relatively predicable outcome. Vodacom (and other MNOs), local business 
outreach programmes, EDTech and the various levels of the Departments of Education work 
towards similar goals of realising digital education. Though this presents a dilemma when each 
actor’s relative independence creates a scenario where there isn’t a unified front in developing a 
systemic approach to digitising education in government schools, and RCSs in particular. 
 
As many teachers may lack the confidence to integrate ICTs into their classes, providing basic 
training on the EDTech platform itself may not go far enough to account for the challenges 
expressed by teachers of EDTech, nor take account of the reality of teachers’ ICT self-efficacy and 
digital literacies more generally. 
 
The distributed and disconnected responsibilities (some contracted and others not) show potential 
for different actors to duplicate work by other actors. Simultaneously, some responsibilities may 
be overlooked based on the assumption, other actor(s) will fulfil these needs. The case of training 
provision for EDTech is a specific example of such. 
 
This is considered within the Institutional Conditions/Perspectives modality due to the often 
disconnected nature of these interventions. Though there is some inter-organisational cooperation 
in initiatives provided, for instance RCS-B has a technology facilitator employed by an UK based 
NPO (focussed on improving literacy through the provision of content pre-loaded e-readers) in 
collaboration with EDTech’s initiative; this is more an exception, than a general reality. 
 
Having multiple sources of technology can result in uneven provision of technology across 
different schools. Some such as RCS-C found themselves in possession of at least 4 learning 
technologies (other than EDTech) and due to proximity to a game reserve benefited from their 
CSI/R initiatives. 
 
The implications of having technologies distributed across different devices include increased 
effort required to search these devices for relevant material. For instance, a teacher would have to 
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go the ‘Vodacom Laptop’ to browse for the content they might be able to use, then use a separate 
laptop provided by the department of education to take home without software/content installed on 
the ‘Vodacom Laptop’. 
 
In RCS-C, there was some very useful software which increased the benefits of the smart board by 
allowing teachers to draw on the screen (through a touch sensitive interface) over what is presented 
from the laptop. This has its own implications in terms of increasing the complexity of use. 
However, the point in this aspect of the Institutional Conditions/Perspectives modality is to 
highlight the uneven distribution of technology within and across schools, districts, and provinces. 
This is further compounded by a lack of research into what technologies are used and the extent to 
which it improves educational outcomes. Such a lack of research results in weak understandings of 
best practice and data driven decision making in the education technology industry 
 
Evidently, a more cooperative, integrated approach to digital education initiatives may provide 
more clarity in terms of specific responsibilities, contractual obligations and ensure the efficient 
use of resources is targeted by various stakeholders operating within this space. Therefore, while 
some training may be provided to some teachers, a more concerted effort to consolidate multi-
organisational competencies could be one aspect of developing teachers practice from an 
institutional or normative perspective. 
 
4.2.3 Individual Factors – The Modality of Interpretive Schemes 
Central to the development of the model are the negotiations teachers make in relation to their 
immediate role as teachers. The significantly different operational conditions (technological and 
institutional) teachers in the three schools faced impacted the specific routines individual teachers 
were able to enact. 
 
The following section highlights the centrality of teachers’ time considerations within schools as 
the relatively poor user experience offered by EDTech through its content and technical structure 
increase the effort required to consult it for appropriate applications within teaching and learning. 
However, time concerns were also apparent through cases of technology (other than EDTech) being 
used. The broad distribution of software and resources across devices supplied by different actors 





What emerges through this section is the delicate and highly nuanced implications of heterogeneous 
distribution of technology, skills, facilities, infrastructure (such as internet connectivity) and 
increase the importance of how teachers approach the sense making of technology within their 
practice. 
 
4.2.3.1 ICT Self-Efficacy 
In the model presented (figure 15), some elements which are found in the Technology Acceptance 
model (TAM) are reflected in this model; namely, ICT Self-Efficacy. This is a salient term used 
within user acceptance modelling and refers to the confidence in one’s ability to use ICT (I. T. J. 
Brown, 2002), as opposed to an objective measurement of their skills. 
 
This sub-category of individual factors tends to speak for itself, although through the empirical 
work gathered for this study, it includes perceptions about out-of-the-box (OOTB) ease of use. In 
other words, is a technology intuitive enough to ‘pick up and go’? 
 
In the case of EDTech, this presented itself as a barrier due to the particular interfacing technologies 
(Wi-Fi) and digital literacies required to use the Hub. Related in a sense to a teacher’s experience 
with technology, the Hub requires a knowledge of how to connect to WiFi (and understanding that 
WiFi provided by the Hub, doesn’t necessarily mean a connection to the internet); how to use the 
app and ensure they are connected/configured appropriately. 
 
In the cases of RCS-A and RCS-C, the EDTech Hub was rarely used. The time taken to (and 
uncertainty involved in) setting it up; and the lack of user support, in situ, complicated use. 
However, RCS-B had RBF. This eased the burdens on teachers. Given the limited accessibility of 
the ICT centre due to the decision to limit access to a timetable and for particular subjects; the 
facilitators role here was more reducing time pressures on teachers than providing technical 
support. 
 
Because the teachers using the ICT centre in RCS-B were already relatively highly digitally literate; 
the role of the facilitator as a trainer was reduced to set-up and breakdown of the technology 
required by teachers. This is not to diminish the important role RBF played in digital education 
within RCS-B. Conversely, the lack of support and/or adequate provision of training to users 




Additionally, given the concerns over content with EDTech; this increases the need for teachers to 
interrogate the resources they intend to use. The author argues that a lack of trust in the content and 
its unsuitability for spontaneous use means teachers must proactively plan their use of the EDTech 
Hub: additional to the expectations of teachers’ to prepare and work outside of school time. 
 
4.2.3.2 Experience with Technology 
A user’s experience with technology is an important consideration which is intricately linked to 
ICT self-efficacy in that where one has increasing experience of technology, it is generally 
understandable that one will develop more confidence over time as tasks and activities become 
routine (Hong & Tam, 2002). 
 
Experience with technology is dependant on access to devices in order to develop the digital 
literacies required to use them. RCT1 explains how important experience with technology was for 
developing their ICT self-efficacy and driving teaching practice to ‘the next level’ as such: “I have 
to practice teaching nearly every day with technology. I would gain more confidence and that 
would make me to be at the next level.” (Interview with RCT1). ‘The next level’ represents an 
intuitive understanding of the teacher development framework presented in figure 20 and RCT1 
represents a teaching professional recognizing the value technology could bring to teaching and 
learning, and the untapped potential they may still realize through engaging in further personal and 
professional experience with technology. 
 
Experience with laptops or computers generally would involve users being able to use productivity 
programmes such as word processors, even at a basic level. In RCS-B, RBT1 used Microsoft Word 
to explain shapes and how to work out their areas, etc. by using the ‘insert shape’ function. 
However, in this example, due to multiple pop-ups and closable menus being open, the shape only 
occupied about a third of the screen it could have (see figure 21 below). Additionally, the thickness 
of the line may have made the shape difficult to see at the back of the room, flooded by natural 





Figure 21 - Use of Microsoft Word in RCS-B (Researcher's Photo) 
While RBT1 was a proficient user of technology, their ability to utilise technology ‘off-the-cuff’ 
was a good example of simple ways technology can be incorporated into classes. After explaining 
the basic principle of working out areas of shapes, RBT1 loaded EDTech on the computer; 
identified the video which was pre-selected for use in this class; and uses the video as a tool to 
explain the process of working out the areas and volumes of various shapes. By playing, pausing, 
explaining and playing the video again, RBT1 incorporated EDTech into the lesson with relative 
ease. RBT1 supplemented the explanation provided in the video through drills of questions; looking 
for the class to repeat the key learning outcomes (LOs) the video is related to in the curriculum. 
 
RBT1 gained experience through the teacher training college they attended and drew on personal 
experience of using computers and the Internet. As one of the teachers sanctioned to use the ICT 
centre in RCS-B; RBT1 operates within the institutional guidelines developed within the school. 
By selecting EDTech as an available technology and utilising some of its features to supplement 
his own explanations; he capitalises on the attraction/excitement of technology by learners to 
enhance teaching and learning and maintain the class’s attention. This is really the only significant 
benefit of using EDTech in this instance as the time required to move learners to and from the ICT 
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centre and open Microsoft Word seem far longer than the action of simply drawing a rectangle on 
a chalk board. 
 
While in this case, RBT1 presents high ICT self-efficacy and experience with technology – 
throughout the research process – other internal mediating factors influence an individual’s choice 
to use technology: EDTech in particular. The perceptions of other factors are important in framing 
both the intention to (not) use; the extent of use; which technologies to implement; and how. 
 
4.2.3.3 Pragmatic Considerations 
Pragmatic considerations can be thought of as the individual negotiation factors teachers make 
based upon the technologies available (and the benefits and barriers they can manifest); the 
institutional conditions (how their role as teacher within a given school context is rationalised); and 
a combination of self-assessment of skills; recognising the primary metric of education is for 
students to pass exams, but on tight curriculum schedules. 
 
Time considerations – A Subcategory of Pragmatic Conditions 
There are various issues teachers experience in relation to time pressures on integrating technology 
into their classes. Principally, the time pressure associated with delivering the curriculum on time 
was often cited as a reason for not incorporating technology within the class. An individual teacher 
may rationalise similar time pressures; within broadly similar institutional conditions; with access 
to the same technology; in very different and occasionally contradictory ways. This is reflected in 
the work done on technological frames by Orlikowski and Gash (1994). They argue individuals 
have and develop their own interpretations (frames) of technology (ibid). These are rooted in the 
individual; their prior experience of technologies; and to some degree, can be shared or congruent 
to other individuals within the organisation (ibid). 
 
Time, depending on the individual, was perceived as a dually constraining and motivating factor 
in the use of technology within the classroom. Such a duality highlights both the nuance involved 
in perceiving the benefits of technology while rationalising this with the time pressures with 
curriculum/prescribed resource changes; the latter, a common occurrence in the past two decades 
in SA education policy. 
 
Technology is mostly viewed as an additional tool which teachers could use to supplement the 




“With[in] the lesson itself, there is no time for that technology. But like myself, during my extra 
lessons, I take them and show them what we were talking about in the classroom, is what we are 
going to see now. Then they watch and they start watching and laughing saying, yes, there it is, 
there it is.” 
(Interview with RCT1) 
 
Having recently started a trial of new curriculum implementation resources (National Education 
Collaboration Trust [NECT] curriculum planner and tracker); RCT1 explained how the 
institutional obligation to utilise these resources impacts on their teaching style. The trial of the 
NECT resources prescribes text which must be copied to the chalk board for teachers to explain 
core learning outcomes. RCT1 and other teachers mentioned how this was difficult due to the 
volume of copying they have to do. 
 
RCT1 provides vivid examples of how technology can assist in adding value to teaching and 
learning and explains over the course of the interview how technology comes to play a role in their 
practice both to be efficient in terms of time to develop comprehension of the LOs, but additionally 
for clarity in concept revision. 
 
“When you check the lesson topic or the lesson title, you can see that this topic, it needs 
technology to help me teach. It will make learners understand better than myself teaching. I’m 
busy teaching about the earth moving around the sun. Mina [read: myself], I can tell them it 
moves like this, when it spins it rotates on it’s own access and it revolves around the sun, but if I 
let them watch the video… they’re going to see this thing is real and how it spins and how does it 
revolve. It makes it easier than showing them with hands and pictures. [sic]” 
(Interview with RCT1) 
 
RCT1 may not have the time to deliver education through technology within sanctioned class times. 
However, they recognise the value in saving time that technology brings when explaining abstract 
theories such as planets moving through the solar system. RCT3 was teaching a very similar topic 
and when observing them teach the lesson without any technology, the volume of writing required 
by the NECT resources and restricts the style of teaching possible (towards a traditional rote 
learning pedagogy). 
 
“RCT3 writes word for word what appears in the [NECT] book as a series of bullet points on the 
left hand board. This seems to slow the pace of the lesson. The English comes from the book, and 
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in xiTsonga, [they] explain what these phrases mean. As RCT3 is talking about the sun as a ball 
of gas which can burn your skin, they point to me [the researcher] to highlight how my white skin 
has turned a little pink.” 
(Observation from Research Diary) 
 
Later, RCT3 explained; "unless I go and find that information myself, I can't use it, there aren't 
resources for my class." (informal conversation with RCT3). The implication here is the time and 
effort required to find resources to aid in the delivery of LOs was a barrier to using technology in 
the classroom, as this would be expected to be prepared in teachers’ personal time. 
 
Here, both RCT1 and RCT3 operate within the same school, teaching very similar classes; but both 
have divergent responses to and enactments of technology. RCT1 is roughly 15 years older than 
RCT3; RCT3 uses their personal laptop extensively outside of school and downloads movies after 
school using the WiFi. These two contrapuntal examples of individual rationalisations of the value 
technology can add to teaching and learning allude to the impact different individual technological 
frames have on the decision to use technology. 
 
This highlights the intricacy of navigating individual motivations based upon the context of 
institutional conditions as well as the new requirements of teachers to use NECT resources with 
tight time demands, thus forcing teachers to use technology as an add-on outside of official, paid 
teaching time. 
 
Selecting Technologies - A Subcategory of Pragmatic Conditions 
In the schools, there are a variety of different technologies available to choose from. EDTech 
represents only one of these within the ‘technology eco-system’. This factor refers to the strategies 
of selecting which technologies to implement, based upon the individual teacher’s goal or desired 
outcome of using a particular technology within the classroom. 
 
Teachers considering to use technology within the class will have to weigh up the benefits and 
challenges that a technology can bring with the outcomes they want to achieve through 
incorporating this into their practice. Drawing on the available technology resources; how 
technology is managed within a school; the confidence of a teacher to implement a technology with 
relative predictability (i.e. has the teacher developed a routine with a particular technology); and 





Taking RCS-B initially, given that technology is used almost exclusively within the ICT centre; is 
rigidly scheduled and prioritised for certain teachers; use is supported through RBF; and teachers 
have immediate access to EDTech: EDTech resources have become routinized in use. 
 
For RCS-A and RCS-C, however, EDTech tended to be used much less – if at all in RCS-C. In 
RCS-C, RCT1 tended to be most comfortable using YouTube to identify resources and using the 
smart board to present this to the class. However, at no point in any of the observations was the 
smart board enacted to its fullest potential (beyond a projector screen): the touch sensitive 
component of the board was never plugged in via USB. However, in spite of this, the projector 
with projector screen was still referred to as a smart board. 
 
RCT1 explained her selection of the smart board as their preferred technologies over using the 
tablets as such: 
 
“It’s good when you use a smart board, because the eye-contact with the learners, you can see 
whether these learners are concentrating on the lesson or not. So I think the projector, smart 
board and laptop is the one… it’s better in my opinion. Tablets are for them to google 
information, but when I’m teaching, I prefer those things [smart board, laptop, and projector]; 
because that way I can see the centre of their attention.” 
(Interview with RCT1) 
 
RCT1’s view of effective teaching and learning was based on catering for different learning styles 
providing information through text, speech, video and images, and ‘practicals’. The traditional 
power relations within the classroom were seen as desirable. As such, technology can produce work 
practice changes where routines are developed or modified during and after the introduction of 
technology (Orlikowski, 2000). Therefore, teachers incorporating technology into lessons by using 
smart boards develops existing routines and power relations of chalk boards as standard school 
technologies. 
 
On at least one of the laptops containing digital education resources in RCS-C, there was a software 
tool which allowed the teachers to control the learners’ tablets. This control allows the teacher to 
stop learners’ tablets from working temporarily; ‘casting’ an individual tablet’s screen to the 
projector e.g. to showcase learners work; and potentially projecting the teachers screen to the the 
tablet. At no point was this ever enacted by teachers and the researcher believes teachers were not 
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aware of this tool, in spite of learners’ tablet management being outlined as an issue in use by 
RCT1. 
 
In RCS-A, RAT1 had a choice of multiple resources curated over his years of transient teaching 
positions around the country. Having relatively extensive experience in implementing technology 
within teaching and learning meant that RAT1 knew which resources and technologies to 
strategically apply to add the most value. While time, in terms of curriculum pressures, was a 
concern for RAT1 (they regularly conducted weekend classes); due to their experience with 
technology, it was relatively easy to compliment core teaching and learning with technology and 
to select technologies with an intricate knowledge of their outcome when combined with skilled, 
strategic enactment. However, given the lack of devices for learners in RCS-A and the lack of any 
internet connection for teaching and learning, RAT1 was restricted significantly to using their 
laptop and the school projector. 
 
In each of the different schools, given the varying access, assemblages of similar technologies, 
skills, backgrounds, management contexts, and individual perspectives; different combinations of 
technologies and resources are used. 
 
Resource Identification - A Subcategory of Pragmatic Conditions 
Teachers find resources in different ways, from different sources, with varying degrees of success, 
and at not always in advance of classes using technology. 
 
Finding resources has implications on the time considerations as in some cases finding the right 
resources ahead of class can be an issue, in spite of others identifying this as important to effective 
teaching and learning. Examples are RCP explaining the expectation that teachers adequately 
prepare for lessons using ICT and RCT1 explaining that lessons with technology require 
preparation. In the case of googling, effective search strategies, are important. RCT2 would search 
for resources to use by using Bing search engine in the ICT centre, in front of the class. This meant 
occasional pauses in class of a minute or two as the teacher iterated through various search terms 
and results. 
 
“RCT2 searches Bing for ‘Transformation’ then ‘Transformation Mathematics’ – RCT2 then 
loads resources from ‘ca.IXL.com’ [content designed for the Canadian curriculum]. After a 
minute or two the screen saver comes on and the projector screen goes blue. As the teacher’s 
phone rings, I am asked to search ‘reduction’ to find appropriate resources. After several 
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iterations of the search, modifying the specific search terms each time, I decide to search google 
images instead. We are struggling to find the best images. Trying to find appropriate information 
on the spot, live is difficult, especially when I am not aware of the key learning outcomes to be 
addressed and at what level of complexity.” 
(Participant Observations in Research Diary) 
 
Here, the researcher assisted in the curation of resources with the teacher live, in the class, and to 
dubious degrees of success. The way this occurred left the researcher feeling this was a common 
tactic employed by RCT2. That a search engine was the go-to resource identification tool, suggests 
that more systematic sources of digital content were not used or that the significant resources 
provided by external organisations within RCS-C, were not consulted. Owing to the distributed 
nature of resources as explained in the section ‘Technology Provided by Multiple, Independent 
Actors’; the time required to search across 4 devices for appropriate content, the disconnected 
technologies present a time consuming, and potentially fruitless endeavour. Avoidance becomes 
an understandable response. 
 
The individualistic processes of employing available resources involve teachers’ assessing the 
speed at which available resources can be consulted; their appropriacy based on teachers’ desired 
outcomes; and the confidence with which teachers feel their skills suit those resources all contribute 
towards the development and maintenance of routines when using technology in class. 
 
Learners have their own distinct views on the digital resources that are introduced into the 
classroom and it isn’t all positive. RAL3 explained “Sometimes those videos can be confusing 
because the video says one thing and the teacher says another thing…” (Group Interview 1 with 
learners, RCS-A). So while digital resources have the potential to enhance teaching and learning, 
there is the potential for these resources to confuse learners. As the curriculum has changed many 
times in recent decades, the impacts on teacher’s subject knowledge and specific elements of the 
curriculum may have been updated since a particular teacher graduated. Technology poses the 
simultaneous potential to contradict and compliment teachers’ explanations; depending on the 
individual. 
 
Resource identification involves an internal heuristic to negotiate between advantages over 
traditional pedagogies (including time and effort); technologies available within the school; and 
ICT Self-efficacy. The teachers’ experience has implications on the kinds of resources they wish 
to implement (e.g. some teachers looked for images, others for videos, others looked for PDFs) and 
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experience in using technology can lead to teachers creating their own collections of resources as 
is the case with RAT1. It can be seen that there is great divergence in strategies to identify resources 
and this leads to very different enactments of technology within schools leading to teachers 
achieving their goals for technology in the classroom to varying degrees. 
 
Perceived Reliability - A Subcategory of Pragmatic Conditions 
Depending on experience with technology and ICT self-efficacy, teachers may perceive the 
reliability of technology (specific or more generally) in different ways. From the data there are 
many aspects and examples of perceived (un)reliability which include relatively new technologies 
(e.g. Bluetooth speakers in RCS-C); ease of set-up (e.g. connecting the various components of a 
smart board); confidence to fix errors presented (e.g. when smart boards don’t function as 
expected); issues related to internet connectivity (e.g. how stable and fast is the internet connection 
and how much data is available); and other, more idiosyncratic issues (e.g. difficulty in providing 
user support in Windows 8+ due to the Microsoft Store’s restrictive log-in requirements). 
 
The perceived reliability of a technology (or an ensemble of technology) is founded upon a 
negotiation of prior experiences (positive and negative); hearing others experiences and issues; the 
ICT self-efficacy of a user; the support available to them; and this list cannot be exhaustive. 
 
RCS-C was in the months prior to research taking place gifted a brand new smart board, but was 
not the same brand or technology as the smart boards present in RCS-A or RCS-B. Both RCS-A 
and RCS-B had Promethean branded boards while RCS-C had their smart-board provided through 
Edu-Board. Prior to an ad-hoc in-service training day conducted by the researcher, no teachers were 
aware how to use it. In RCS-B, the smart board was rendered useless beyond an expensive projector 
screen. During a theft in the months leading up to research: the cable to connect the board to a 
computer was stolen. In RCS-A, the smart board was never connected and only used as a projector 
screen – which then forced the teacher to rely on the two small blackboards with which to write on 
(figure 18). 
 
While technically, all schools could claim to have smart boards, none of them were successfully 
implicated in practice during the research encounters unless the researcher, in the case of the ad-
hoc in-service training, set it up to do so. This required the researcher to come prepared with a 
screwdriver to adjust the laser positions inside the touch sensitive unit above the board. This was 
aided though simple instructions provided by Edu-Board technical staff over the phone. However, 
the researcher’s relatively high ICT self-efficacy and experience with technology facilitated this 
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process, with relative ease. With a trial and error approach it ended up taking about 30-45 minutes 
to fix. Something which, based upon the digital literacies and ICT self-efficacy of the teaching 
staff, may have been immeasurably more challenging, if not simply a waste of time in their eyes. 
 
This is linked to the device supply chain issues mentioned in ‘Technology Provided by Multiple, 
Independent Actors’ section. Through the example of the smart board in RCS-C (and to some 
extent in RCS-A given the non-use); reliability and teachers possessing the skills and knowledge 
to actively engage in setting-up and managing the technology effectively, are of vital importance 
if these donated technologies are to live up to the impact/reach purported. For as long as these 
devices and technologies remain unused, the investment in the technology is arguably redundant 
and from a critical perspective, ineffective use of the financial and social resources by the 3rd party 
organisations, regardless of intentions. In other words, could the provision of ‘food parcels’ to the 
least economically stable learners be a more valuable, impactful investment; though less seductive 
to donors with funding power? 
 
4.2.4 Summary of Negotiations of Education Technology in Context Model 
Heterogeneity appears frequently throughout the results and in all of the different categories of the 
model. This is manifested in the various technologies available and the ways in which these are 
connected and implemented. However, above and beyond the multiple technologies available 
within the schools studied; the individual teacher and the expectations, protocols and management 
styles within these schools also impact on the specific ways technologies are implemented. 
 
As there are various suppliers of education technology within schools, each school will find itself 
with varying technological options open to them depending on where they are; how connected their 
school is; and how available structured/formal support is. In terms of EDTech, the Hub represents 
one of five options in RCS-C (if the internet is included as a technological resource). Therefore, 
for EDTech use to be increased; a more concerted effort to provide training and support to teachers 
in ICT must include sufficient rhetorical work to ‘sell’ the features and benefits of technologies; 
gain important user based feedback on barriers towards implementation (while effectively 
addressing these); as well as developing the core competencies of those teachers who wish to use 
technology in teaching and learning. 
 
Additional to the number of teaching and learning devices available; in instances where a BYOD 
culture has emerged (where teachers and learners use their personal devices); there are specific 
issues highlighted from the data such as the appropriacy of low-cost/low-performance devices and 
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the issues of 2nd hand devices. These can have issues such as broken keyboards or older OSs (issues 
RAL1 and RAT2 faced). 
 
E-CEO was explicit in viewing a BYOD policy as a positive behaviour. However, in the context 
of RCSs – there are numerous other unintended consequences of such an approach. This includes 
the potential to perpetuate existing inequalities; but also in the experience of RAT2 and RAT1; 
devices which are older and relatively low performance struggle to use the EDTech App. 
Furthermore, while EDTech recommend devices with screens of 7 inches or above on the App 
Stores; E-CEO’s complacency in believing a small screen is better than no screen is not 
unproblematic. 
 
Several issues specific to EDTech (the Hub and the App) emerged throughout the research process. 
These tend to be symptoms of deeper issues particularly evident in the experience of users. This is 
in terms of the content quality (colour contrast and aspect ratio); pace of speech and accent; and 
the lack of content for many subjects and grades. While these are not all issues directly stemming 
from EDTech’s realm of control, they ultimately affect the user experience and go some way 
towards exploring the less than expected utilisation. More fundamental issues with the technical 
structure of the Hub and the App, while affecting the user experience significantly, point towards 
the development process followed and the implications of development time being donated and 
measured in terms of hours of development time. 
 
Within schools there are various approaches to ICT facilities management. Depending on the 
spaces available to use technology in teaching and learning, either the technology moved between 
class rooms or the learners moved from traditional classrooms to dedicated ICT centres. However, 
the specific approach to managing who uses technology in their teaching and learning varied 
between schools and depended on how the principal delegated management of space, technology, 
and practice. Regardless of how technology was managed within schools, teachers who used 
technology in their practice had the motivation to use technology. The researcher only observed 
teachers who wanted to teach in these spaces, rather than teachers being forced to. 
 
The supply of devices in RCSs led to a high degree of variability in access to specific technologies 
and resources. Leading from disconnected education technology interventions; while it is positive 
to see so many devices with pre-installed resources, there is a distinct increase in the demands on 
teachers to consult each of these devices separately. Furthermore, with each device operating as a 
silo, many of these devices and resources are underutilised. With a disconnected stream of actors 
 
 112 
providing resources within schools, the RCSs studied didn’t necessarily suffer from poor access to 
resources; but rather the strategies to consult each of these devices and understand how each 
supplied device can add value in different ways. As EDTech is one of these disconnected providers 
of technology, it is not surprising that poor user experiences lead to teachers not implementing 
EDTech systematically, if at all. 
 
Teachers develop their own routines in using technology over time, through experience, and in 
tandem with their colleagues. Furthermore, when EDTech is perceived by technology using 
teachers as inadequate (in RCS-A and RCS-C); this generally is perceived by other teachers. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that in RCS-C, teachers opted for the simplest vector of educational 
content – search engines – and tended to ignore the other resources provided within the school. 
Therefore, OOTB usability is key for any education technology endeavour. How this OOTB 
usability is developed is a matter to be discussed in the proceeding chapter. Additionally, for 
EDTech, teachers identified the importance of content operating as standalone, trustworthy 
resources giving them the confidence to utilise it during their class with minimal use of their 
personal time to ‘vet’ content. 
 
5 Discussion 
This chapter discusses the implications of EDTech/IMA as a hybrid organisation aiming to effect 
positive improvements within the South African education landscape. Having presented the results, 
this dissertation now discusses the implications of these findings to the research questions; 
compares existing literature with these implications; and frames these within the limitations of this 
study and future directions for research. 
 
 
This study seeks to uncover factors which led to limited/non-use of EDTech within resource 
constrained schools in Bushbuckridge Municipality, Mpumalanga. The secondary research 
question seeks learning opportunities from the EDTech/IMA approach to integrating technology in 
no-fee government schools in Bushbuckridge Municipality, Mpumalanga. 
 
The results show various factors internal to the social enterprise, which have contributed to this 
result. While not an exercise in placing blame; three major factors have been discovered. Mission 
drift of the organisational focus; ambitious and arduous strategies for growth; and ineffective 
product design and development processes for no-fee school contexts all contributed to 




This chapter now breaks each of these three factors down into a series of tensions which frame the 
discussion. 
 
5.1.1 Mission Drift as a Contributing Factor to Limited/Non-Use of EDTech 
Mission drift is when “the social objectives of the social enterprise are sacrificed to achieve 
financial sustainability” (Doherty et al., 2014, p. 423). However, through reading the results, in the 
case of EDTech/IMA this definition may not be as straight forward or cater for the nuance of the 
context of the organisations. As such, three tensions are highlighted to explore mission drift in the 
context of EDTech/IMA. 
 
5.1.1.1 Mission Re-Definition Vs. Mission Drift 
One tension which became apparent to the researcher throughout the data analysis process was the 
tension and grey area between redefining an organisational mission to more fully satisfy 
client/beneficiary needs and when such redefinition of the mission becomes mission drift. 
 
Revising the mission of IMA to include the provision of non-music education resources to improve 
the holistic development of IMA learners may not be defined as mission drift. Rather, the author 
would consider this scaling in or deepening impact with existing service users. However, the point 
at which significant resources and management time were redirected towards developing a digital 
solution for the Mpumalanga Department of Education – this is considered mission drift. 
 
As Rangan’s (2004, p. 114) work would suggest, IMA were “pulled by market forces” (ideas of 
easier revenue streams beyond regular funding applications) away from the organisations core 
competencies of music tuition. This impacted the organisation’s ability to balance multiple 
stakeholder expectations which is typically difficult, stressful, and time consuming of its own 
accord. Due to the three organisational objectives and complex, disintegrated value streams of 
EDTech/IMA; they are caught in the multiple objectives trap; where organisational focus is pulled 
in different, oppositional directions (Garrette & Karnani, 2010; Wach, 2012) further compounding 
the impact of such mission drift. 
 
The confidence of IMA to use EDTech as a significant and sustainable revenue stream led to an 
overzealous distribution of resources to the project. EDTech utilised many resources in ineffective 
ways. The waste of limited financial resources reduced the impact the organisation could have on 
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its core social mission (Ebrahim et al., 2014). This underscores the lack of critical project leadership 
in allocating resources to the design and development of EDTech. 
 
To further exemplify the pull of the market, the promise of significant funding to develop the 
EDTech concept into a market based product (partly through interest from the provincial 
Department of Education) contributed to the prioritisation of speculative financial gain. This 
highlights a departure from what has been considered a development of the organisational mission. 
 
Mission drift is a key aspect of the failure of the EDTech trial in terms of limited/non-use. Simply 
put, developing EDTech for government school settings was an incredibly large project to 
undertake for a relatively small and niche organisation with specialist competencies in music 
tuition. Particularly in terms of micro-finance, mission drift is often discussed as prioritising profit 
making as a trade off (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007), implying success at raising self-
generated income at the expense of social outreach. However, for IMA; venturing into an unrelated 
field resulted in failure to generate sustainable revenue streams. This failure to develop a 
sustainable revenue stream is further compounded by the complexity of the multiple objectives 
trap. Together they both constrain the potential to achieve multiple social objectives in a financially 
sustainable manner. Danone recognised the impact of the multiple objectives trap and focussed 
their mission. EDTech did not and continued their efforts. 
 
5.1.1.2 Board and Management: When Being Inclusive Can Deepen Understanding 
The emergent and complicated organisational structure made realising the multiple organisational 
objectives between EDTech and IMA more difficult. Key issues surfaced through the data 
including a lack of oversight of EDTech by IMA and the board of EDTech was not inclusive of 
target groups (instead it was three white, relatively wealthy men). Furthermore, the complex, mixed 
funding streams for the EDTech project from E-CEO individually; from the MDoE; from the 
National Lottery fund; private sector social development funds; etc. contributed to the complexity 
of planning, developing, and implementing the project successfully while satisfying various 
donor/partner expectations and prerogatives. 
 
Given the limited contact with teachers, principals, learners, and schools involved within the trial; 
there is promise in viewing teaching professionals as antagonistic assets. EDTech may be able to 
utilise target groups such as teachers’ and principals’ knowledge, experience, and wisdom into 
developing a competitive advantage (Hockerts, 2015). Teachers and principals from resource 
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constrained school settings have an acute understanding of the conditions within which teaching 
and learning takes place as well as the specific challenges that are faced within such schools. 
 
EDTech only involved teachers in the content curation process and with little focus on consulting 
their skills and experience. The involvement of teachers within the board or as implementation 
managers could act as target group representatives. Furthermore, with experience of curriculum 
integration, these teachers could provide valuable insight into assumptions and strategies that don’t 
compliment the operational realities of no-fee government schools developing an enabling 
environment within schools where EDTech is introduced. 
 
From the perspective of the sociomaterial studies of technology – because technology is not an 
independent variable (Leonardi, 2012) – success in one particular school requires a holistic 
understanding of the operational context through which it is applied. Even though EDTech may 
‘function’ as intended within the IMA hubs, the successful application in the complex environment 
of no-fee schools is dependant on a variety of individual teacher’s needs, constraints, and 
knowledge; the finer details of ICT resource availability and management; and even what education 
practitioners’ definitions of a ‘successful’ might be. 
 
Had EDTech included target groups within the board, design, or decision making/governance 
structures of the organisation; teachers would have been able to utilise their vast experience and 
expertise contributing meaningfully towards EDTech’s education development logic. As such, 
without involvement of those within the organisation with education experience/logic; there was 
great difficulty in developing an organisational identity which complimented the technology 
business logic (E-CEO’s background) (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
 
While E-DBA understood EDTech and felt themselves an integral part of it (given their dual roles 
within IMA and EDTech) E-DBA as a resource could not be utilised over the long-term of the trial 
to manage integration and provide on-going support and training. E-DBA’s role within integration 
generally remained as an initial trainer and informal technical support provider via WhatsApp. Had 
EDTech hired a part-time administrator for IMA (to relive E-DBA of their duties); or hired an 
integration manager – the limited/non-use situation may have been reduced and the contractual 
responsibilities for integration support addressed. 
 
5.1.1.3 Dual Value Chain Development Skewing Resource Allocation 
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The intense resource requirements of the EDTech project detracted from the core focus of IMA, as 
highlighted through the annual report of 2014. What was imagined from its inception as a cash 
cow, a sustainable revenue stream for IMA to reduce reliance on donor funding paradoxically 
became a significant resource consumer. Given that E-CEO had invested personal savings into the 
project; this may have clouded judgement in recognising sunk costs and reassessing the prospects 
of EDTech Pty. Ltd. becoming a successful venture; an aversion to loosing what is available at the 
expense of developing something new and more useful (Liedtka, 2015, p. 931). While this may 
have resulted in a decision to terminate the EDTech project, such a decision would have reduced 
investment into a product that would ultimately wield poor results anyway. 
 
The point at which EDTech ceased to be a project of IMA; and instead became a for-profit 
company; IMA departed from being a “blending hybrid” (where clients and beneficiaries are the 
same but value creation requires “regular support”) to being a “coupling hybrid” (where clients and 
beneficiaries are distinct groups and two value chains require management) (Santos et al., 2015, p. 
45). As Santos, et al,. (2015, pp. 49–50) explain “social impact is also dependent on additional 
interventions that are not included in the provision of their core commercial activity.” IMA had to 
scale back their events programme in 2014 because of heavy resource allocation to EDTech. 
 
Opposing the literature of prioritising customers over beneficiaries (Battilana et al., 2015; Ebrahim 
et al., 2014), EDTech/IMA as a social enterprise neglected their customers (assuming schools are 
considered proxy customers of the MDoE). While in the long term, EDTech became a massive 
resource consumer for EDTech/IMA; in the short term IMA may have financially benefited from 
such large flows of capital from various sources. The specific flows of investment destined for the 
EDTech project are technically donated first to IMA from donors and subsequently contracted to 
EDTech Pty. Ltd. with a fee deducted for IMA acting as a third party. 
 
In spite of short term income gained through the process of subcontracting EDTech development 
funds to EDTech Pty. Ltd., there could have been a more effective utilisation of resources and 
importantly, a more realistic understanding of the requirements of the EDTech project prior to 
developing the technology for government schools. Given the time consuming and resource 
intensive nature of managing a technology start-up in general (Ries, 2011); more realistic 
projections of the true costs of redeveloping EDTech for use in RCSs may have allowed EDTech 
to realise the difficulty, expense and risks to IMA: the organisations primary social project. 
Subsequently, this may have allowed a more rational, objective decision of the commercial viability 
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of the business venture or dramatically altered the linear design, development, implementation 
process. 
 
The significant time, personal financial investment made by E-CEO (as well as by other individuals 
and donor agencies) could have been used to develop alternative revenue streams. Had IMA 
considered the key knowledge, organisational competencies, and networks of social capital within 
IMA; such revenue streams more closely aligned with core or complimentary to existing 
programmes could have been prioritised. This could be a vehicle to create a financially self-
sustainable organisation avoiding the implications of two disintegrated value chains. 
 
5.1.1.4 Summary of Mission Drift 
EDTech/IMA incrementally redefined their mission to a point at which management, resources and 
the broader organisational focus were prioritised on developing EDTech as a potential revenue 
stream. As Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair (2014, p. 84) mission drift can cause differentiated hybrids 
“to invest more resources into their commercial activities than in their social ones”. 
 
EDTech prioritised resources towards future financial gain at the expense of the IMA social 
mission. While there may have been a superficial mission towards improving the South African 
education landscape, EDTech was primarily financially driven. 
 
There was no representation of EDTech’s target groups (teachers and principals) on the board or 
within the organisation’s work force. As such, there were key assumptions of EDTech which went 
unchallenged and valuable insight from practicing education professionals untapped. While there 
is an inherent social mission within EDTech (to improve access to multimedia education resources 
within schools); this was undermined by the financially driven focus of EDTech Pty. Ltd. Given 
that E-CEO had invested personal finances towards the project; this may have created a bias 
towards driving developments to recoup part or all of this investment. Such a scenario would limit 
objective assessments of the viability of the project and perhaps compel them to continue diverting 
money and resources at EDTech with the same speculation and cognitive biases that defined 
previous design and development practices, and resource allocation tactics. 
 
The dualistic value chain impacted not only the delivery of core social projects of IMA due to 
resources being diverted to EDTech; but increased demands on management to oversee the delivery 
of three organisational objectives of music and arts education in resource constrained communities; 
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improving the quality of South African education; and developing a mass-market education 
technology product. 
 
Such a trio of institutional logics is akin to the experience of Danone trying to achieve adequate 
profitability of their fortified yogurt product (Wach, 2012). However, an important distinction to 
be made here is the difference in the degree of convergence between customers and beneficiaries. 
For Danone, paying customers would automatically receive social value through the nutritional 
value of their product and subsequently local environments not be harmed after the packaging was 
produced. For EDTech/IMA on the other hand, given the divergence between customers and 
beneficiaries; the impact of having dual value chains accentuates the complexity. Not only do 
EDTech face the difficulty of managing the two, distinct value chains (Santos et al., 2015), the 
inclusion of a third logic further increases complexity.  
 
The difficulty of managing these three organisational objectives is shown through management’s 
expectations to grow rapidly and the design and development process through which EDTech was 
created. Both will be discussed sequentially now. 
 
5.1.2 Strategy for Growth as a Factor Contributing to Limited/Non-Use of EDTech 
As development actors and traditional non-profits are being pulled towards market based, capitalist 
legal forms and philosophical ideals  (Curtis, 2008; Evans et al., 2005); there is an increasing 
disposition of third sector organisations showing promise with evidence of impact to grow and 
scale their impact (Doherty et al., 2014). However, scholars often find tension in scaling up for 
growth by targeting increasing numbers of beneficiaries reached as the essence of the social 
mission is build on relationships, social ties, and the development of organisational culture – which 
scalability would seek to standardise through mass-market-like products and services (Hockerts, 
2015). Without knowing what value schools, principals, teachers, and learners were looking for; 
standardisation of EDTech was premature. 
 
The following sections related to growth and scaling strategies reveal primarily, the incorrect 
evaluation that EDTech had achieved product-market fit and the implications this had on the failure 
of EDTech to realise ambitious growth. 
 
5.1.2.1 Products Must Have Viable Value Proposition Before They Can Scale 
 
 119 
In the lean start-up, Ries (2011) outlines the importance of achieving product-market fit prior to 
exploiting opportunities for growth. Product-market fit is when the value derived for the product 
satisfies users needs and wants at a price which is acceptable and is sustainably scalable. 
 
That the best performing school, RCS-B, is only “half functioning” (Interview 2 with E-CEO) 
indicates that the product isn’t wholly suited to resource constrained school settings with limited 
space to utilise technology more regularly. Additionally, the extent to which technology use was 
facilitated by RBF in RCS-C – a resource most schools do not have – indicates that schools with 
no dedicated internal support staff may struggle enact EDTech within the classroom. This, based 
upon the model in figure 15, will create negative experiences for teachers trying to use EDTech 
and failing to do so with sufficient ease. This subsequently reduces their confidence in the 
technology leading to EDTech being resigned to gather dust in cupboards, cabinets, and safes. 
 
Even with RBF, the structure of resource constraints (only capacity for cohorts of 15 learners in 
the ICT centre and inadequate internet connection) provides more evidence of EDTech being unfit 
for purpose. Without effective internet access EDTech can only be used as a content retrieval 
system as opposed to its fuller VLE capabilities with class analytics. There must be a fundamental 
re-think of the technical structure of the EDTech hub/digital library to account for and work within 
this constraint. Furthermore, critically evaluating whether the learning analytics component of the 
software delivers value to teachers or solves problems they actually have. 
 
The principles of the lean startup and design thinking emphasise on starting with a small number 
of users; generating value early within the development process; a focus on agile, iterative 
development practices; and building solutions incrementally with an emphasis on organisational 
learning (Blank, 2013; T. Brown, 2008; Kelley & Kelley, 2012). The approach of IMA did not 
foster these core principles. 
 
Only upon realising product-market fit, managers are in a position to drive growth through scaling 
efforts to gain new customers and crucially, retain them (Ries, 2011). The growth strategy was 
myopic in the sense that growth was imagined organically through sales of EDTech to provincial 
governments. This would rely on a strong product offering which aligns the value proposition with 
the needs of users and an evidence base of successful implementation and results – a large element 
of product market fit. This requirement of product market fit prior to growth is reflected in the 




Teachers’ approaches to utilising technology in the classroom and resource identification heuristics 
are individualistic and draw on a wide range of sources. As such, there is a value deficit within the 
current design iteration of EDTech given the content concerns highlighted. This limits the 
possibility of sustainable growth by pushing for a standardised product prior to understanding the 
diverse routines, styles, technology availability, etc. within schools facing different immediate 
challenges. 
 
5.1.2.2 Unchallenged Assumptions Impact Product Value and Growth Potential 
Growth was prioritised as EDTech/IMA had assumed EDTech had reached product-market fit 
based upon the experience of implementing EDTech within IMAs drop-in hubs. The perceived 
transferability of the EDTech product from IMA hubs to resource constrained government schools 
is founded upon a few assumptions which highlight the lack of end user involvement in product 
development. 
 
It can be loosely argued that design thinking principles were followed to some degree and users 
were involved in the incremental early phase developments of EDTech. However, such 
involvement was narrowly focussed on the specific context of IMA drop-in hubs. Utilising the 
technology-in-practice framework would have decentred such a techno-centric perspective to 
consider varying users’ practices and institutional contexts through which they teach. The 
replication growth strategy (from IMA hubs to no-fee schools) was not realistically going to be 
successful as it requires willingness to adapt “to new contexts via co-generation of knowledge” 
(Moore et al., 2015, p. 77). This idea of co-generation of knowledge was not fostered given the 
projections of need from EDTech; a lack of empathy building; and having no openness towards 
adaptation to the new context of no-fee government schools beyond adding significantly more 
learning content. In reference to the conceptual model in figure 4, systematic context based problem 
definitions are required when designing and developing technologies to ensure that they deliver 
clear value to users.  
 
Through a lean start-up gaze, EDTech/IMA would have recognised that limited/non-use of EDTech 
in trials were a sign of failure to reach sufficient product-market fit as opposed to the gloomier 
rationalisation that “there is not a demand for education” [emphasis in original] (EDTech Funders 
Report, 2017). 
 
One assumption which undermined the possibility for EDTech to build a realistic contextual 
appreciation for operating within no-fee schools in non-urban locations was the disposition of E-
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CEO and annual reports to overuse “rural” as a defining characteristic of the communities they 
operated in. 
 
Such a broad categorisation of all areas IMA operates in as rural not only detracts from the rich, 
complex, multi-faceted sub-categorisations of rurality. It also reveals a lack of appreciation for the 
specific and highly variable circumstances of individual villages, tribal authorities, townships and 
former homelands. The lack of any systematic and empathetic involvement of teachers, learners, 
principals and school governing bodies within the redevelopment of EDTech for resource 
constrained schools underpins why so many assumptions went unchecked; leading to EDTech not 
being wholly fit for purpose in the context of resource constrained schools. 
 
The benefits of EDTech, in the opinion of E-CEO is in its ability to provide targeted revision topics 
for teachers based upon the analysis of class assessment data but a digital sticking plaster on the 
systemic oppression of such communities will not suffice (Mercer et al., 2003). Because whole 
class assessments are rarely conducted; the quality of data available for teachers to target and 
prioritise their teaching based upon EDTech class analysis is poor. The causes of low numbers of 
assessments vary between schools. The element of the product believed (but never empirically 
proven by EDTech) to deliver the most value was never fully realised. 
 
From a practice lens perspective, such elements cannot be considered as part of the technology-in-
practice: even though they are part of the 1s and 0s which make up the software. As such this 
represents an over engineered solution for a misunderstood problem; or as Orlikowski (2000, p. 
416) writes: “simply a solution in search of a problem”. 
 
This element of the product, in current usage, represents a wasted investment of development time, 
finances, and organisational focus. Thusly, both the data and the conceptual model in figure 4 rather 
than pursuing scale; efforts should have been made to make EDTech a plausible solution within 
the trial schools, requiring, initially, a significant degree of integration support in tandem with 
adaptive maintenance so that over time standardisation and streamlining of the new install process 
can be achieved. 
 
5.1.2.3 Scaling Impact Requires Evidence of Impact 
The trial of EDTech in 11 schools in Mpumalanga was largely viewed by E-CEO as an easy proof 
of concept. If successful, this would be testament to the transformational power of EDTech to ‘fix’ 




In developing a track record of success, costs in the early stages of start-ups usually overshadow 
earnings thus making a breakeven point an aspiration at this point of business development (Blank, 
2013). As such, developing case studies of success and being able to prove a product is impactful 
is necessary to gain the trust of new users beyond passionate early adopters and ensuring use is 
recurring. The failure of EDTech management to intervene during the early stages of the trial were 
described as being due to resource constraints within IMA. This highlights the short term costs of 
iterative development in the aftermath of an expensive development process involving very few 
users. However, in the long run this increases the probability a valuable, scalable product can be 
developed to generate revenue. 
 
The diffusion of responsibility experienced though operating in an eco-system of multiple, 
independent actors combined with poor contract negotiation with the Mpumalanga Department of 
Education contributed to a lack of support being provided within schools. E-CEO’s assertion that 
the informal contract renegotiation of training responsibility from EDTech to the MDoE was the 
cause of a lack of integration support. From the perspective of a teacher keen to increase their use 
of technology within the classroom; the lack of provision of training and support was the issue; not 
the provider. This is reflected in the rich picture diagram which forms part of the praxis model in 
appendix E. It gives a visual representation of different stakeholders, their perspectives and their 
relationships. 
 
Such a perspective does not foster an enabling environment within the trial schools; limited 
EDTech’s ability to learn if, how, when, why, and why not schools use the technology; and continue 
the development process of the technology to a point at which adoption of the product happens as 
user retention increases. This is representative of the build, measure, learn cycle in the lean start up 
(Ries, 2011); which typically happens prior to product-market fit being achieved, but should 
continue through ongoing development. 
 
In spite of E-CEO’s emotions when discussing the MDoE requesting responsibility for training 
(referring to the MDoE and its employees as incompetent); according to lean principles, EDTech 
management should have maintained regular contact with trial schools with learning (or “structured 
sense making” (Liedtka, 2015, p. 934)) as an organisational priority. This should have involved 
visits to understand why digital libraries were mostly resigned to cupboards and safes. These visits 
didn’t happen and thusly, user based accounts of non-use only emerged through the research 
process for this dissertation. The researcher was the first representative of EDTech to visit RCS-A 
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and RCS-C for more than a half day since initial training was provided. This experience of 
expecting scale through “rapid saturation” without an evidence base of success was similarly 
experienced by OLPC (Warschauer & Ames, 2010, p. 36). As the conceptual model in figure 4 
shows, the lack of target group representation and linear development processes hinder the 
development of effective and scalable technology based solutions in the complex ecosystems 
presented in the rich picture in appendix E. 
 
5.1.2.4 Summary of Strategy for Growth 
The ambitious growth strategy of EDTech caused management to overlook key factors which 
directly contributed to the failure of the project. These include the assumption that product-market 
fit had been achieved and exponential growth was inevitable; ignorance towards the contexts of 
resource constrained schools in marginalised settings and no-fee government schools more 
generally; and the diffusion of responsibility for training. 
 
Evidently, the perception that EDTech was a finished product played a major role in shaping the 
expectations of E-CEO for the trial in terms of the value he perceived teachers to realise based 
upon their limited appreciation of the context. Subsequently, this perception of having a finished 
product saw E-CEO move from a perspective of design and re-development for a new context to 
focussing purely on diffusing the product. Furthermore, the lack of systematic training as a result 
of contractual disagreements, led ultimately to one of the more straightforward explanations for a 
lack of use: a lack of integration support and learning about users. 
 
Without adequate training and support to use the technology; effective use will be difficult to realise 
and without evidence of effective use; attempts at scaling are unwise or futile tasks (André & Pache, 
2016). If a product is scaled when there are usability/integration issues; this correspondingly scales 
the costs and effort for the organisation to remedy these issues. The higher short term costs in 
iterative design and development will be recouped at a point at which a context relevant product 
with scalable implementation practices will be recouped in the longer term growth. 
 
Determined attempts to scale at this stage will cause a great deal of frustration and demands for 
support as users perceive they have been over-sold the benefits of a technology (Warschauer & 
Ames, 2010). 
 
5.1.3 Product Development as a Contributing Factor to Limited/Non-Use of EDTech 
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From a design thinking perspective, building empathy is central to the development of a technology 
product where managers, designers, and developers do not represent the lived experiences of end-
users. “Time and again, initiatives falter because they are not based on the client’s or customer’s 
needs and have never been prototyped to solicit feedback.” (T. Brown & Wyatt, 2010, p. 32). 
 
The next section of the discussion deconstructs the design and development process for EDTech to 
be used in resource constrained government schools. 
 
5.1.3.1 Underestimating the Impact of Context on a Product’s Appropriateness 
Development time was donated to EDTech from a for-profit software development company based 
in South Africa, from their social development fund. This was measured by a number of 
development hours and thusly may have limited the extent to which an agile development process 
such as lean or design thinking could be used. As there was no direct financial incentive for the 
developers to invest the effort required to redevelop the system for use beyond IMA hubs; this is 
another indicator that resources had not been adequately planned and allocated to allow for re-
design for the specific context of no-fee government schools.  
 
Biases towards EDTech (in its current form) as an appropriate solution, inhibited rational user 
based expressions of the sticking points and stressors within the school system; issues Liedtka 
(2015, p. 930) would specifically describe as “egocentric empathy gap” where E-CEO selectively 
chooses which information to believe based upon his world view and his subjective personal 
(financial and emotional) connection to the solution. 
 
“Understanding the broader context might have enabled the development of something much more 
powerful, and something that would actually be adopted.” (Beckman & Barry, 2007, p. 33). 
Empathy building develops from observations of, and constructive conversations with users to get 
to the fine details of the problems the face or needs they have (Beckman & Barry, 2007). 
Furthermore, while potential users themselves don’t always know what they they want, a design 
thinking approach helps to mitigate this through rapid prototyping, and quick and dirty experiments 
(Liedtka, 2015). 
 
Prior to the trial, this feedback was not systematically collected by EDTech. When combined with 
the organisation’s bias towards the product’s completeness and no donated development time 
remaining; systematic approaches towards product adaptations were not taken. As such, the 
prototype phase of EDTech’s development in no-fee schools was skipped over. The impacts of 
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missing this crucial stage of (education) technology development resulted in a very rigid, obtuse 
tool which is inflexible to suit the varying needs, wants, and stress points of teachers’ work. 
 
5.1.3.2 EDTech and Determinisms: Users (and Their Routines) are the Weakest Link 
EDTech had imagined the technology would encourage schools within the trail to perform a 
massive shift in pedagogy from teacher directed, rote learning towards a more learner driven 
independent learning environment characterised by group work and independent research. Such a 
pedagogical revolution shares many of the core philosophies of the previously failed move to an 
Outcomes Based Education (OBE) policy after the transition from the Apartheid Bantu Education 
policy (South African Council for Educators, 2011; Thwala, 2010). 
 
For many reasons, the OBE policy in South Africa did not last and some of the most potent reasons 
were due to insufficient resource availability within many South African schools and a lack of 
support to teachers to facilitate such a change. As such, “far-reaching restructurings tend to be 
driven through much too quickly, ignoring the long time it takes to establish new cultures, 
procedures, and skills, let alone new patterns of trust” (Mulgan, 2006, p. 157). EDTech attempting 
to introduce a completely new style of teaching and learning shows a lack of understanding for the 
historic policy context of education in South Africa and the well document experiences of why 
OBE failed. 
 
E-CEO only visits RCS-B. As the best functioning school, this only served to reinforce their 
perception that it works when used correctly – a logical conclusion with a technologically 
deterministic perspective (Oliver, 2011; Selwyn, 2010). Therefore, in visiting RCS-B, E-CEO 
“may enter with preconceived notions of what the needs and solutions are” (T. Brown & Wyatt, 
2010, p. 32). In this sense, EDTech is imbued in power politics (it works when used correctly) and 
is prescriptive of new teaching and learning cultures (where existing school cultures aren’t 
considered “functional spaces” (Interview 2 with E-CEO)). 
 
As Hodas (1993) explains the most likely technologies to experience success within schools are 
ones which mimic existing power dynamics and routines of teachers – explaining why projectors 
(smart boards) were used in each school. This was seen in earlier decades by the overhead projector 
(Hodas, 1993, p. 10). However, when the technology appears to subvert the role and routines of 
teachers or are said to provide a ‘more efficient’ way of completing tasks; teachers generally meet 




The lack of cooperative design and development to understand how EDTech could reasonably be 
implemented was a major design issue led to an ineffective solution. Furthermore, the ambitious, 
out of touch, and previously failed visions of technology-facilitated pedagogies show neglect for 
an empathetic, experience-based implementation plan.  
 
5.1.3.3 Content: Quantity and Haste Vs. Quality 
The lack of a systematic approach to curating content for EDTech and limited foresight to 
understand the ease with which these resources can be confidently used is a primary barrier to 
effective teaching and learning with EDTech. 
 
As a starting point, teachers who would eventually become end-users were not consulted in terms 
of what kinds of resources would be most appropriate. Instead, it was assumed that videos would 
add most value to lessons using EDTech. Many teachers found and used videos using their own 
resource identification strategies to compliment their teaching and specific issues emerged in terms 
of the quality of videos available within EDTech. Teachers mentioned they couldn’t trust the videos 
to explain the key learning outcomes effectively and the researcher noted the lighting conditions 
within classrooms using technology were difficult to see given the colour contrast of videos. 
 
Here there is tension in the value perception of EDTech between management and users. EDTech 
management perceived issues in the education system being partly to do with teachers not being 
adequately resourced (in subject knowledge and teaching support resources). This developed the 
predisposition towards replacing teachers primarily through providing videos. EDTech didn’t trust 
teachers to explain learning outcomes effectively. While RCT1 outlined subject specific knowledge 
as a challenge; this, in their opinion, is addressed through ACE/T courses aimed at refreshing and 
updating teacher knowledge. RCT1 used videos to compliment teaching of more abstract theories 
which would supplement rather than replace their role as teacher. This subtle difference suggests 
that EDTech, in the content curation process, viewed teacher’s subject knowledge issues as 
justification to subvert their role by replacing them with videos – confirming their biased 
hypothesis of the value of videos (Liedtka, 2015). 
 
The teachers responsible for content curation were seen as contracted suppliers of digital resources 
as opposed to utilising their wealth of collective experience to benefit the project at a deeper 
strategy and decision making level. There was a lack of a coherent quality assurance process. 
Content was aggregated from existing sources (Khan Academy, YouTube, etc.) and rarely 
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developed in-house. Such diverse sources of content lacked the consistency, appropriateness, 
quality, and depth. These factors were sacrificed for developing a finished looking product quickly. 
 
While attempts to crowd source the quality assurance of videos were made; such a system relied 
on users having an active internet connection to rate videos; the benevolence of users to actively 
engage in rating videos; and teachers submitting more appropriate content. The latter required a 
team of teachers (which in reality didn’t exist) to vet the videos uploaded by teachers. Given the 
lack of users engaging with the platform and with the internet connection issues highlighted, this 
isn’t a realistic solution to addressing the weakness of content within the system. 
 
Given the significant financial resources invested in the content curation phase and the incredibly 
low use of it in practice – a lean approach to product development (which includes content as a 
critical component) would lead management, designers, and developers towards a very different 
approach to content curation. EDTech and the MDoE agreed mass aggregation of already available 
content for the 10 major enrolment subjects for all high school grades, However, a lean approach 
could have allowed EDTech to enter trial schools asking what specific subjects and grades would 
be most aided by additional resources and developing content in smaller batches. Here iterative 
build, measure, learn feedback loops would have allowed for detailed feedback on each batch of 
video content released and allowed EDTech to cooperatively design consistently good quality 
resources over time. 
 
5.1.3.4 Technical Structure of EDTech at Odds with Practical Realities 
There are specific findings, corroborated across field sites and data sources which indicate clear 
issues in content available within EDTech leading to limited use; the applicability of EDTech in its 
current design iteration; and device requirements for resource constrained school settings. 
 
Specific issues such as the full screen button not working on iOS devices, and the time navigation 
bar not working effectively across all operating systems meant teachers could quickly get frustrated 
with the user experience. This makes users increasingly reluctant to use it again. As EDTech was 
unable (or unwilling) to fix these issues; bugs within the system remain and detract from a teacher’s 
perception of a seamless, trustworthy, quality technology. As is generally accepted, ease of use 





While in the early stages of IMA developing a digital solution to provide consistent, efficient music 
education there was significant involvement with users; this design philosophy did not translate 
into the integration of EDTech into schools. For example, learners were automatically directed to 
the data intensive in-app browser rather than the streamlined assessment facility. 
 
As was the case in the OLPC programme; the idea that deep rooted, complex, and emergent social 
issues can be remedied through a digital solution which requires intensive teacher training and 
significant infrastructure development leads the programme towards failure (Bass, 2009; 
Warschauer & Ames, 2010). 
 
The only way for EDTech to monitor utilisation, other than direct observation of use, is through 
data provided through online assessments. Given that even the best performing school faced serious 
issues with internet connectivity regularly; much of the online assessment content remained 
completely unused and thusly no utilisation monitoring was possible. Had there been an empathy 
building approach during the design and development phases of the product; different approaches 
to assessment design may have been identified to address the lack of assessment data and usage 
monitoring data more generally. The praxis model (appendix A) suggests addressing this through 
a redesign of the app and presents an alternative new business model which bundles internet 
services within a monthly fee with an HTML based interface for users connecting to the EDTech 
Digital Library. 
 
5.1.3.5 Integration Strategy: Limited Understanding of Context and Owning the Problem 
Assumptions made about existing teaching and learning practices taking place within these schools 
went untested due to the limited engagement of teachers. EDTech management couldn’t develop 
an integration strategy and support programme to develop utilisation within the schools without 
understanding the broader context and other structures at play. While initially, this would consume 
more resources than it would produce; the opportunity was missed for organisational learning about 
how teachers want to, already do, and could use a technology like EDTech. Schools and teachers 
were ‘left to their own devices’ – metaphorically and literally – as was found by Selwyn, et al., 
(2017) in their paper titled as such. 
 
EDTech management had perceived that teachers and learners would bring their own devices to 
school to use EDTech. While in many cases this did happen, given the specific context of resource 
constrained communities: access to devices and the quality of these devices is highly variable. 
Literature on BYOD policies tends to emphasise the very variable impact of one device per learner 
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policies have – and these studies tend to focus on countries like Australia (Selwyn et al., 2017). 
However, given the complex inequalities facing South Africa, the data reveals uneven access to 
technology suitable for a BYOD policy to reflect the redress and equity goals of South African 
education (Roberts, Spencer-Smith, Vänskä, & Eskelinen, 2015). 
 
While some teachers and learners within the schools involved in this research had access to devices, 
some had partially functioning devices (RAT2’s broken keyboard) or low-cost/low-performance 
mobile handsets. The latter lacked the necessary processing power to effectively use EDTech, not 
to mention the extremely limited mobile data balances users had to fully utilise the online only 
content. Not all android devices are equal and on the lower-performance end of the spectrum; 
EDTech is simply not fit for purpose given these limitations. Smartphone penetration may be 
increasing (Kreutzer, 2009); but the differences in processing power; screen quality; battery life; 
and product durability vary significantly between high-end and budget devices. 
 
For more developed nations and more equitable societies BYOD policies may be appropriate. 
However, given the complexity of technological, socio-economic, and spatial inequalities facing 
South Africans in resource constrained families and communities – BYOD expectations are not 
appropriate, nor inclusive, and can perpetuate existing inequalities. 
 
5.1.3.6 Summary of Product Design and Re-Development 
From a product design and development perspective, there are several critical oversights made by 
EDTech. These stem from the perspective that the product was market-ready and ‘worked’, 
requiring no adaptive maintenance to the context of no-fee schools. This resulted in the EDTech 
management believing that in order for the technology to integrated into classrooms; teaching styles 
and work practices needed to be adapted to suit EDTech, rather than EDTech being adapted to suit 
or subtly develop existing routines and work practices. 
 
This approach undermined the realistic chances of success. Adopting the practice lens to view 
organisational change with technology; the application of a specific technology can be very 
different depending on the users (interpretive schemes); the organisational cultures (norms); and 
importantly the existing structures through which technology use is situated (Orlikowski, 2000). 
 
While a co-creative design thinking approach was adopted for the early product iterations for IMA 
hubs; such a mindset didn’t continue through to implementation in schools. This is reflected in the 
process of content curation which didn’t account for the needs and feelings of teachers, nor the 
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ways in which they could realistically implement EDTech within a classroom setting. The 
relegation of integration strategy planning to the remit of individual schools coupled with the lack 
of support is akin to the belief “that the transformative power resides in the box itself rather than 
in the uses to which it is put” (Hodas, 1993, p. 7).  
 
 
This dissertation employed a qualitative methodology using purposive sampling. As such, the 
findings are not necessarily statistically representative of every no-fee government school in 
Mpumalanga, or South Africa.  
 
In order to avoid researcher bias, three separate methods of data collection were employed to 
contribute towards a triangulation of sources, as mentioned in the methodology chapter. By 
utilising a mixture of observations and informal conversations, semi-structured interviews, and 
document collection and analysis; a number of perspectives were gathered within each encounter. 
 
Research took place within a small geographical area where each school was within 5Km of the 
others. Each school operated within the same circuit (a geographical area under with the same 
manager). Therefore, the particular circuit manager responsible for each of these schools may have 
had a more or less hands-on approach with regards to technology use within their schools. This 
gives a rich picture of the similarities and differences between schools operating within relatively 
similar communities. 
 
Qualitative research of this nature is heralded for the process of discovery (Gioia et al., 2012). The 
experiences of the specific schools involved within this study provide rich accounts of their 
experience with technology; much of which may be transferrable across schools in different areas 
experiencing similar resource constraints. Each school appeared to be a relatively high achiever; as 
such there is potential for differences in the enactments of technology within lower achieving 
schools. This highlights that even on the lower extremes of resource constrained schools; there are 
barriers in the integration of technology into teaching and learning. 
 
With regards to the authors use of resource constraints as a term; in reality, each school experienced 
resource constraints in slightly different ways. Resource constraints may be an appropriate term to 
describe the general experience of operating within restrictive budgets. However, the specific mix 





The researcher’s constraints in terms of funding, time, and transport limited the length of the 
research encounter within each school. Had the researcher been able to remain within these schools 
over a period of longer than one week each; the relationships between informant and researcher 
may have developed further and richer understanding of the operational conditions of teaching and 
learning within the schools, identified. However, given the studies explicit focus on a particular 
technology, observations of use, and the alternatives to EDTech give a broad frame for limited/non-
use of EDTech. 
 
 
Principally, this research suggests that EDTech experience limited/non-use as a direct result of 
working on a project that was too resource intensive and beyond the professional capabilities of 
IMA, the board, and management. Resultantly, the prioritisation of EDTech/IMA’s commercial 
logic over the music/arts development logic is reflected particularly well in uneven resource 
allocation (financial resources and funding applications and management time/focus) towards the 
development of EDTech as an organisation and as a packaged technology over IMA. 
 
When the strategic decision of IMA to monetise the software developed for after-school music and 
arts education; mission redefinition became substantial mission drift. IMA hoped EDTech would 
become a mass-market oriented product aimed at sales to all government schools within South 
Africa. The high complexity of managing two completely different value streams with different 
beneficiaries (learners in IMA’s drop-in hubs; and teachers and learners in government schools) 
and paying customers (provincial departments of education) proved too big a project to be 
realistically administered by a local arts education social enterprise. 
 
With more integrated, complimentary value streams; EDTech may have limited their experience 
of the multiple objectives trap through a more manageable and realistic duo (rather than trio) of 
objectives (Garrette & Karnani, 2010); and developed sustainable revenue streams where 
commercial success and social performance are more integrated, even complimentary (Ebrahim et 
al., 2014; Santos et al., 2015). As such, the Praxis Model in appendix A suggests that EDTech/IMA 
would benefit from splitting and EDTech forming a social enterprise for itself and to have a 
simplified and integrated value stream. 
 
There is a broad acceptance in recent years for agile approaches to software development such as 
lean principles (Ries, 2011). With the lean startup approach, the point of a technology product 
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delivering sufficient value for the cost of buying it; product-market fit is an important stage in the 
start-up organisation. A foundational error of EDTech management was to assume that based upon 
the relatively successful implementation within IMA; that this had been achieved. 
 
However, the failure for any school to implement EDTech as expected and to make us of the full 
technological potential that it is believed to have, indicates product-market fit had not been 
achieved. Based upon the experiences of EDTech to facilitate independent learning within IMA; 
EDTech had been standardised for this specific context and the independent learning culture 
developed within the drop-in hubs. 
 
The unchallenged assumptions of need within no-fee government schools could have been 
mitigated to some degree through target group inclusion in decision making and strategy setting. 
EDTech over-estimated the product’s transferability. As such, no resources were allocated to the 
re-development for this specific context. Reflective through the determinism of E-CEO and through 
annual reports and reports to funders of EDTech highlight the rejection of responsibility for failure. 
This was further compounded by an over-reliance on limited assessment data requiring internet 
access within schools and a lack of observation of EDTech in practice. 
 
Without observation data, EDTech management were unable to challenge their biases. Unfounded 
assumptions remained. Such a projection of need and a lack of empathy building for the project is 
imbued in power politics. This sense of ‘we know what they need and how they need it’ is, in the 
authors opinion, made more acute due to the racial composition of the board which leads of 
oversimplifications and biases towards black (South) African lived experiences (Mercer et al., 
2003). Such oversimplifications are evident in the misunderstanding of the systemic impact of 
historical processes on development of former non-white areas of South Africa. Furthermore, the 
over-use and homogenisation of definitions of rurality, townships, poverty, and an under 
appreciation of the impact socio-economic inequalities reduced the ability to recognise contextual 
nuance. 
 
While the idea of facilitating multi-media learning content through an offline server in resource 
constrained schools in South Africa is a good idea: 
 
“An idea does not by itself solve a problem, but needs to be combined with time to develop it, 
skilled work to provide evidence for it, rhetorical work to make it plausible to others, and the 




Over the 5 or 6 years EDTech has been developed, there is still a lot of work to be done to realise 
a sustainable revenue stream. In terms of EDTech as a mass market product there is a need to ensure 
that content provided through the EDTech platform is consistent, reliable, trustworthy, and intuitive 
to be used out-of-the-box. Furthermore, in terms of the technical design of the system there is work 
to be done to repurpose the solution for the context of schools with limited access to reliable internet 
connections, not to mention for use on second hand and low-cost/low-performance devices. 
 
However, this can only be achieved by fundamentally re-evaluating the core philosophy driving 
the development of the product. As such, a user-centred approach to design through adopting 
design thinking and lean startup principals is essential. Such an approach, given the track record of 
EDTech/IMA in delivering mass market education support through internet enabled technology, 
will require the inclusion of target groups such as teachers in setting strategy; scoping the needs of 
teachers and learners effectively; and innovating within the contexts of and constraints of the 
problems – as Prahalad’s (2006) innovation sandbox suggests. 
 
Through an iterative design, development, implementation, and testing process; early value 
delivery should be a priority. To claim transformative potential within South Africa’s education 
landscape, there must be an evidence base of success. Resources must be applied within a 
framework of delivering the most value early on in such a process, critically; knowing when to stop 
development of one area and start on another. It requires a keen eye for agile software development 
where product managers are passionate about solving problems through cooperative design with 
users, and not prescriptive routines for beneficiaries. 
 
6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Forward from the discussion chapter, there are three principal findings which underscore why there 
was limited/non-use of EDTech within resource constrained, no-fee government schools in 
Bushbuckridge Municipality, Mpumalanga. 
 
However, with no experience of working with, managing, or implementing technology within 
resource constrained schools; this was a difficult task. Given the primary focus of EDTech Pty. 
Ltd. was financially motivated; resources were diverted from the core programme of social value 




What makes the case of EDTech somewhat unique is the triple focus of the organisation. However, 
the example provided to explain the multiple objectives trap through the Danone fortified yoghurt 
is different in that the value spillovers associated with product were automatic (simply by 
consuming the product, not contingent on a change in teacher and learner behaviours (Santos et al., 
2015). The implications of the multiple objectives trap may be more acute in coupling hybrids. 
 
In the broader literatures on hybrid organisations seeking a dual logic of profitability and social 
impact; difficulty in managing these are highlighted as one of the core challenges facing managers 
of hybrid organisations. However, for EDTech to try and achieve this with the added logic of 
enhancing education in government schools; this seems to highlight an extremely difficult triad of 
objectives. Mission drift presents itself as the primary reason for failure within the EDTech trial. 
 
While the focus of this dissertation is on explaining limited/non-use of EDTech within no-fee 
government schools; had EDTech not naïvely invested so much time, financial resources, 
management focus, and energy into the project; there would have been no technology (within the 
context of resource constrained schools) to have critiqued limited/non-use. 
 
Specific issues which contributed to the failure of EDTech in practice are far reaching. Principally, 
failure emerges through the strategy of management to scale very quickly with a product that had 
no evidence of effecting improvements within the resource constrained contexts of schools. 
 
Because EDTech management believed so passionately in the appropriateness and completeness 
of the product; this led management to believe, deterministically, that failure was not due to 
unsuitability for the context. Rather, from this perspective it was a failure because those responsible 
for the implementation (schools and the MDoE); didn’t act. 
 
Critical issues in the content are revealed through the data which resulted in a wealth of videos 
(over 15,000) which lacked depth, consistency, relevance for the specific contexts of schools; and 
neglected how these could be implemented within schools. The technical architecture of the 
product was not fit for purpose and this highlights the lack of effort on behalf of EDTech to 
understand the context they were trying to innovate within. Rather, an extremely expensive and 
time consuming product was developed to be relegated to the cupboards, cabinets, and safes of 
schools. Even when it was, as in RCS-B to marginal success, use was at the absolute most 15-20% 





Given this lack of appreciation for the context they were trying to innovate within; it is clear that 
EDTech did not foster contemporary design practices, principles and philosophies which now 
receive increasing credibility within social innovation theory (Kelley & Kelley, 2012). 
 
The following section builds upon these shortcomings and makes various suggestions as to the 
development of a sustainable revenue stream for IMA; and optional recommendations to salvage 
what progress has been made to date with the EDTech technology. 
 
 
The recommendations are developed in tandem with the Praxis Model (appendix A) which details 
a potential business model and opportunities for EDTech/IMA to recover from their experience of 
the failure of the EDTech trial. 
 
As such three options are presented, which account for the broader context through which 
EDTech/IMA operate in. 
 
6.1.1 Recommendation Option One: End EDTech Pty. Ltd. focus in Government Schools 
This recommendation is based upon a reflection of the competencies of management; commercial 
viability of the project; and realistic resources available within EDTech/IMA. This option has 
implications on how EDTech management and the board of IMA reconcile their experience of 
developing EDTech. Admitting failure to achieve the mission is a difficult process. However, 
considering the requirements of EDTech to continue pursuing commercial success; recognising 
EDTech’s developments for government schools as a sunk cost would remove distractions and 
realign the organisation with the founding vision of IMA. 
 
Because IMA and their constituent drop-in hubs utilise the technology, this is not a wholly wasted 
investment. However, continuing to prioritise resources and gain funding to pursue this as a 
revenue stream for IMA requires extensive work to ensure fitness for purpose for the context of 
resource constrained schools. 
 
The effort and resource intensiveness of continued adherence to the commercial and social mission 
of EDTech, in EDTech/IMA’s current form are unlikely to succeed. The author asserts this based 
upon the track record of the organisation particularly within the worldview through which the 




Furthermore, the lack of initiative of the board and management to ensure inclusion of target groups 
within decision making and strategy formation indicates a lack of appreciation for the needs of 
resource constrained schools. However, this is potentially because those who participate on the 
board of IMA as a non-profit; are members primarily to facilitate music education within 
disadvantaged communities. Therefore, given the extent to which finances, focus, creativity, time, 
and energy were diverted from IMA’s core social mission; the continued commitment to EDTech 
beyond use in IMA’s hubs will continue to restrict the fulfilment of music development of young 
South Africans. 
 
Instead of IMA investing in the speculative revenue stream of EDTech; resources would be more 
reasonably be spent on developing revenue streams which are more integrated with the core social 
mission of IMA. This may involve prioritising the development of performance spaces and 
recording studios for IMA learners to use; which could be ‘rented’ to others for a fee when not in 
use by EDTech. However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that IMA return to a traditional charity 
model; operate within the established funding mechanisms for non-profits; and operate with a pure 
social impact logic. 
 
6.1.2 Recommendation Option Two: Separate EDTech Pty. Ltd. and IMA 
Given the multiple objectives trap and the disintegration of the social and commercial missions; 
complexity is inherent and managing of the competing resource demands social objectives difficult. 
The continued investment of money, energy, time, creativity and management of the project will 
continue to affect the ability of IMA to achieve its social mission. With EDTech as its own social 
enterprise; there would be a dedicated board to ensure the appropriate design, development and 
strategy of the organisation and technology. This would allow the inclusion of teaching 
professionals to ensure teachers are viewed as ‘antagonistic assets’ systematically throughout the 
organisation. 
 
Such an approach would require redesign and redevelopment of the platform, in line with what is 
suggested in recommendation option three, below. 
 
6.1.3 Recommendation Option Three: Fundamentally Re-Design and Re-Develop EDTech 
Based upon the research within resource constrained schools; there are specific recommendations 




The following key recommendations are based upon the praxis model presented in appendix A. 
The following is a summary of what is contained in these documents. 
 
Firstly, EDTech require a critical reflection on the recent trial which wielded significant levels of 
non-use. Current organisational perspectives (including blaming the MDoE) are inadequate. These 
neglect the internal issues identified with EDTech. Such critical reflection should prioritise 
interrogating the motivation of the board, staff and management to continue with the EDTech 
project. 
 
Secondly, an empathy driven user consultation must happen. While this dissertation has uncovered 
the complex process of integrating technology into resource constrained schools; EDTech 
management must create organisational governance policies which prioritise communication, co-
creation, and iterative re-development processes. This could allow a process for EDTech to begin 
to learn from failures, and work constructively to address them. 
 
Such a consultation process must push EDTech to convert perceptions of failure and blame into 
contextual learning opportunities. Given the complexities technology start-ups face, someone with 
design thinking experience should be brought into the organisation. The specific competencies of 
the experienced design thinker in this consultation process must seek to build shared understanding 
of the context between EDTech management, and the schools involved within the trial. 
 
Thirdly, after this consultation period, based upon the lessons learned and specific assumptions 
used to build the current iteration of EDTech digital libraries; a process of fundamental redesign 
will be required. Such redesign should address the specific issues of EDTech experienced by 
schools particularly in the unsuitability for older operating systems and low-cost/low-performance 
devices, and the inadequacies of the current content catalogue, for instance. There are a significant 
number of constraints within schools as identified through the model in figure 15 and the 
contributing data, which highlight variable access to and the limitations of internet connectivity 
within schools. 
 
Fourthly, following the lean startup principles during this process and throughout to the incremental 
development process where value is created early for users and; the development of technology 
cannot be carried out in a vacuum – as happened during the trial. Product development must follow 
a lean approach which is flexible enough to respond to feedback from users. As such the number 
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of schools involved within such a process must be significantly smaller even limited to two or three 
schools. There should not be a focus on standardisation in the early stages. 
 
Fifthly, key partnerships must be developed with organisations who already specialise in digital 
education content and remove this responsibility from EDTech. These partners are required to free 
EDTech to focus on the development of technology for serving content in low connectivity 
environments. As such there should be a focus on integrating solutions within the trial schools to 
reduce the effort and complexity for teachers to plan, use, and evaluate their technology use. As 
such, this will require strong stakeholder management competencies, which EDTech may need to 
hire other external staff. 
 
Lastly, the specific revenue streams open to EDTech may have to be fundamentally re-evaluated. 
Currently, sustainable monetisation of the product only comes through repeated purchases of digital 
libraries as the product beings to fail. Current predictions of the digital library life span are three 
years. Consideration of EDTech as a service could prove a more valuable revenue stream 
mechanism as this forces EDTech to ensure value is delivered throughout the whole experience 
and provides a key metric of the value proposition delivering enough value to schools for monthly, 
quarterly, or annual subscriptions. This could involve bundling mobile data through 4G sim 
connectivity already possible with the existing digital library hardware. 
 
In summary, the third recommended option presents significant resource requirements due in part 
to the need to recruit experienced technology industry professionals. However, as is the case with 
technology focussed start-ups; it is rare to find such companies are profitable as soon as the first 
product iterations are launched. This requires recognition of the significant resources required for 
EDTech to reach product-market fit (prior to scaling). 
 
Fundamentally, there should be an understanding that technology products are never truly 
‘finished’. Continued success is based upon incremental re-design and development. Had 
Facebook, for example, not innovated beyond it’s early product iterations; there would be no 
Facebook today. Facebook, Google, IBM, etc. recognise maintaining and enhancing competitive 
advantage relies upon continuous innovation and iterative development. 
 
 
There were numerous possible directions for this research. However, the author decided to focus 
on emerging theory within the area of mission drift and the implications of EDTech/IMA’s 
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approach to product implementation within resource constrained schools in Mpumalanga. Other 
possible areas of enquiry adding to this body of research would be to have a deeper enquiry into 
the composition of the board and explore how the demographics of board members affects decision 
making, strategy, and inclusivity of those who are sometimes referred to in South Africa as 
previously disadvantaged individuals. 
 
Additionally, given the tension in terms of the contract between EDTech/IMA and the MDoE; 
future research could explore more cases of the tendering process of education resource tendering 
as well as how contractual responsibilities and expectations are formed. Such exploration would 
encourage an understanding of how public-private partnerships are administered within the context 
of education in Mpumalanga, South Africa. 
 
Such research to understand contract negotiations would help to explore some aspects of why 
training was not delivered to an adequate standard within the schools involved within this study 
and as such compliment this research’s analysis of some antecedents of failure within the trial. 
 
Further research to understand how these independent stakeholders may be brought into a unified 
project structure could facilitate a more productive use of resources between them and maximise 
each organisation’s core competencies. Such research could work towards developing an evidence 
based, integrated strategy to increase the effectiveness of technology within schools; create 
enabling environments for teachers who wish to increase their use of technology; and build upon 
the work of the national Department of Education’s e-Education policies (Department of Basic 
Education, 2007; Department of Education, 2004). 
 
 
“The rabbit-hole went straight on like a tunnel for some way, and then dipped suddenly down, so 
suddenly that Alice had not a moment to think about stopping herself before she found herself 
falling down a very deep well… She had plenty of time to look about her, and to wonder what 
was going to happen next.” 
(Carroll, 1984, p. 3) 
 
In the opening chapter of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Carroll tells the reader briefly of the 
circumstances surrounding her decision to follow the white rabbit and quickly finding herself in a 
dark tunnel with no idea of what lay ahead. This is an appropriate metaphor through which to 
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describe EDTech/IMA’s tumultuous journey; chasing after money; and ultimately trying to do 
business in a completely new, unknown context. 
 
The metaphor of Alice following the white rabbit down the hole is akin to EDTech’s experience of 
mission drift. At countless stages there were opportunities to evaluate progress; to understand 
where they were heading; until it was too late. The vast resources utilised in the process clouded 
objective judgements of the likelihood of the EDTech’s commercial and social missions being 
achieved. EDTech/IMA followed the white rabbit only to find themselves in a place they could not 
recognise, nor relate to. 
 
The critical difference between EDTech/IMA’s experience of what happened next was that Alice 
was curious, developed empathy for her counterparts, and forged an adventure of learning about 
new realities – EDTech/IMA did not. 
 
EDTech made two principal errors. First and foremost; to chase speculative future gains only to be 
caught in the multiple objectives trap where resources were spread too thin caused the failure of 
the project to realise commercial success and to positively benefit the South African education 
landscape. Secondly; deterministically assuming that because a technology works (within 
acceptable bounds) in a specific context; it’s transferability is all encompassing; ultimately led to 
critical oversights. Thusly, the solution developed didn’t address the needs of users and thusly a 
white elephant was developed. This secondary error is built upon emotional connections to a 
solution at the expense of gaining evidence based, empathetic understanding of what needs actually 
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Appendix A – Praxis Model Report 






Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town 
 
Purpose: 
To critically assess the current business model and strategy of EDTech based upon the trial in 11 
schools in Mpumalanga and present an alternative. This is used to show areas of organisational 
learning to develop a ‘road-map’ for EDTech’s future development and implementations as well 
as presenting the business case for a revised business model. 
 
Audience: 
Senior management within EDTech, for examination as part of MPhil. Inclusive Innovation degree 
of the author. 
 
Structure: 
A. Reflection on project to date 
B. ‘Road map’ to success 
C. A new business model 
D. The business case moving forward 
 
Appendices Referenced: 
• User Critiques of EDTech 
• Comparisons Across Field Sites 
• CATWOE and Root Definition 
• Rich Picture Diagram 
• Current Business Model Canvas 
• New Business Model Canvas 




Reflection on Project to Date 
 
The annual reports of EDTech/IMA reveal key issues in EDTech’s utilisation and the observation 
data contained within the dissertation show a mismatch between expectations and reality. An 
interim report produced by the researcher and provided to EDTech presents a summary of many of 
the main issues identified throughout the research process. 
 
Process of Prototype Development 
The approach to the project was to have a finished product as soon as possible. The fast pace of re-
development for no-fee schools shifted focus from addressing user needs, to packaging a vague 
idea of what might be useful. This is a costly approach as what was developed is significantly 
underused. 
 
Money was prioritised to be spent up-front for platform and content development prior to 
systematic engagement with teachers and learners to understand what content was required. The 
rush to develop a ‘finished’ app and Hub reduced the possibility of testing/maintenance as well as 
iterative design. This increased the costs of errors/misjudgements as it scaled through the trial. 
Early attempts to standardise without experience in diverse no-fee school contexts meant EDTech 
was not appropriate as a one-size fits all product. Scaling for increased penetration was therefore 
premature (as outline in the dissertation). 
 
Issues in Hub, App, and Content Design 
The extent to which internet access was available was overestimated and the reliance on an internet 
connection for seamless user experience limited the Hubs usability and offline use of EDTech often 
presented error messages. The App/Hub interoperability software architecture is processor 
intensive and not suitable to user devices typically found in the trial schools involved. 
 
Content lacked in several key areas. This was in the quality of content available but also how useful 
and relevant it was in depth and accessibility. Issues relating to content, app design, Hub design, 
and the interoperability of hardware and software are shown in the document labelled ‘User 
Critiques of EDTech’. 
 
Critique of Business Model 




The business model for EDTech was focussed on the sale of Hubs as assets as opposed to a 
subscription based model. There was a ball park 3-4 years’ life span placed on an individual digital 
library. It was assumed the product would work and that repeat purchases would be sufficient. 
However, should the hub actually have a life span of 5-7 years, then income drops significantly. 
Additionally, reliance on the sale of Hubs as one off purchase assets increases the upfront costs to 
use, making EDTech less accessible to no-fee schools and also conceals the hidden costs, 
particularly in mobile data/internet connectivity (essential for the full functionality). 
 
EDTech was envisioned as a large scale, multisided platform. This requires EDTech to 
simultaneously cater for learners in need of extra resources and practice assessments; teachers in 
need of time efficient teaching materials; and school/class progress reports generated for 
departmental officials to use. These are three very different user groups. For the value proposition 
to be realised for each three relies on consistent, widespread use of the online assessment facility. 
 
There were many functions build into EDTech Digital Library and App. This was far above what 
teachers described as their needs. Teachers were not asking for class analytics. They needed 
resources which could explain and structure important topics but perhaps more pertinently, time 
saving techniques. 
 
The current business model has several key strategic weaknesses which include the broad user 
groups who were intended to be targeted. For instance, learners as users are considered within the 
classroom under the supervision of teachers and for use at home on their personal devices which 
they download content to. 
 
This is problematic in the sense that even learners with devices theoretically capable of using the 
App struggle due to device performance. This essentially creates an exclusive group of potential 
users who have stable enough socio-economic networks to own devices capable of running 
EDTech. This increases the relative disadvantage learners from less economically stable families 
face. Those who can afford technology are the only ones who could realise the full benefit of 
EDTech. 
 
Key failures in this current business model was the lack of communication with trial schools to 
identify support needs and explain low utilisation; a lack of any follow-up policy to understand 
when utilisation does and doesn’t happen; and the risky ‘build everything, release, and see what 




The trial was viewed as a proof of concept exercise, not a prototype test. As such, little thought 
was given to being systematic in the approach to monitoring and evaluation. This was further 
compounded by the weak links between the inputs, outputs and impact of the innovation (shown 
through the CATWOE analysis). 
 
Typical of a traditional product development project, costs can only be recovered after development 
has finished and a product is perceived by the developers to be market ready. However, this is 
contingent on the intuition of developers to correctly identify ‘market readiness’ or Product-Market 
Fit (PMF). 
 
Limited User Engagement and Co-Constitutive Development 
The prescriptive approach of EDTech management to implementation did not reflect the lived 
realities within schools. There was limited target group representation in the foundational phase of 
identifying EDTech’s purpose and design. The problem definition developed by EDTech was not 
generally representative of the user market. 
 
The document titled ‘CATWOE Analysis and Root Definition’ outlines the organisational 
perspective of the environment EDTech saw themselves as operating within. Key insights from 
this tool show a large gap in how EDTech as a standalone technology can be a pivotal tool in 
improving education within Mpumalanga. The lack of an explicit, realistic, and testable theory of 
change model reduced EDTech’s ability to systematically test if, what, how, when, and where the 
prototype improves education outcomes. 
 
‘Road Map’ to Success 
 
Step 1 – Organisational Introspection 
In light of what was broadly perceived as a failure; in the aftermath of the EDTech trial it is vital 
for EDTech management to engage in an organisational reflection and learning process. 
 
This should focus on: 
• How does the organisation feel about the outcomes project? 
o Is there the will to go back to the drawing board? 
• IMPERATIVE: how can failure be converted to organisational learning? 
o Instead of blaming teachers for non-use; ask why are teachers not using EDTech? 
o What factors (other than lack of training) contributed to non-use? 
• Can EDTech identify endogenous factors which limited the chances of success? 
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• Points of failure should be de-politicised 
o Rather than blaming stakeholders, how can these be framed as non-aggressive 
barriers? 
• Can the organisational structure and business model of EDTech/IMA be changed? 
o Could EDTech form its own dual structure social enterprise EDTech Pty. and 
EDTech NPO)? 
o Could a different value proposition (and bus. model) be pursued? 
 
The ultimate questions EDTech/IMA should answer by the end of this step are: 
• Is there still drive to enhance the experience of education in South African government 
schools through a digital education solution? 
o AND does this drive to enhance SA education bigger than the drive to finance 
IMA? 
• Is there energy to fundamentally revise the processes through which EDTech is designed, 
developed and managed? 
o Are users reconsidered as vital assets and strategic partners going forward? 
 
Step 2 – User Consultations 
If EDTech answers yes to all of these major questions, then a user consultation is essential. This 
should prioritise observation and interviews over data gathered through online assessments. This 
should be the first step in ensuring teachers are involved and encouraged to participate in shaping 
what EDTech looks like. 
 
At this stage someone with design thinking experience should be brought into the organisation to 
provide technology focussed design experience. 
 
User Consultations will have three primary functions: 
1. Understanding what functionality is needed by teachers 
a. Do teachers need resources? 
i. E.g. videos, slide decks, work sheets and when these are useful 
b. Do teachers need a curriculum tracker/planner? 
c. Do teachers need ways to save time in the classroom? 
i. Where are the current bottlenecks in the classroom? 
ii. Which of these are simplest to address and give the most value? (think 
Pareto analysis) 
2. Exploring what content is required, useful, relevant, and accessible 
a. Is rich multimedia content appropriate? 
i. When is it and when isn’t it? 
b. Are teachers’ main concerns with regards to textbooks and additional teaching 
resources for learners to work through? 
c. When are videos useful and when are they distracting? 
3. Understanding when, how, where, and why (not) teachers would use a digital solution 
a. This must be seen as to constrain the scope of the project brief 
b. Is there sufficient demand for a digital solution? 




c. Why did teachers not use the current prototype? 
i. Technical reasons? 
ii. Content reasons? 
iii. Time? 
iv. Digital literacies? 
v. Accessibility, etc.? 
 
This stage will provide rich description of the actual needs, wants and restrictions teachers place 
on digital solutions within no-fee school settings. It would be most useful to visit every school 
involved within the trial to gain some level of feedback. 
 
This stage will throw up many ideas. This is why it’s important to have a design thinking 
practitioner to guide and document findings throughout this consultation. This user consultation 
will naturally lead to the 3rd stage of the road map. However, this is assuming there is no change to 
EDTech management’s drive to continue with the project in light of hearing what teachers bring 
up throughout this process. This can be thought of as a lighter product design process than what 
step 3 suggests. 
 
The aim of this step is not to produce a project specification, but rather seen to validate and 
challenge EDTech management assumptions of the value the EDTech Hub delivers. Without 
having these assumptions built into the previous prototype, challenged; the same misjudgements 
are likely to be repeated. 
 
This stage will involve a lot of high level planning such as repeating the use of business analysis 
tools such as the CATWOE, Root Definition, and Rich Picture development. These tools bring 
with them benefits of capturing multiple (occasionally contradictory) stakeholder perspectives. 
This is important for identifying potential tensions which may arise. 
 
Step 3 – Re-design process 
This stage is where the design thinking process starts and where iterative design, development and 
implementation are carried out. 
 
As with design thinking, the idea is not to develop a finished looking solution as quickly as possible. 
The priority is to add value as quickly as possible. Often times this is not profitably scalable. This 
is not the goal of the early prototyping phase. The philosophical basis for design thinking will 
require that the design thinking practitioner take the lead in this process. This is where the most 




This step is difficult to pre-emptively plan. Instead the questions that require answering at this stage 
is to what extent can EDTech be realistically re-designed? These are presented in order of most 
likely to realise a sustainable organisation in the medium/long term (in the author’s perspective). 
1. Total overhaul and redesign (back to the drawing board) 
2. Significant revisions (retaining a lot of the technical architecture previously developed) 
3. Minor bug/error fixes (this is not a good choice as it neglects the structural issues inherent 
in EDTech’s previous prototype) 
 
The researcher’s opinion is that the current design lacks appropriacy in ways that the time, effort 
and resources required to retrofit the current prototype to the context would outweigh the benefits 
of a radical redesign. 
 
The least financially costly option is to only address minor bugs/error fixes. However, this would 
limit the chances of success due to its high processor power requirements of devices and the Hub’s 
high internet data requirements. 
 
If the most radical solution is opted for (option 1), this frees EDTech to reimagine how digital 
solutions can positively impact the experience of learning in South African high schools. This 
would represent a more authentic design thinking process as overlapping spaces as opposed to 
stages as it offers a ‘fresh start’. 
 
Here, there will be an emphasis on developing paper based/low-tech solutions, rapid prototyping, 
significantly manual process (not yet digitised and packaged as a final, market ready product). 
 
Step 4 – Re-Development Process 
As indicated, this isn’t a distinct stage. It rather represents moving from rough rapid prototypes 
into more ‘product resembling’ and ‘packaged’ prototypes. Again, iteration is a key consideration. 
If something doesn’t work like it was expected to after early stage developments – go back and 
learn something about why it didn’t work. 
 
The researcher advises the following tightly scoped boundaries: 
• Forget about: 
o Class analytics 
§ they are never used and there is nowhere near enough data for any 
meaningful analysis to take place 
o Nationwide scalability 
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§ the focus in the early stages of rapid prototyping is not of sustainable 
scaling 
§ it’s about success replication (even when costs outweigh income) 
§ Financial sustainability will come over time with luck and evidence of 
success (no design process can guarantee commercial success) 
• Prioritise: 
o Focus on small number of schools 
§ 2-3 schools within easy commuting distance from the EDTech office is 
vital (think about visibility of the schools to EDTech) 
§ 1-3 subjects which from the smaller sample of schools’ highlight as 
subjects where digital education could add most value 
o Listen to teachers, first 
§ If an idea does not get the approval of teachers – don’t spend money or 
waste time developing it 
§ Ask first, quick and dirty prototype second, ask again, prototype again… 
• Only ‘build’ when a prototyped element has a realistic chance of 
being used 
• For every newly designed, built, and revised element, the lean start-
up approach to purposeful should guide action 
• Intentional experimentation should be prioritised through the build 
measure learn cycle – Fail fast, fail often, fail early, learn. 
 
Step 5 – Implement in Increments for New Locations 
One of the big oversights of EDTech during their failed trial was to seek scale as a primary 
objective. The EDTech hub had not reached product-market fit. 
 
At the stage of incremental implementation, schools should be added on a case by case basis and 
perhaps look to phase in the product by modules. This allows for the important process of planning 
implementation and training/support requirements for new installs to be systematised over time. 
 
New installs are selected strategically for being similar enough to the initial 2-3 schools involved 
within the re-development. EDTech MUST be expecting to make changes to adapt the product to 
slightly different operating contexts. 
 
Even with a small pool of schools, this research highlights through the ‘Comparisons Across Field 
Sites’ table that even schools within very close proximity to each other have different access to 
technology, management styles and processes, student bodies with variable strengths and 
development areas. 
 




A new business model is presented with this praxis model though a business model canvas. This 
section outlines the key elements of the suggested approach to developing financial self-
sustainability and social impact (organisational hybridity) within the operations of EDTech. 
 
This introduces the new business model’s key elements; what has been stripped out from the 
previous business model; where strategic focus and resources should be; and an overview of some 
mechanisms to ensure organisational hybridity can be achieved. 
 
Exploring the New Business Model Canvas 
The Value Proposition initially presented needs revisions to address the concerns users raised 
throughout the research process and in keeping with the findings, learning, and reflection of the 
various steps of the road map to success section. 
 
As opposed to a focus on providing a plethora of content varying in quality, consistency, and 
appropriateness for the context of no-fee schools; the revised value proposition should seek to 
structure current curricula into interactive, ‘classroom ready’ lesson plans with integrated slide 
decks. These should be given to teachers in formats which can be printed and used manually as 
well as more integrated slide decks for teachers. Ideally, this would be done in partnership with the 
NECT group of organisations. 
 
As a time saving mechanism, slide decks following the currently paper based NECT lesson 
planners/trackers appear to the researcher to be the most appropriate vector of digital content. 
Videos may be incorporated into these slide decks, but the principal aim should be allowing 
teachers to talk and show the theory as opposed to verbatim, regurgitations on chalk boards of what 
appears in current teaching guides. This reduces the time a teacher’s back is to the class; may 
increase student engagement; and ideally provide a more seamless teaching and learning 
experience. 
 
The idea of developing online assessments as a dual function learner assessment facility (to benefit 
teachers and learners) and utilisation data source (to benefit EDTech) is not farfetched in principal. 
However, little thought was given to the context of no-fee schools and the logistics such a drastic 
change in pedagogy requires. Additionally, the requirement of Internet access to use this feature 




As such, akin to printable lesson plans, printable test sheets would equip teachers with resources 
that they themselves can manually administer. There is nothing to stop marks (question by 
question/test by test) being input manually as a way for teachers to track whole class progress. This 
would reduce the vast data requirements observed in RCS-B where out of a class of 30, only 6 
learners could complete an assessment. 
 
The Customer Segments should be reduced to thinking principally about teachers. Teachers are the 
gatekeepers in a sense of how learning takes place. Therefore, when a teacher decides to incorporate 
EDTech into their practice, learners will follow suit. It is vital that teachers do not feel undermined 
by the technology. In fact, it’s essential that the technology is build to be viewed as an enabler of 
teaching as opposed to a subversion of their craft. While considering how learners come to 
experience EDTech is still an important factor; teachers should remain the priority user group. 
 
Customer Relationships is a key area neglected by EDTech throughout the project. No systematic 
approach to managing user feedback was in place and there is no log beyond the recollection of E-
DBA of issues which arise in use. One quick, easily implementable solution would be to create a 
customer query database through Google Forms to log every call for support, the school, etc. This 
could be made in 15 minutes and live instantly providing a systematic approach to recording user 
support requests. 
 
WhatsApp and Facebook continually emerges as vital communication channels as these require 
minimal and for many users, free communication platforms (Facebook free-basics on some 
networks). 
 
These emerged organically as the best way for teachers to communicate and engage with EDTech 
(via. E-DBA, the researcher and the organisations profiles and pages). There could be room to 
exploit this preference towards messaging by creating WhatsApp groups for teachers to share their 
experiences in a semi-moderated, digital group space. 
 
Delivery Channels are interesting to consider in relation to social networks too. Given the rise and 
power of ChatBots within the tech space, there could be a move to innovate within this space. This 
could serve content through accessible platforms such as WhatsApp or Messenger where text, 
images, videos, and audio can be sent. This would be an exciting area to explore and create on 
demand, digital learning content access. Many mobile networks within South Africa offer mobile 
data packages specifically tailored for apps such as WhatsApp for under R20 per month (roughly 
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£1.30). EDTech could explore this with relatively low costs given elementary training in the 
Watson system by IBM. 
 
Revenue Streams need to be fundamentally revised. The researcher believes revenue streams need 
to be more intrinsically linked to improved education. While these are broad, one such way 
highlighted through the business model would be to focus on subscriptions to EDTech as opposed 
to asset sales. Internet access is consistently highlighted as a top operational concern. If EDTech 
were to bundle mobile data packages with the Hubs and simultaneously reduce the requirement for 
internet access through redesign; a service based subscription would allow EDTech to see how 
much value schools saw in the system. This would also increase the opportunities for usage data to 
be transmitted from Hubs. 
 
As subscriptions (e.g. monthly or 6-monthly) increase or decrease; this gives EDTech the 
opportunity to observe which schools don’t see value in EDTech. While bundling mobile data could 
be costly, through the implementation of an APN; significantly cheaper rates and longer usage 
periods can be spread across all schools. As a guide, through an APN data supplier 20Gb of mobile 
data valid for 3 months across unlimited sim cards can cost R2193 as opposed to retail rates (for 
ordinary individual users) 1GB costs R1494. Incredible savings are possible against consumer 
prices and immense value creation in bundling data services become obvious. 
 
As schools already face issues in access to the internet, this is another feature of EDTech which 
could position it much more favourably in the eyes of schools and could incorporate the costs of 
mobile data (hidden in the current business model). 
 
Key Activities within the current business model were largely in the development of EDTech. 
There was no formal follow-up policy to visit schools regardless of performance. Additionally, 
training was not considered an activity within the remit of EDTech. Content provision was seen as 
one of the key activities throughout the development phase. In practice however, the output of this 
activity provided low quality content. 
 
As such, the new business model suggests developing key partnerships with existing content 
providers who have key competencies in developing engaging, out-of-the-box ease of use, relevant, 
                                                   
3 Source: https://www.axxess.co.za/mobile/cellc [accessed August 2018] 
4 Source: https://www.cellc.co.za/cellc/get-databundles [accessed August 2018] 
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and consistent learning resources. EDTech would act as a vector for such content providers to 
access new markets unserved without access to the Internet. This should free up time, resources 
and efforts to focus on providing consistently great learning experiences through technology. 
 
By partnering with organisations providing desirable content such as IXL or homeschoolersSA; 
EDTech could focus primarily on user experience and the technology which enables meaningful 
content to be delivered. EDTech have shown through the prototype Hub that technically it can 
serve content in a somewhat structured fashion. Critically however, spreading organisational 
resources across content curation/development and technology development phases limited the 
extent to which the technology could offer seamless experiences. The time and money spent on 
content curation/development produced sub-standard resources, the vast majority of which were 
unused entirely. 
 
Key Partners are explored in part through the CATWOE document. While the various levels of 
DoE are still the most important external stakeholders; this business model adds content providers 
as vital to the success of EDTech going forward. Leveraging content providers’ competencies (such 
as IXL and HomeschoolersSA) would allow the burden to be shared and recognise the role EDTech 
plays within the eco-system of multiple, independent actors. 
 
Additionally, given the limited involvement of teachers throughout the trial and development of 
EDTech, the involvement of teachers’ unions could provide a starting point to engage with 
professional teaching bodies. This could contribute throughout various stages of the iterative 
development process for development of design prototypes prior to development with 
organisations whose purpose is to represent the interests of teachers in South Africa. Additionally, 
a partnership with one or more teaching union may give further credibility to the project above and 
beyond the MDoE alone. 
 
Given the social enterprise structure of EDTech/IMA (or EDTech alone should the organisations 
split); this may allow some level of leverage when approaching mobile network providers when 
seeking preferential data rates through an APN set-up. Providers such as AXXESS provide APN 
products which are competitive at commercial rates. This is potentially a partnership which could, 
over time and with evidence of success, leverage greater buying power of EDTech given the social 




Key Resources within the new business model will reduce the burden of content creation/curation 
from EDTech. Given that much of the content was curated from external, third party sources, this 
content was never truly an asset belonging to EDTech. Instead, over the course of iterative 
technology development, the value of EDTech will be more focussed on technology as a key asset. 
 
As such, the development of, for instance, an HTML based interface for the hub (as opposed to the 
App) could provide a starting point for reimagining how users engage with EDTech. While the 
App offers somewhat acceptable user experiences, an explicit focus on the technology within the 
new business model can refocus efforts on delivering consistently seamless and positive user 
experiences. As has been seen through the negotiations of technology in content model in figure 
15 as well as more generally through UX and Technology Acceptance Modelling (TAM); increased 
user satisfaction, perceptions of ease and usefulness have positive impacts on repeated use. A focus 
on creating such experiences are vital in ensuring the technology becomes a key resource/asset 
over the longer term. 
 
The suggested centrality of social media within the new business model as both a customer 
relationship and delivery channel would mean EDTech need to upskill existing employees such as 
E-DBA. E-DBA’s skill set appeared to be undervalued and investment in their professional 
development lacking. As a key resource, E-DBA should be cross-trained and reskilled to have a 
more strategic role within EDTech. 
 
The Cost Structure within the new business model are changed particularly through the suggested 
bundling of mobile data with the Hub. Regardless of how this is packaged and marketed; it offers 
EDTech the opportunity to increase interest in the product and actually offer savings to schools 
such as RCS-B who currently buy their own mobile data for EDTech. This could be recouped 
through the EDTech as a service subscription model. 
 
By partnering with content providers, EDTech would remove the cost burden of content curation 
and allow it to be redirected this into technology development. Technology development costs 
would represent an increase if EDTech were unable to gain donated development time. However, 
given the particular issues identified with the donation of development time (a rushed, non-
chargeable project and development happening in a vacuum of users); this may ultimately allow 




With an emphasis on following lean and design methodologies; the benefits of in-housing 
development could reduce the distance between development and users ultimately leading to a 
more relevant product. In-housing development will only allow for a more empathetic approach to 
design if it is supported by iterative, user centred design approach. 
 
Strategic Focus Going Forward 
Strategic focus of EDTech within the new business model should be in three main areas: 
1. User centred design processes 
a. Reducing the number of schools who participate in early stage prototype iterations 
b. Working with teachers with enthusiasm, interest, and experience as key participants 
in the design process 
c. Ensuring systematic build-measure-learn cycles are planned, carried out and issues 
addressed 
d. Incremental design, early value creation for users, less focus on the short term 
financial sustainability/commercial viability 
2. Building and maintaining relationships with content providers 
a. This is key for the new business model 
b. During consultation with teachers (step 2 of road map to success); identify 
organisations whose resources teachers’ liked 
c. Seek to work in partnership with these organisations to adapt this content for use 
in offline EDTech environments 
3. Systematic approach to and documentation of integration in schools 
a. At each level, all the resources, time and costs of integrating EDTech into schools 
should be recorded 
b. This will give a clearer idea of the true costs of implementing the solution 
c. Understanding of total cost of implementation will help in designing a systematic 
approach to integration within schools 
d. While integration can’t be streamlined in initial trials, over time as the technology 
gets closer to PMF, integration should become systematised 
 
Aligning Commercial and Social Impact Logics 
From the dissertation, EDTech/IMA failed to achieve successful hybridity. This is in part due to 
having two separate value chains (EDTech as commercial and IMA as social). These two value 
chains are disintegrated. The new business model suggests restructuring the social enterprise model 
to separate IMA from EDTech, while creating a NPO for EDTech. Such restructuring would allow 
EDTech NPO to have its own board made up of individuals with a primary remit of ensuring the 
effective development of a digital education solution. 
 
Within the new business model suggested for EDTech is introducing a subscription model with 
data bundled within this subscription cost. This allows EDTech to have shorter cycles between 
customers repeat purchases. This in turn will force EDTech to ensure that user experiences are 




As internet services will be bundled with EDTech, this will allow for more utilisation data to be 
transmitted to EDTech remotely from each school, and in time for remote support to be provided 
by EDTech. 
 
However, ensuring repeat subscriptions is only broad proxy indicator of social value creation. 
Within the current organisational structure (shown through the CATWOE document) social 
objectives and impact are not reasonably measurable. While ‘high school leavers with skills for the 
economy’ may be a longer term impact of EDTech (assuming excellent learning experiences can 
be delivered through it); this will not be measurable until years after learners stop attending schools. 
 
E-CEO sought to compare EDTech utilisation and exam grade improvements as an impact proxy 
measure. This is also not a good measure of the impact of EDTech as there could feasibly be other 
contributing factors within the school such as improved access sanitation facilities (allowing girls 
to attend school more regularly); teachers completing ACE/T courses; school management 
implementing new policies; etc. 
 
Through developing an explicit theory of change, EDTech will find more immediate measures and 
proxy indicators of social value creation. This, for instance, may include understanding of the time 
savings slide decks provide teachers (they don’t have to write on chalk boards). 
 
A theory of change is an important process which forces EDTech to think more clearly about the 
steps in between large scale, long term systemic impact inherent in the organisational vision; and 
the practical improvements that are more observable in practice. 
 
Summary of the Business Case 
 
The revised business model for EDTech builds upon the research for this dissertation. It is primarily 
focussed on removing/reducing the barriers to use (e.g. poor internet access; poor user experience; 
broadening access for low-performance devices); and providing useful, trustworthy, easy to use 
content. 
 




• building a solution which is relevant to the needs of teachers by consulting and testing with 
teachers throughout redesign/development  
• understanding the requirements to increase utilisation of EDTech within an individual 
school 
• making it easier for teachers to use EDTech within their classrooms 
• building a solution which addresses more adequately addresses the issues teachers face 
implementing digital education in no-fee schools 
 
Contributing factors leading up to and during the failed trial of EDTech in no-fee government 
schools were: 
• a lack of user involvement in adapting EDTech for use within no-fee schools 
• self-imposed pressure to scale for financial sustainability quickly 
• no resources planned for testing/maintenance/training/post-install support 
• no coherent process for measurement & evaluation and impact assessment 
 
Critically, the link between EDTech (in its current form) as a potential social innovation and the 
wider impact is tedious. There is a significant between EDTech contributing to socio-economic 
growth and how this is achieved. It is almost impossible to measure. The simplistic input-process-
output-outcome beliefs (sown in the CATWOE document) did not foster critical engagement with 
the issues at play. 
 
The value created by EDTech is contingent on the technology being suitable for the context; the 
opportunity for teachers to implement it successfully; as well as broader support from within 
education institutions. Therefore, it is not feasible to expect that EDTech alone (as a technology) 
will impact positive change. Subsequently, a fee-for-service model will allow EDTech resources 
to provide on-going support and development. 
 
A market ready product may only emerge after 2 or 3 years in smaller scale trials, therefore a long 
term perspective on financial sustainability must be sought. By partnering with existing players in 
digital education, EDTech can produce a digital education solution which is high quality, 






Appendix B – User Critiques of EDTech 
Problem 
Area 
Symptom Likely/Potential Cause(s) Impact(s) Evidence Remedy 
Content Aspect Ratio 
(black ‘boxes’ 
around video) 
Inadequate attention paid 
during video encoding to 
maximise screen real-
estate. Issues in some 
videos comes from the 
method used to record 
screen 
Even when videos are 
‘maximised’; they do not 






May not be possible if the original 
video uses 4:3 aspect ratio. 
 
Must be considered for an in 
house content developed and be 
incorporated into content curation 
checklist 
Black background 
and coloured text 
on videos – 
difficult to see 
clearly 
Inadequate consideration 
of accessibility (not 
proactively designing for 
users’ visual impairments) 
Inadequate curation of 
content for use in RCS 
conditions 
Videos are almost unusable in 
high natural light conditions in 
RCSs and users with visual 
impairments suffer most. 
Images 
 
Check all content for accessibility 




speech of video 
narrator difficult 
Videos designed for other 
contexts (native/proficient 
English speakers) not 
designed to consider the 
SA context/curriculum 
Videos can be difficult to 
follow and require significant 







Policy on content curation 
(external content providers) and 
make checklist based upon user 
comprehension metrics 
 
Utilise SA developed content by 
partnering with Mindset, SABC 
education, etc. 
Videos not made 
by school teachers 
or for school 
classrooms 
Videos curated through 
YouTube may have been 
considered superficially 
and not based on evidence 
Videos lack the explanations 
required to deliver core 
concepts to an adequate level 




Policy on content curation 
(external content providers) and 
ensuring content is vetted by 
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of appropriacy and ease of 
classroom integration 
teacher. I.e. ( not every 
component of the CAPS 
documents are covered) 




Content curated doesn’t 
always cover all modules 
of all courses. Content 
curators for visual arts 
only made content for 2 
out of 4 optional modules. 
Agriculture content not 
available but teacher 
wanting to use technology 
Visual Arts teachers unable to 
use the resources for the 
modules they opted to teach. 
 
Teachers wanting to use tech 
can’t because their classes 
aren’t catered for 
conversations Selecting content to be 
developed/curated in partnership 
with existing users to ensure 
resources (time, finances, HR) are 
mobilised to foster high 
utilisation. 
      





Issue in the design of the 
app meaning users are not 
able to manually drag the 
time locator to a specific 
point to replay a section of 
the video. 
 
The go back button 
sometimes restarts the 
video (from the beginning) 
or moves it by a mater of 
seconds 
Videos where there are content 
comprehension issues are 
difficult to use. 
 
Seriously impacts user 
experience as these features 







Requires redesign of the 
multimedia player within the app. 
However, there may be difficulties 
in pushing this update given the 
high cost of mobile data. 
Full screen mode 
on iOS app 
doesn’t work 
effectively 
Issue in the design/testing 
of the app prior to full 
release. 
 
This exacerbates the aspect 
ration issue greatly as videos 








However, there may be difficulties 
in pushing this update given the 
high cost of mobile data. 
Limited App OS 
Compatibility 
App was designed to 
operate on newer 
operation systems only 
e.g. Windows 8+. 
 




Users using Nth hand devices 
struggle to use EDTech due to 
OS incompatibility. 
 
EDTech user market is 
restricted to less resource 
constrained individuals – mass 






Consider alternative App 
distribution methods over and 
above App stores. E.g. distributing 
App .exe file through the Hub, 






App designed on 
assumption that ‘a 
Smartphone’ is 
‘categorical’ i.e. doesn’t 
link the rise of smartphone 
penetration with the 





smartphones will be 





Unusable in these cases. Can 




devices typically have limited 
backing storage and cannot 
store many videos. Users of 
devices with 8Gb built-in 
storage typically populate this 
with music, personal 








Could require serious redesign of 
system architecture prioritising 





These users don’t have 
finances to buy removable 




Ineffective (if any) 
usability testing during 
SDC. When logging in 
through the app, the in-app 
browser is used for this 
task loading EDTech 
Enterprise. Users must 
manually leave the IAB to 
use streamlined testing 
facility. By default users 
are taken out of the native 
app and presented with the 
enterprise version. 
This poses a potentially 
significant draw of PPB 
internet subscriptions and 
renders the streamlined testing 
facility potentially unused. 
 
Many users may not realise 
this and inadvertently use more 
data than is necessary. 
 
In RCSs this reduces the 
number of learners able to do 
online testing rendering class 
analytics feature worthless. 
Observation Requires redesign of some app 
elements to: 
1. Add streamlined login 
process 
2. Automatically return user 
to the native app (not 
IAB) after login through 
enterprise version 
 
Alternatively, reconsidering the 
assumed importance of class 
analytics to teachers could allow 
assessments to be delivered 
offline. 
This will impact the data 
transmitted to EDTech on 
utilisation but potentially improve 
UX 
App installs and 
runs one day and 
doesn’t work the 
next day 
This points to issues with 
the Windows store for app 
distribution and the 
requirement for users to 
have their own Microsoft 
accounts to download 
applications/programs 
Support staff can’t use their 
own accounts to install the app 
on users devices as the 
Microsoft store and user 
profile are linked in strange 
ways, not suited to RCCs that 










Consider alternative distribution 
methods of the Windows App, 
perhaps providing the .exe file 
directly from the hub as opposed 




      




and in-app guidance. 
 
 
Users may give up quickly if 
early user experience issues 
are negative; complicated to 
remedy; and require ICT soft 
skills/trouble shooting e.g. 









Potentially re-design of the 
hub/app to ensure seamless initial 
use. 
 
Redesign error messages within 
the app to provide more 
information about an error. 
 
Develop a usable user manual 
which assumes no technical 
knowledge. 




No files appear on 
first use 
Internet access appears 
necessary to do initial set-
up/connection between 
App and Hub. 
Users may not be able to use 
the app without mobile data or 






Develop a truly offline feature that 
removes any need to download 
‘class files’ ensuring that this data 
is downloadable from the Hub 
Mobile 
data/internet 
required to move 
between G7-9 and 
G10-12 resources 
This method is used to 
reduce the demands on 
end-user device’s 
processor. However, for 
teachers teaching multiple 
grades or learners who 
share devices (e.g. 
siblings) it creates a 
requirement for mobile 
data (even if it’s little 
amounts) 
Users may not be able to use 
the app without mobile data or 
WiFi even when there is a hub 
available. 
 











This is more fundamental to the 
system architecture of EDTech 
and may require an overhaul of the 
platform to re-think the technical 
aspects of how content is served 




      
Maintenance 
Process  





‘soft fixes’ not 
app fixes and 
couldn’t be 
adapted for RCS 
environments 
Development costs are 
high meaning highly 
iterative design process is 
not possible. As 
development time was 
donated, this project may 
have been viewed more as 
a CSI/R obligation as 
opposed to ‘normal client’ 
Issues identified within the 




corrective maintenance isn’t 
possible due to cost 
implications of development 
and allocation of resources to 






More systemic to the organisation 
– CEO was critical of other 
players in Education technology 
field viewing CSI/R obligations as 
a tick-box exercise. However, the 
approach by EDTech developers 
appears to mimic this. 
 
One approach to remedy this has 
more to do with organisational 
perspective viewing users as co-




Appendix C – Comparisons Across Field Sites 
 Field Sites 
Comparison 
Factor 





-some teachers use 
regularly 
 
Restricted by several 
factors 
 
Teachers Find their 
own resources and keep 
them personally 
High utilisation (relative 
to other RCSs) 
-restricted to certain 
grades and subjects 
 
Interactive use of 
technology (RBT1 using 
MS Word to create 
shapes to ) 
Use spread more 





-much of this is done 
‘on the fly’ 
 
tablets often 
distributed but not used 
(sometimes 
distracting) 
Use of EDTech Limited use of EDTech 
-RAT1 doesn’t think 
it’s a great programme 
--issues with content 
cited 
-RAT1 is the most 





-Some use of online 
assessment feature 
Almost no use of 
EDTech 
-Content availability is 
a main challenge 
-EDTech Hub doesn’t 
allow easy access to 
content (technical 
structure of files issue) 
Management of 
Technology 
Technology is mobile 






Individual teachers take 
their own initiative to 
use tech in class 
Technology is static 
-learners are mobile in 
15/15 groups 
 
Clearly defined norms of 




Allow those who really 
want to use it, use it 
Technology is static 
-learners are mobile 
(whole class) 
 
Use of ICT centre is 
open to all (monitored 
by register) 
-semi-formal norm and 
ambiguous sanction 
 
More direct approach 




through teachers (and 
learners as a proxy) 
 
No systematic tech 
support or training 
Dedicated technical set-
up support (externally 
funded) 
 
High levels of 
international social 
capital networks for 
assistance 
Internally appointed 
ICT centre manager 
-Not highly skilled 
-mostly responsible for 
administering registers 
-not one of the most 
frequent users 
-dual function teacher 











demands on bandwidth 
and data) 
Reliable Internet (2 
VSAT networks with 




Limited use of EDTech 
 
Mostly BYOD 
-issues in this 
 
Projector and screen 
(smart board without 





Most use of EDTech 














All delivered within 
classrooms 
Delivered in dedicated 
ICT centre (15/15 
groups) 
Dedicated ICT centre 





Lack of ICT centre is an 











ICT centre big enough 
for whole class 
 




Assistance in ‘moving 
to the next level’ 
-training and support 
-peer education and 
watching other 
teachers use tech well 
in class 
 
Access to OOTB 
resources seems 
important in RCS-C 
-reduce wasted time in-
class 
-reduce need to vet all 














Appendix D – CATWOE and Root Definition 
 
CATWOE Analysis – EDTech Pty. Ltd. 
 
NOTE: This analysis is based upon the perspective of EDTech/IMA as an organisation to more 
succinctly represent the general understanding of their product, market, competition, stakeholders, 
and organisational objectives. 
 
CATWOE is a useful tool for exploring problems from one perspective. In this case CATWOE is 
used to explore the perspective of EDTech/IMA leading up to and during the trial in 11 schools in 
Mpumalanga. The views expressed here are not necessarily shared by the researcher, nor objective 
facts. It is important to note that there is subjectivity in the perspective of EDTech/IMA presented 
below which this tool seeks to make explicit. 
 
For fuller details on the background of this tool and the family of tools within Soft-Systems 
Methodology, see work by Peter Checkland including: 
 
Checkland, P. B. (1989). Soft systems methodology. Human systems management, 8(4), 273-289. 
Checkland, P. (2000). Soft systems methodology: a thirty year retrospective. Systems research and 
behavioral science, 17(S1), S11-S58. 
 
 




• Lower than average academic attainment – significantly lower than fee-paying schools 
• Lack of access to diverse resources (currently only teachers and usually textbooks) 
• School circuit and district managers need more data to allow them to prioritise visits 
to schools most in need of support 
• Teachers need to manage their time better 
• Teachers need more accountability to ensure they do their job 
Expected Reaction to proposed solution 
 
• Young people love technology, so they’ll love a digital solution 




• Learners (better education) 
• Teachers (time/effort saving) 
• Dept. of Education (improved results) 
• ‘The economy’ (more skilled 
workforce) 





Actors – People Making EDTech Happen 
 
Technology Designers and Developers 
 
Teachers 
• Responsible for the process of turning 
ideas, needs, and project specifications 
into end deliverables such as the Apps 
and Websites 
• Responsible for implementing the 
solution within classrooms 
• Adapting their routines to utilise the 
wealth of new resources 
How might they react to the project 
 
Technology Designers and Developers 
 
Teachers 
• Development time is donated – results 
in an increase in non-chargeable hours 
• This results in a need for fast pace 
towards development and handover 
• There is little scope for ongoing 
maintenance and adaption  
• Teachers are already over worked 
• The time, effort, and resources to 
gain digital literacies may 
overwhelm/demoralise teachers 
• This may result in minimum 
acceptable use (or non-use) 
 
 
Transformation – Inputs & Outputs (and what’s in between) 
 
What happens to achieve success? 
 
The systematic enactment of Technology Mediated Learning (TML) in schools to improve 
delivery and comprehension of Learning Outcomes as proxy measures of good education. 
Inputs 
 
• Underperforming schools 
• Under-resourced and under-performing teachers 
• Learners with variable Socio-economic circumstances 
• Technology (laptops/tablets, internet, EDTech) 
Outputs 
 
• Learners with skills for the economy 
Steps in Between 
 
• Giving out EDTech Digital Libraries in resource constrained 
settings 
• Letting learners learn for themselves and teachers facilitating 




There was limited consideration for the practicality of this deterministic 
process. 
 
This includes a lack of: 
• reasonable planning for training provision to teachers 
• varying access to technology within schools 
• support for implementing digital pedagogies 
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• engaging with schools showing little/no utilisation 
• no measurement/evaluation metrics of social value creation – it 
is assumed that EDTech WILL improve education, little 
thought given to how, when, or what will improve 
 
Worldview – How Does EDTech/IMA View the Broader 
Context? 
 
South Africa is a challenging country with many serious problems including violent crime, 
relatively poor education systems, poverty, lack of motivation to achieve. 20 years into 




• ‘Failing education system’ 
• ‘Incompetent government’ 
• ‘Apathetic learners’ 
Real Problem 
(these are framed as 
a set of accusations – 
not apolitical 
problems) 
• Teachers can’t teach the subjects due to subject knowledge 
• Learners don’t care about themselves, their families, or their 
future 
• Parents don’t do enough to support their children 




• Long-term socio-economic growth (when learners grow older) 
• Lower poverty due to individual economic activity (when 
learners grow older) 




The worldview of EDTech is limiting due to its broad negative 
perspective and developing a product with little thought to seek 
alternative conceptualities of what is going on. 
 
For instance, the lack of appreciation for implications of historical 
processes on the current education system play a role in shaping some 
inequalities. Additionally, there is no thought given to the structural 
issues of the South African Education institutions such as the fee-based 
system. 
 
The worldview of EDTech/IMA tended to focus on who is to blame 
rather than constructive discussions of the issues. 
 
Owner – Who Ultimate Responsibility and Authority Rests With 
 
Departments of Education (national, provincial, district) 
 








• Cooperate with training 
implementation and scaling the 
innovation 
• Recognition of mutual benefit 
(improved education outcomes; 
achieving national objectives) 
 
• When success starts happening, 
scaling it up can be needed 
How can they block? 
 
Why would they block? 
• Exit the agreement/end partnership to 
develop EDTech  
 
• Assign similar projects to competing 
companies 
• Based upon limited effectiveness 
• Contractual agreement not upheld 
 
• No value for money delivered 
• Encouraging different ways to 
innovate with the same problem 
 
Environment – The Operational Context of EDTech  
 
Broad challenges within the environment of no-fee schools operating in non-urban areas 
 
Some schools lack adequate teaching spaces, some have fewer classrooms than are needed, some 
have no electricity or water and many struggle with internet connections. EDTech believe these 






Schools cannot be privatised which limits the impact of market forces 
in education (a solution E-CEO believes in). 
 
Pedagogy can’t be instantly revolutionised or easily achieved in the 
short-medium term 
** EDTech blamed the lack of training on the MDoE. However, this 
was a valuable opportunity for EDTech to observe the individual and 
institutional requirements of implementation beyond a technical view 
of problems. This would have provided a dual function 
training/support opportunity as well as user feedback on the design. 
Technological 
Resources 
Schools lack adequate internet access to meaningfully use EDTech 
(even though it should work without it) 
 




Learners have become disenfranchised and see no hope. Therefore, 




Teachers have become complacent and don’t see any need to be 
committed, motivated, or be leaders within the classroom. 
Distance between 
developers and users 
The geographical distance between trial schools and where EDTech 
was designed and developed limited the opportunity to travel every 
day to observe schools. 
Researcher’s thoughts EDTech underestimated the complexity of no-fee schools. The 
oversimplification of rurality and conflation of issues relating to 
rurality, poverty, black lived experiences, a prescriptive view of need 
and resource constrained schools reduced the scope for empathy 
building. 
 
The worldview of EDTech/IMA management (leading to their 
perception of the environment) seems to be a significant detractor 
from the potential for success. As the research shows, the lack of 
involvement of target groups throughout the technology design and 
development process concreted unchallenged assumptions into the 
technology. 
 
The deterministic perspectives of what technology alone can do also 






Improving Education Standards 
 
EDTech Perspective 
A system owned by the Mpumalanga Department of Education (MDoE) where teachers in no-fee 
schools teach using technology to improve education standards and future contributions of learners 
to the economy; because the education system in South Africa ‘is broken’. This is constrained by 
the lack of training available to teachers to use technology; a lack of technology in general; and a 
lack of motivation by teachers to improve their work. 
 
Apolitical re-definition (researcher perspective) 
A system owned by the Mpumalnga Department of Education where teachers in no-fee schools 
teach using technology to engage learners and explain complicated theory to improve the quality 
of education learners receive and their final grades because there is historic underinvestment in no-
fee schools/teacher training as well as teacher already finding themselves over worked. Achieving 
improved (digital) education in no-fee schools is constrained by stakeholders in digital education 
operating in relative isolation; the fact that digital literacies take time and motivation to acquire and 
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What are the most important costs inherent in our business model? 
Which Key Resources are most expensive? 
Which Key Activities are most expensive?
Through which Channels do our Customer Segments 
want to be reached? 
How are we reaching them now?
How are our Channels integrated? 
Which ones work best?
Which ones are most cost-efficient? 
How are we integrating them with customer routines?
For what value are our customers really willing to pay?
For what do they currently pay? 
How are they currently paying? 
How would they prefer to pay? 
How much does each Revenue Stream contribute to overall revenues?
 
For whom are we creating value?
Who are our most important customers?
What type of relationship does each of our Customer
Segments expect us to establish and maintain with them?
Which ones have we established? 
How are they integrated with the rest of our business model?
How costly are they?
What value do we deliver to the customer?
Which one of our customer’s problems are we helping to solve? 
What bundles of products and services are we offering to each Customer Segment?
Which customer needs are we satisfying?
What Key Activities do our Value Propositions require?
Our Distribution Channels?  
Customer Relationships?
Revenue streams?
Who are our Key Partners? 
Who are our key suppliers?
Which Key Resources are we acquiring from partners?
Which Key Activities do partners perform?
What Key Resources do our Value Propositions require?




This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License. 
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ 
or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
VALUE:
Learners need to be able to study and learn
independently as the school system in South
Africa is failing. Learners can use their phones
to educate themselves.
Teachers need assistance to effectively deliver
education which is suited to the 21st century,
knowledge economy which students will enter
the job market for.
Offline:
Curriculum aligned, digital resources
Online:
Weekly learner assessments
Class analytics to show cohort performance
Targetted revision suggestions
Problems (projected/assumed):
Teachers don't have access to resources
Teachers struggle to keep curriculum pace
Teachers don't prioritise learning effectively
Teachers don't know their subjects enough
Teachers require help to explain LOs
Students don't have enough revision resources






Aimed at being self-service, OOTB, intuative
Initial training is only formal point of contact
Communication with MDoE (and other partners)
is limited
Informal support provided through WhatsApp
-though not recorded or tracked
EDTech don't communicate with users
Email is ineffective
Facebook and Twitter show some engagement
App stores are difficult channels due to log-in
and Internet/mobile data requirements
EDTech Peter Nimmo
1
EDTech focus on recurring asset/product sales
-based upon 3-4 year digital library life span
-R3,000 net profit per digital library sold
Payed for by: Provincial Departments of Education
Other revenue streams come from CSI/CSR budgets of companies to develop
content
Training and support is very expensive on an ongoing basis
-Impact of scaling too quicly is the increased cost of rectifying issues
-currently required for every install (product not OOTB ready)
 but this isn't provided due to contractual disagreements
Platform Maintainance
-requires expensive software developers
Platform Development
-time consuming, expensive
-would force EDTech back to the design process to make the product more suited
 to resource constrained settings
Training and user support
-very limited (a couple of days of training)
No follow-up policy
-imagined all schools should be remote
monitored
Knowledge/skills as a resource
-Software Development skills and experience
 *only through donated development time
 *not in-house

















-e.g. IXL, Mindset, HomeschoolersSA





What are the most important costs inherent in our business model? 
Which Key Resources are most expensive? 
Which Key Activities are most expensive?
Through which Channels do our Customer Segments 
want to be reached? 
How are we reaching them now?
How are our Channels integrated? 
Which ones work best?
Which ones are most cost-efficient? 
How are we integrating them with customer routines?
For what value are our customers really willing to pay?
For what do they currently pay? 
How are they currently paying? 
How would they prefer to pay? 
How much does each Revenue Stream contribute to overall revenues?
 
For whom are we creating value?
Who are our most important customers?
What type of relationship does each of our Customer
Segments expect us to establish and maintain with them?
Which ones have we established? 
How are they integrated with the rest of our business model?
How costly are they?
What value do we deliver to the customer?
Which one of our customer’s problems are we helping to solve? 
What bundles of products and services are we offering to each Customer Segment?
Which customer needs are we satisfying?
What Key Activities do our Value Propositions require?
Our Distribution Channels?  
Customer Relationships?
Revenue streams?
Who are our Key Partners? 
Who are our key suppliers?
Which Key Resources are we acquiring from partners?
Which Key Activities do partners perform?
What Key Resources do our Value Propositions require?
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EDTech/IMA (EDTech continues as a project) Peter Nimmo 2
July 2018
Fully equipped lesson plans
which can be printed and
used digitally
Consistent video formats/
designs for key theories
   -These must be designed
    cooperatively with users
   -must be made in SA
   -should consider different
    video for lg/sm screens
Powerpoint slides prioritised
over videos.
   -aim is to help teachers
    delivery lessons without
    having to write everything
Must consider the existing
teacher reources and actively
link to them (e.g. NECT)
Assessments offline
   -allow learners to download
test data from Hub
Teachers in no-fee government
schools
   -teachers are central to the
    education system.
   -their buy in is paramount to
    success
   -(the aim is to become mass market
     eventually - not within 2 years)
Learners not a major priority
   -learners will use when teachers
    buy in (if appropriate for low-end devices)
 
Relationships with DoEs are important!!
   -they will assess success and future
    opportunities to invest in a platform
    showing results (results first)
   -In all agreements, ensure there is
    sufficient financial planning for rolling
    training, assessment, tech dev.
Building relationships with existing
Education tech players whose core
competencies are content.
   -build joint ventures, share risk, costs,
    rewards
   -utilise their resources in content along with
    EDTech technology
   -content is not EDTech's strong point
Teachers Unions
   -Having buy in from local branches of unions
    may help to encourage inclusion of target
    groups within existing professional teacher
    networks
   -Unions deal with professional concerns of
    the professional body (main customer
    segments)
Discussing with mobile network operators how
to facilitate low data costs for e-learning
Whatsapp is a vital
channel for communication
   -Think about building chat-
    bots which serve content
 
Facebook and social media are successful,
but highbandwidth content is not served free
include a 4g sim-card with data (APN to
transmit utilisation data and provide remote
support cost effectively)
I think a software as a service (SAAS) model is most appropriate
   -gives EDTech clear and instant feedback on non-use via cancelled subs
   -provides steady streams of income and forces EDTech to continually think
    about development of the platform.
Bundled data services - take the responsibility of internet access from MDoE
     -APN would allow EDTech to buy data monthly in one account spread accross X
      schools
     -This overcomes potnential for lack of internet to be a direct cause of non-use
How can the EDTech programme be developed over time into an Adult Basic Education/
Training (ABET) tool which could be licenced to education providers and corporates
     -This was successful in the current EDTech trial with Woolworths staff CPD courses
Teachers require more assistance
- sharing best practic in other schools
Facebook and whatsapp groups
 share experiences, tips, user feedback,
show EDTech listens and responds.
   -requires EDTech is proactive in
managing these spaces.
Events outside of the school are important.
-selecting techers based on utilisation would
 help engage the early adopters.
Constantly developing content and being
strategic with what subjects and grades are
developed.
   -This requires a lean approach where only
    content which will be most used is created
Allow time and resources for on-going app dev./
maintainance ensuring that the UX is always
heading towards optimal.
goals, measures, and processes for dev.
CONTENT - it's an expensive paperweight
without it
USABLE APP (HTML based interface on Hub?)
HR FOR SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT
- organic self-management of these spaces may
result in these becoming wasted relationship
opportunities
getting an APN to centrally manage and allocate
mobile data
APP/HUB DEVELOPMENT
-may have to recruit a developer who can write code for many platforms
    -more realistically a small team
-This is essetial for iterative development. building, rolling out, testing.
CONTENT - this requires teachers with diverse skills and experience
-These teachers will be at the tip of the teacher development pyramid
   -This learning content creation process requires agility based upon user feedback
-strategic partnering with an organisation known for quality learning resources
    -Ease cost burden on EDTech alone. focus on tech development.
MOBILE DATA
- If a bundling approach is opted for then, this allows for EDTech to push updates to
devices. Assuming they are left on.



































• Policy	and	resource	changes	impact	a	 teachers’	professional	self -conf idence	
and	self -eff icacy	and	subsequent	use	of 	resources











• M-learning	isn’t	 as	valuable	as	 it	is	often	imagined	 to	be
• Screen	 size	plays	 a	major	role	in	what	functions	are	possible/f it	for	purpose	
through	M-learning	platforms
• In	using	‘low-cost	:	low-performance’	or	‘Nth hand	:	diminished	performance’	
devices	 are	 often	not	able	to	handle	multiple	apps/mass	storage	of 	content
• ‘Lower	than	 ideal’	performance	 devices 	often	 have	limited	 internal	 s torage	and	lack	
funds 	to	 buy	SD	 cards
• Not	all	Apps 	allow	you	 to	select	a	download	 location	(e.g.	 memory	 card)
• ‘Less 	than	ideal’	performance	 phones 	can	s truggle	 to	handle	 the	process ing	speed	




• Developing	 teachers’	 domain	specif ic	knowledge
• Teachers’	 revision	prior	to	teaching	a	new/blurry	topic/learning	outcome
• In	class	 content	delivery	to	learners	in	conjunction	with	teacher
• To	add	clarity	to	 a	teacher’s 	definition
• To	add	visual	communication	 (efficiency	in	LO	delivery)






















• Set-up	 prior	 to	 lesson
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